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This thesis examines the complex relationship between social capital and the welfare state. 
Focusing on the measurement of both social capital and the welfare state, it highlights the 
importance of accounting for dimensionality in explaining the role of the welfare state in 
effecting social capital outcomes. It draws attention to how conflicting evidence for the welfare 
states influence on social capital relates to theoretical and methodological choices. Building on 
existing theory and evidence, it provides a workable framework for social capital that is 
theoretical and empirically substantiated.  
The framing of the debate for the welfare state's role in effecting social capital outcomes is 
primarily within the context of the 'crowding-out' debate, which reflects the broader 
ideological narratives of the relationship between the individual, market and state. Here I draw 
attention to two limiting assumptions; i) that the welfare state 'crowds-in' or 'crowds-out' ii) 
that it affects everyone equally. These two issues form the basis for the first two research 
questions, where we aim to understand in what circumstances 'crowding-out' occurs and 
whether this varies according to socioeconomic factors. In the final analytical, I consider how 
the established dimensions of social capital relate to one another, highlighting the central role 
of trust in social capital formation and implications for welfare state policy. 
The analyses combine European Quality of Life Survey data and contextual information using 
a range of quantitative methods, including multilevel modelling, structural equation modelling 
and path analysis. The findings show that generous and universal welfare provision is important 
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1 Introduction  
As the impact of structural reforms and the ongoing program of austerity unfolds across 
Europe, the consequences for both the individual and society remain prescient. The 
importance of the welfare state in protecting its citizens from market failure continues to be 
brought into question (Farnsworth 2016). Within this context, social capital represents a vital 
resource that acts as an intermediary between the individual, state and the market. Its 
popularisation is embedded within the concerns of modernisation on society (Tönnies 1887; 
Durkheim 1893), alongside the politics of neoliberalism and rational choice theory (Fine 2010; 
Ferragina 2017), and the transfer of responsibility for provision to the individual (Gilbert 2005). 
As such, the nature of the role played by the welfare state in shaping our social environment 
and ability to participate within society demands critical reflection 
Here in the UK, the current liberalisation processes present the need for deficit reduction 
whilst simultaneously promoting the positive outcomes of self-help, governance and provision 
laid out in the ideas of the big society (Cabinet Office 2010). The positive portrayal of shifting 
the responsibility to the individual and third sector for service provision is one of enhancement 
for both individual autonomy and civil society. In this context, social capital is an essential 
resource that enhances both economic and social development. Where individuals free from 
the confines of the state can innovate and mobilise their social resources to positive ends. 
Despite the significant amount of research dedicated to the field, the nature of the relationship 
between the welfare state and social capital remains highly contested, both at the theoretical 
and empirical levels (Ferragina 2017). For some, the comprehensive welfare state impedes 
social capital development, crowding-out the networks of civic participation and creating 
distrust (Wolfe 1989; Etzioni 1995; Fukuyama 2000; Scheepers et al., 2002). For others, it is a 
significant determinant of social capital, which promotes solidarity, trust and wider 
participation (Kunemund and Rein 1999; Rothstein 2001; van Oorschot and Arts 2005; van 
Oorschot and Finsveen 2010).     
The thesis presented here primarily concerns itself with disentangling this contradictory 
relationship of the welfare state and social capital. It does this by explicitly drawing attention 
to the limitations inherent within the crowding-out vs crowding-in debate, offering an 
alternative of social capital calibration. It does this by following a fully dimensional account of 
social capital, focussing on the measurement of both the dependent and independent 
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variables. Here I draw to the reader’s attention the central importance of how varied 
measurement of social capital and the welfare state sustains contested outcomes. By 
addressing theoretical, analytical and empirical concerns, the thesis aims to provide clarity and 
rigour to the social capital welfare state discussion.   
1.1  Structure of the thesis      
The first chapter begins by introducing the literature and situates the research questions within 
the field of study. Here I present the existing theoretical positions on social capital that 
distinguishes between the individual-level and society-centred approaches to understanding 
social capital. The informed model proposed is most in line with the notion of access to 
individual resources yet establishes a bridge to the collective social environment via trust. This 
distinction is an important one. Acknowledging dimensionality is essential to understanding 
the multifaceted nature of social capital. Specifically, as we will find throughout the existing 
literature, the multitude of uses and applications of social capital's elements are critical factors 
in an unclear comprehension of outcomes. Only by separating the structural and relational 
elements, along with types of individual and collective resources, can we provide the necessary 
distinctions to address the crowding-out debate. In doing so, the hope is to clarify the nature 
of the welfare state on social capital outcomes. 
At the same time, we can only achieve clarity concerning crowding-out through an adequate 
representation of the welfare state, which has thus far been insufficient. Here I address the 
existing limitations of expenditure and regime approaches, emphasising the importance of 
generosity in understanding the social capital, welfare state relationship. Alongside generosity, 
I also account for the welfare state through its level of universalism. Together, the dimensional 
account of social capital and the welfare state allows a comprehensive assessment of whether 
the welfare state matters for social capital outcomes.  
In the second part of the literature review, I address a second substantive issue with the 
crowding-out debate - the assumption that everyone has equal access to resources. It is 
perhaps somewhat of an omission that the crowding-out debate has largely ignored the 
potential for welfare states to vary in social capital outcomes between groups (see van 
Oorschot and Finsveen 2009). Even if we endorse the society-centred approach, rather than 
the inequality of resources at the individual-level (perhaps more easily delineated from 
Bourdieu’s theory of access to resources), there are still significant discrepancies in the ideas 
18 
 
of civic participation that presupposes the requisite tools to participate - one that ignores any 
potential structural inequalities. Such as class, education and employment that may act as a 
barrier to participation.    
Part of this inadequacy derives from the lack of attention towards the equalising tendencies of 
the welfare state that the mainstream approach overlooked- opting instead for the appealing 
Tocquevillian prescription promoted by Putnam. The idea of variation in outcomes because of 
social structures was pivotal to Coleman's conceptualisation of social capital, which makes the 
admittance more surprising, considering his recognition within the field and rational choice 
applications. In acknowledging the social structure, the patterns of structural inequality are 
themselves a key area for exploration.  
Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of social capital, we identify the role that existing economic and 
cultural inequalities play in the development of social capital. Specifically, how existing capital 
translates into social capital in a mutually reinforcing process. Here we acknowledge the 
welfare state's role in reducing structural inequalities and social capital inequalities. This forms 
the basis for our second research question that asks whether the welfare state does reduce 
social capital inequalities.      
If we are to understand the role of the welfare state in affecting individual outcomes of social 
capital, it is vital that what we are measuring is both theoretically and empirically 
substantiated. This critical assessment has been surprisingly lacking in a large number of 
applications. The central importance of measurement to social capital exploration has 
demanded a dedicated chapter to the dependent variable. Here I provide the necessary 
theoretical and empirical work to support coherent and valid operationalisation of social 
capital for analysis. Chapter 4 focuses on establishing clearly defined measures that are both 
reliable and theoretically driven. Here, the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) application within 
the structural equation modelling (SEM) framework enables the reliable construction of latent 
variables. Considering social capital is a latent variable construct, the fact that it has been 
inadequately addressed is somewhat of an omission within the literature. (Since writing, 
Ferragina (2017) has applied this method to address the social capital welfare state 
relationship; finding a mostly positive association of welfare state generosity and social capital 
will observing a negative association of welfare state size.). 
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The second analytical chapter (chapter 5) is primarily concerned with assessing the importance 
of welfare state generosity and universalism for an individual's social capital. This takes place 
within the context of the crowding-out debate, where I propose the distinction of calibration. 
In doing so, the aim is to move beyond simple dichotomies and provide a more considered 
understanding of the impact of the welfare state on social capital. Realising this aim requires a 
more comprehensive and robust measurement of both the dimensions of social capital and 
the welfare state itself. Measurement is, therefore, central to the contribution of this chapter 
and provides clarity to the crowding-out debate.  
By fully recognising the complexity of measuring social capital and its dimensionality, I 
acknowledge the likely causal mechanisms of the welfare state that can simultaneously 
promote both positive and negative social capital outcomes. Attention to the conditions and 
circumstances is extended in the third analytical chapter, where the focus is on who has access 
to social capital and under what conditions this varies.  
Drawing on the resources perspective, chapter 6 aims to understand how conflict over 
resources and existing inequalities may translate into further social capital inequalities and the 
likely mechanisms by which the welfare state may alter this relationship. In utilising a multilevel 
modelling framework, random slopes allow us to explore the between-group cross-national 
variation. Here we address each social capital dimension according to the socioeconomic 
factors of income, education, benefit recipients and the unemployed. In doing so, we provide 
insight into the role the welfare state generosity and universalism has on reducing social capital 
inequalities. 
In the final analytical chapter (chapter 7), I aim to bring together the existing analysis towards 
a more reflected understanding of the relationship between the dimensions of social capital. 
Here, I explicitly acknowledge how the determinants of social trust locate within the society-
centred and institutionalist approaches to social capital. The purpose of this is to build on the 
established idea of dimensionality while informing the likelihood of the necessary conditions 
for social capital development. Remaining within the SEM framework, I apply path analysis to 
test a theoretical model and explore the causal relationships between each of the social capital 
dimensions.  
Together what these analytical chapters present is an attempt to understand the relationship 
between the systems of welfare provision at the macro-level and access to social capital at the 
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micro-level. Importantly, it does this from a position of considered measurement with 
construct validity at the centre of its analysis. Having formed a coherent theoretical and 
analytical approach, we can then expand on what this means for the individual in a time of 
austerity and the broader implications for social policy.   
Chapter 8 revisits the literature, research question and hypotheses, within the context of the 
research aims. It provides a discussion on the key insights from the literature and the thesis 
contributions. Building on the findings of the previous empirical chapters, the final chapter 
considers directions for social policy and the welfare state that may be most conducive to the 
social capital environment. Appropriate consideration is also given to the study's limitations, 
highlighting potential areas of improvement before offering some thoughts on possible future 





2 Literature Review  
The contribution of this thesis to the debate about social capital and the welfare state is to 
stress the importance and complexity of measurement and highlight the role of social capital 
inequality in outcomes. This debate has played out under the auspices of the 'crowding-out 
hypothesis', forming two opposing views within the literature. The communitarian position 
portrays the comprehensive welfare state as an impediment to social capital development, 
‘crowding-out’ the networks of civic participation and trust (Nisbet 1962; Wolfe 1989; Etzioni 
1995). For institutionalists, the comprehensive welfare state is a major determinant of social 
capital, ‘crowding-in’ through solidarity, trust and broader participation (Skocpol 1996; 
Rothstein 2001; van Oorschot and Arts 2005).  
Part of this is political, often ideological, where the state is perceived either in direct 
competition with individual rights or enhancing an individual's autonomy (Kääriäinen and 
Lehtonen 2006). Part of this dispute relates to the conception and measurement of both social 
capital and the welfare state. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of social capital, 
whether it is an individual or collective property or what characterises adequate measurement 
and operationalisation. Equally, the debate over defining and measuring the welfare state to 
capture its generosity remains a 'dependent variable problem' (Clasen and Siegel 2007).   
It is somewhat surprising that so much research proliferated without a critical basis for 
measurement. Such was the desire to unlock the potential of social capital; the political project 
[of social capital] superseded the theoretical and analytical work required for critical 
establishment. Indeed, statistical offices and supranational organisations quickly adopted 
social capital into their workings and policies. Social capital was seen as a core component of 
understanding the ‘well-being of nations’ (OECD 2001) and ‘the missing link’ in development 
outcomes (World Bank 1998). It is not until 2013 that the OECD asks what social capital is, with 
the paper 'an agenda for measurement' (OECD 2013). It is important to recognise that the 
establishment of concepts can take time. However, the research and application of social 
capital to all aspects of the social structure without a coherent theoretical and methodological 
framework often created confusion over outcomes (Portes 1998). This uncertainty is 
particularly true of its relationship to the welfare state, where the focus on aspects of social 
capital has perpetuated claims of the crowding-out thesis.  
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This chapter forms two main two parts. The first part of the chapter visits the social capital 
theory, paving the way to identify and measure a multidimensional construct. Focussing on the 
relationship between social capital and the welfare state, we address the theory and empirical 
evidence within the context of the crowding-out debate. I highlight the central importance of 
measurement to understanding this relationship and the need to move beyond dualistic 
interpretations of the welfare state. The second part of the review brings structure back into 
the social capital debate, acknowledging the importance of resources in identifying social 
capital outcomes. Here the focus is on social capital inequality, specifically how the welfare 
state may affect the process of social capital accumulation.  
2.1 Social capital theory - Part one 
Social capital broadly encapsulates those resources available to an individual through networks 
of social relations, which has both individual and collective aspects.  By its very nature, social 
capital is a complex concept. Something that is intangible demands a certain amount of 
discussion and agreement on just what that something is. Perhaps the fuzziness of social capital 
is part of its attraction, one that allows multiple disciplines to engage with the concept while 
having the freedom to define it on their terms. As a result, there are a plethora of social capital 
definitions found within the literature (see Adler and Kwon 2002 for an overview; appendix A). 
These definitions vary depending on whether the focus is on the sources, the function, or the 
effects of social capital (Robison et al., 2002). In addition, they vary depending on whether the 
focus is on the relations maintained between individuals, the structure of ties within a 
collectivity, or both types of linkages (Adler and Kwon 2002). This diversity in the application 
relates to the three distinct schools of thought from which social capital was developed and is 
principally attributable. We discuss the theories of the three foremost exponents in turn before 
summarising their contribution.    
2.2 Bourdieu 
For Bourdieu (1986), social capital is a resource acquired through social networks. The volume 
of an individual's social capital is dependent on other forms of capital, or rather the ability to 
mobilise existing resources to generate social capital. Thus, the 'social' is placed within the 
context of other existing symbolic and material dimensions of valuable resources and powers 
(Bourdieu, 1979), stating that:   
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‘the volume of social capital an individual possesses depends on the size of the network of 
connections he can mobilise and the volume of capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) 
possessed in his own right’ (Bourdieu 1986:249).  
Bourdieu stresses that the primacy of economic capital is at the ‘root of all other types of 
capital’ (1986: 252) but maintains other forms are not simply reducible to the economic; 
rather, they are 'inextricably linked' (Bourdieu, 1979) through transformations and 
concealment. Social capital is neither reducible nor exists independently because of the related 
exchanges within the network of connections that also act as a multiplier with the other forms 
possessed. Thus, it is within the interrelations of networks and resources that we begin to 
understand social capital as an entity.  
The logic of functioning capital can be understood from the conversions of one type to another 
(Bourdieu 1986: 252). Transforming economic capital into social capital requires the specific 
endeavour of investing time and energy into social relations, which in terms of social 
exchanges, are a good investment that will provide returns later on (Bourdieu 1986). The 
maintenance and accrual of social capital require skills and knowledge to ensure a profitable 
outcome and create lasting connections. Likewise, the transformation of economic capital into 
cultural capital requires the expenditure of time. Indeed it is only through having the economic 
capital that provides the opportunity (available time) to generate cultural capital.  
This process of capital accumulation, where one form leads to an increase in another form, 
creates the potential for inequality in obtaining social capital, as it is inherently linked to an 
individuals' economic position. Indeed Bourdieu's position on social capital is based on an 
understanding of social hierarchy, where combined forms of capital led to the creation and 
reproduction of inequality. Social capital, in terms of social assets, is the product of 
accumulated labour where the profits gained from membership are made possible on the basis 
of solidarity (Bourdieu, 1986). Accumulation is not necessarily pursued consciously but is 
derived from the networks of connections, which themselves are not a given, but are the 
'product of endless effort at institution … that produce and reproduce lasting, useful 
relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits' (Bourdieu, 1986:249).   
The density and durability of relationship ties are central to Bourdieu's social capital, where: 
'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources are linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
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(Bourdieu, 1986:248). While group membership to the family or association is essential for the 
acquisition of social capital, it is the sum of resources accrued through social exchanges within 
networks that are significant (Bourdieu 1986).   
Bourdieu's strong emphasis on privilege as the basis for social capital offers little in the way of 
how those less fortunate individuals could accumulate and utilise such a resource. It does, 
however, provide us with a position from which we can explore social capital, namely, 
differentiating between the levels of available resources between individuals. After all, if there 
is an unequal distribution of social capital between individuals in society, then access to social 
capital is to some extent contingent upon social policies. 
2.3 Coleman  
James Coleman has been particularly influential in the study of education (Field, 2003) and 
developed his social capital theory in response to his findings on adolescent educational 
attainment. His longitudinal study of US high school sophomores showed a significant 
difference between the drop-out rates of Catholic and state schools, the former being 
considerably lower. This disparity between the levels of attainment, according to Coleman, was 
a result of the lack of social capital (Coleman, 1988). Coleman aimed to import the economists' 
principle of rational action into the analysis of social systems (Coleman, 1988:97), where 
rational choice theory interprets social interaction as a form of exchange. Social capital is 
defined as: 
  'A particular kind of resource available to an actor’, comprising a ‘variety of entities with two 
elements: they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain 
actions of actors’ (Coleman, 1988:98). 
For Coleman, social capital is both an individual and collective property; aspects of the social 
structure can be used to achieve individual interests and common goals. In practice, this could 
involve accessing information that would be unattainable or too costly to obtain without the 
social relationship, or by individuals coming together to improve neighbourhood conditions 
that alone would not be possible. Social capital provides a way of understanding how combined 
resources can produce different behaviours and outcomes (Coleman, 1988).  It is this 
interaction of the individual within the collective social structure, understood as a property of 
networks, that produces an outcome – social capital. 
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Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations, which depends 
on two elements; ‘the level of trustworthiness of the social environment [and] the actual 
extent of obligations held’ (Coleman, 1988:102).   
Contextually, if I were to help a friend or neighbour (and trusting that person), I would expect 
them to reciprocate the favour at a future date and that they would be obligated to do so. This 
interaction of expectations and obligations can be conceived as a credit slip. An individual can 
generate and hold many slips for a number of persons, which by direct analogy is financial 
capital. In social structures, outstanding credit slips can be held on both sides of a relation, 
creating a body of credit. Because these slips appear not entirely fungible, they do not cancel 
each other out, which, provided the trust is not eroded, maintains the body of social capital 
(Coleman 1998:102). As differences in the social structure shape both trust and obligations 
(Coleman 1988), it is possible to understand how welfare states can create situations 
favourably or indeed detrimental to the development of social capital. This acknowledgement 
of the social structure and how it influences social capital is a key contribution from Coleman. 
Particularly within the context of our aim to understand the welfare states' influence on 
individual and social circumstances.   
2.4 Putnam 
The most renowned proponent of social capital is Robert Putnam, who is mainly attributable 
to the popularisation and entry of the concept into mainstream political discourse (Baron et 
al., 2000). His macro-sociological approach places civic associations at the centre of social 
capital discourse. In the formative study 'Making Democracy Work', Putnam (1993) looked to 
explain the differences in effectiveness between the regional administrations of North and 
South Italy through the lens of social capital. According to Putnam, the cause of the North's 
superior performance compared to the ineffective south, where civic engagement is weak, 
resides in the 'associations of civil life'. Following Tocqueville's (1835) writings on American 
democracy, observing peoples' civic engagement, associational participation and interest in 
public affairs provided the framework for explaining these apparent disparities. 
Social capital thus became defined as those ‘features of social organisation, such as; trust, 
norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions’ (Putnam, 1993:167).   
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Putnam subsequently turned his attention to the perceived decline of American civil society, 
which he characterised as ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam, 1995; 2000). Here the emphasis is on the 
positive externalities of communities. Rather than individuals being the sole recipients of their 
network investment strategies, network interactions have spill-over effects. Putnam's example 
is how neighbours keeping an eye on one another's houses can reduce the local crime rate, 
which benefits all individuals regardless of whether every individual participates. Social capital 
is, thus, simultaneously a 'private good' and a 'public good' (Putnam 2000:17). From the 
networks of community, we find the norms of reciprocity to facilitate social capital - the idea 
that I do something for you with the expectation that you or someone else will do something 
for me in the future. It is this idea of generalised reciprocity that is deemed essential for 
efficient and productive societies. 
Following Coleman, Putnam employs the similar analogies of physical and human capital where 
tools and training enhance individual productivity; ‘social capital refers to the productive 
benefit of connections between individuals - social networks, the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them’ (Putnam, 2000:18-19).  
Putnam stresses the importance of the decline in social capital by relating it to a broad number 
of indicators, such as health, well-being, education, economic prosperity and democratic 
engagement. Putnam is clear of the positive correlations of social capital, which 'makes us 
smarter, healthier, safer, richer, and better able to govern a just and stable democracy' 
(Putnam, 2000:290). Indeed, such is his faith in associations; he explains that joining an 
association or group cuts your chances of dying in half. Naturally, such claims have attracted a 
great deal of attention from critics and optimists wishing to harness social capitals potential.  
Some are critical of Putnam's theory for conflating ends and means. As Portes (1998:19) points 
out, there is an apparent circularity in the argument, where social capital is simultaneously a 
cause, and an effect that leads to positive outcomes and its existence is inferred from the same 
outcomes. Cities that are productive and governed well do so because they have high levels of 
social capital, those that underperform are uncivic and have low social capital. Also, his focus 
on civic, political associations as ‘civic culture’ does not take account of other important social 
situations and settings that enable the development of social capital, such as universities and 
cyberspace (Misztal 2000:121). Like Coleman, Putnam has been criticised from a functionalist 
perspective failing to address power and inequality. The overemphasis on the role of the 
community downplays the state's role, which Leonard (2004:941) finds to be crucial in 
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facilitating or inhibiting the emergence of social capital. That said, his definition provided a 
straightforward way to identify aspects of social capital that could be readily measured and 
compared.  
2.5 Understanding social capital perspectives  
What these three perspectives have in common is an understanding of networks and 
relationships as a resource derived through group membership. For Bourdieu, social capital is 
an asset used by the elite alongside other forms of capital who mobilise resources to get ahead. 
Coleman too places emphasis on social relationships providing resources for individuals- social 
capital allows the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable (1990:302). 
Although there is the suggestion, it has resonance for the underprivileged. Both see it as a 
resource accessed by families and individuals (Field, 2003; Foley and Edwards, 1999). Putnam 
also acknowledges how social connections affect an individual’s life chances, potentially 
mitigating socio-economic disadvantage (2000:319). He maintains it has a function at the 
societal level- emphasising the norms of reciprocity and trust that sustain our cooperative 
behaviour. The generalised reciprocity and trustworthiness are also central to Coleman’s 
understanding of social capital’s emergence- derived from the relationships of exchange 
through mutual expectations. 
Bourdieu's position resides at the individual level, where the focus is on individual resources 
accrued from the group or network. While group membership in the family or association is 
essential for the acquisition of social capital, the sum of resources accrued from the social 
exchanges within the networks is significant (Bourdieu 1986). From this position, we can 
measure social capital by differentiating the level of available individual resources. Here 
resources are derived from the privileged position of access to the group or network, which is 
particularly relevant to understanding social capital variation and the broader context in which 
this happens. 
Coleman likewise approaches social capital from an individual level, focusing on the available 
resources to individuals. However, there is also a collective element to his understanding of 
the possible variations created by social structures. His contribution does bring to our attention 
the potential role of the state in shaping the social structures for social capital to develop and 
the opportunity for everyone to accrue social capital resources, which is central to our research 
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questions. The attention to network resources is somewhat overshadowed in mainstream 
operationalisation and macro [Putnam] approaches.   
For Putnam, civil society relates directly to the level of social capital reflected in civic 
associations. His measurement basis consisted of a single social capital index comprising of 14 
indicators under five dimensions, related to organisational life, engagement in public affairs, 
community volunteerism, informal sociability and social trust (Putnam 2000:291). Aside from 
the criticisms faced with Putnam's analysis and his inductive approach (see Portes 1998), 
perhaps the most prominent issue lies with the composition of multiple facets that lead to 
varying social capital outcomes. Individual and collective characteristics are often discussed 
interchangeably when, in fact, they measure separate aspects. This has led some scholars to 
specify the need for a distinction between the collective and individual forms. 
2.6 Bridging the individual and Collective Divide 
From the literature, we understand that social capital consists of the resources an actor can 
mobilise from their embeddedness in the network of social relations, which has both individual 
and collective properties. The relational nature of social capital (derived from group relations) 
is conceived independently from the sum of relations; (Meulemann 2008:8), where an actor 
invests and mobilises resources through direct or indirect personal relations (Esser 2008). At 
the individual level, relations come together in a common shared goal through networks and 
civic associations, which creates the system capital (Meulemann 2008). The collective system 
highlights the trust of a network. It is not something possessed by an individual actor per se 
but has benefits to the individual regardless of whether they have invested in the network 
(Esser 2008). Although both types of capital are interlinked due to the nature of social relations 
within a structure, the distinction helps us to realise the specific nature of social capital. 
Figure 2.1: Individual and collective social capital 
 
                     
     
 
 





Figure 2.1 represents the association between the individual and collective elements. Here 
social capital can be understood to comprise of resources derived from the networks of 
relations and the trust that resides within them. The important thing here is maintaining the 
idea of social capital as a resource. A criticism of the macro-sociological approach is that by 
defining it by its function, it becomes anything and everything (Portes 1998). Without 
maintaining the relevance to the individual, we are unable to assess the significance of the 
social structure to which social capital may vary. If social capital is an important concept, as 
professed, then what this means for the individual and how their access to the resource is 
affected is the fundamental question. It is here where I consider the welfare state an essential 
mechanism in influencing the outcome of individuals' social capital. 
2.7 Welfare State and Social Capital 
There are two clear opposing positions relating to the nature of the relationship between social 
capital and the welfare state. The society-centred approach views the universal welfare state 
as a hindrance to social capital accumulation. It is argued that welfare systems replace informal 
social caring relations, along with the systems of self-help and norms of reciprocity. In doing 
so, it crowds out the networks of civic engagement that are essential for social and economic 
well-being, hindering participation and creating distrust in institutions (Janowitz 1976; Etzioni 
1995; Fukuyama 2000; Putnam 2001). In response to the ‘crowding-out’ thesis, the 
institutionalist position argues that the comprehensiveness of welfare provision is a significant 
determinant of social capital (Van Oorschot and Finsveen 2010). Universalism creates a 
national context based on solidarity and support, promoting wider participation (Kunemund 
and Rein 1999; Rothstein 2001; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005) where the symbolic sense of 
community engenders feelings of belonging, trust and security (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 
2006).  
2.8 Crowding-out theory 
The discussion surrounding the relationship between the welfare state and social capital 
resides within the crowding-out debate. Within this context, the expected relationship 
between the state and civil society is one based on 'substitution and complementarity' 
(Dahlberg 2005). We begin by addressing the theory before reviewing the evidence within the 




Where the state is considered to be in competition with [freedoms of] the market, the 
assumption is that the welfare state will also have a detrimental effect on the function of civil 
society (Fukuyama 2000; Karlson 2004). Where there is a public provision of a service, there 
will be no need for a voluntary alternative. This notion of the welfare state crowding-out 
voluntary civil society centres on substitution theory. There is an implication of an inverse 
relationship between statutory and voluntary services, where one service increases, the other 
decreases, and vice versa (Dahlberg 2005:745). This idea of a zero-sum game suggests a finite 
number of resources for a finite number of tasks that one provider can only undertake; it is 
just a matter of who will do them (Finsveen and van Oorschot, 2007). With the portrayal of the 
generous welfare state as taking over civil society, 'crowding-out’ community and voluntary 
associations, there is a weakening in the moral networks of civil society (Lee 2000).  
2.8.2 Complementarity 
Complementarity theory suggests that tasks relating to the specific characteristics of the group 
or organisation make them the most appropriate to carry out specific functions (Dahlberg 
2005).  Statutory organisations are most suited to uniform tasks that benefit from the division 
of labour, as are tasks that require specialised skills delivered at specific times (Litwak 1985). 
Health care, education and formal care are obvious examples of such provisions. Voluntary 
organisations, on the other hand, have more altruistic motives and are limited in terms of 
available time. Volunteers cannot necessarily guarantee a continued service provision and 
require flexibility to fit in with personal time constraints (Litwak 1985). Rather than substituting 
one service with another, different actors provide different functions in a complementary 
manner. Therefore, comprehensive welfare states do not replace existing services but allow 
individuals to participate in other areas (Dahlberg 2005). 
Far from substituting civil society, the welfare state is an essential determinant in creating the 
environment for participation to take place (van Ingen and van der Meer 2011).  The universal 
system increases individuals' rights and possibilities to engage in civil society (Kääriäinen and 
Lehtonen 2006), actively encouraging participation in voluntary organisations (Pichler and 
Wallace 2007; Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000). In this situation, the relationship between the 
welfare state and civil society is one of expansion (Evers and Laville 2004; Rothstein 2001). 
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Rather than in opposition to the state, civic organisations are part of the broader democratic 
structure (Trägårdh 2007:31).  
2.9  Social capital and welfare state crowding-out empirical 
literature 
This section explores the empirical evidence from different studies that examine the 
relationship between social capital and the welfare state and its implication for the crowding-
out debate.  
Scheepers et al. (2002) find support for the crowding-out of social capital. Using the 
Eurobarometer 1992 survey (aged 60 and over), they observe the tendency for the socio-
democratic regimes to have lower levels of social capital compared to other regimes types. 
They only focus on one dimension of social capital, operationalising it through two measures- 
frequency of contact with family and friends. Following Lin's (1999) individual-level theory of 
social capital and achievement, Koster and Bruggeman (2008), from their empirical analyses of 
the ESS 2002/3, find evidence of a crowding-out effect. Welfare states (social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP) decrease the value of social capital in terms of status attainment 
(occupational prestige), as measured through informal networks (how often they socially meet 
with friends, relatives or colleagues). Gelissen et al. (2012), on the other hand, analysing data 
from the Eurobarometer 2004, find a positive relationship between welfare spending (social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP) and social capital (access to informal help from network 
members outside the family in eight situations). Stadelmann-Steffen (2011), using the 
European and World Values Surveys (1999-2001), find overall support for the crowding-out 
thesis, with social volunteering, reported being lower in countries with higher social 
expenditures (social expenditure as a percentage of GDP).  
Distinguishing between bonding, bridging and generalised trust, Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 
(2006), using the ISSP 2001, find mixed support for the crowding-out hypothesis. Socio-
democratic welfare regimes showed greater bridging social capital (participation in voluntary 
activities) and trust but the least bonding social capital (frequency of contact with family and 
friends). Likewise, van Oorschot and Arts (2005), using the EVS survey 1999/2000, find 
evidence of crowding-out in terms of social networks (contact with friends) and interpersonal 
trust. Individuals have lower levels of interpersonal trust in countries where the welfare state 
effort (social expenditure as a percentage of GDP) is higher and report less contact with friends 
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in Scandinavian welfare states. Where they do observe crowding-in with social spending is with 
peoples trust in institutions and membership in voluntary associations. In contrast, Gesthuizen 
et al. (2008) find no effect of social security (social expenditure as a percentage of GDP) on 
informal networks (frequency of contact and informal social support). However, they do 
observe the crowding-out of participation in voluntary associations (active participation in 
organisations). 
2.10 Crowding-in or crowding-out? 
As illustrated in this summary of the empirical literature, the contested nature of the social 
capital welfare state relationship is not easily solved. We observe conflicting evidence for 
crowding-in and crowding-out across the dimensions of social capital. As previously suggested, 
this may relate to the various operationalisation of both the independent and dependent 
variables. Simultaneously it is possible to observe the positive and negative effects of the 
welfare state as welfare regimes or social spending. This situation becomes more problematic 
with the selectivity of the dimension of social capital used for analysis.  
What we learn from this is that it may not be a simple case of crowding-in or out but rather a 
process of calibration in which in some domains the welfare state crowds-out, but in others, it 
crowds-in. As Kumlin and Rothstein (2005:342) suggest, 'welfare-state institutions have the 
capacity for both making and breaking social capital’. Given that there is a clear division both 
in terms of measurement and outcomes, the need to account for the multidimensionality and 
draw out the idea of calibration provides a crucial step in understanding the nuance of the 
relationship beyond the crowding-out dualism. If, on the one hand, informal networks are 
crowded-out, the same does not automatically apply to formal networks. There could be a 
crowding-in effect of participation and trust generated through generous and universal 
support. Here lies the problem with the crowding-out debate. Broad explanations of the 
impacts of welfare provision on civil society are discussed in narrow terms. In doing so, it 
obscures the variation that might be present not only between social capital dimensions but 
also between SEGs—as such, addressing measurement and dimensionality is centrally relevant 
to this debate. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of the empirical literature, the welfare state and social networks 
Study Social capital Construction Welfare state measure Relationship 
Scheepers et al. 
(2002) 
Frequency of contact with family 
Ordinal scale  
Welfare regimes Liberal regimes (+) Socio-democratic regimes (-) 
GDP spent on social security 
benefits or pension provisions 
Greater welfare effort (-) 
Frequency of contact friends Welfare regimes 
Conservative-corporatist not sig different from 
social-democratic, but the liberal regime has more 
van Oorschot and 
Arts (2005)  
Contact with friends 
Sum scale 
Welfare regimes & Social spending 
% GDP 
Lowest in Scandinavian welfare states (-) 
Importance of family Social spending % GDP Greater welfare effort (+) 
Number of voluntary 
organisations 
Social spending % GDP Greater welfare effort (+) 
Kääriäinen & 
Lehtonen (2006) 






Socio-democratic regime (-) compared to other 
regimes 
Gesthuizen et al. 
(2008) 
Contact with family and friends 
Counts 
Social spending % GDP No effect 
Number of voluntary 
organisations 
Social spending % GDP Greater welfare effort (-) 
Koster and 
Bruggeman (2008) 
Socially meet with friends, 
relatives or colleagues 
Likert scale Social spending % GDP Greater welfare effort (-) 
van der Meer et al. 
(2009) 
Contact with family, friends and 
extended family 
Sum score 
Social security and health care 
expenditure % GDP 
Greater welfare effort (-) on extended family only 
Stadelmann-Steffen 
(2011)  





Table 2.2: Summary of the empirical literature, welfare state and trust 
Study Social capital Construction Welfare state measure Relationship 
van Oorschot and 
Arts (2005)  
Interpersonal 
trust 
Sum scale  
Social spending % GDP Greater welfare effort (-) 
Welfare regimes Socio-democratic regime (+) compared to other regimes. 
Institutional 
trust 
Social spending % GDP Greater welfare effort (+) 





Sum score Welfare regimes Socio-democratic regime (+) compared to other regimes 





2.11 Measuring social capital  
Measurement and operationalisation are critical factors in understanding the relationship 
between social capital and the welfare state.  Within the literature, social capital is measured 
through different aspects in multiple ways (Table 2.3). When operationalisation is factored in, 
there is a greater potential for conflicting outcomes. Part of this relates to the limitations of 
the data sets themselves in providing the appropriate questions to address the multiple facets 
of social capital. A broader issue is the lack of critical reflection on the measurement of 
indicators themselves. Proxies such as frequency of contact are taken as a priory for social 
capital measurement, often without due consideration to its appropriateness. Scores and 
scales are created without always being clear on the construct validity of the indicators. When 
there is a statistical assessment, there is often a lack of sufficient detail provided to the reader. 
To illustrate this point, of those studies listed below, two acknowledge the validity of the scales 
employed, and two specifically employ factor analytical techniques to create distinct 
indicators. Therefore, greater critical reflection surrounding what the indicators measure and 
their construction is required. With this in mind, chapter four is dedicated to providing a critical 
assessment of the dependent variable. I address the issue of measurement in detail in chapter 
four.  
In summary, to have a clearer picture of crowding-out and understand the effect of the welfare 
state on social capital, we need to have a clear idea about the mechanisms for the causal 
relationship as well as a greater understanding of how this directly relates to the 
operationalisation of both social capital and the welfare state. The first analytical chapter deals 
explicitly with the measurement and construct validity of social capital, which goes some way 
to begin addressing these concerns. In the next section, I provide a conceptual framework for 
addressing the dimensionality of social capital, as well as identifying an alternative approach 






Table 2.3: The different accounts of social capital 
Dimensions Studies 
Informal networks Gelissen et al., 2012; Koster and Bruggeman 2008; Scheepers et al., 2002 
Formal and informal networks  Gesthuizen 2008 
formal networks and trust Adam 2008; Paxton 1999 
Social trust Rostila 2007; Larsen 2007 
Institutional and interpersonal trust  Kumlin and Rothstein 2005 
Social networks, trust, and social norms  Oorschot and Arts 2005; Oorschot and Finsveen 2009 
Formal and informal networks and trust  Oorschot et al., 2005 
Networks, trust and civism  Oorschot et al., 2006 
Informal and formal networks, informal social support and 
interpersonal trust 
Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006 
Formal networks, informal networks, generalised trust, norms 
and institutional trust 
Kaasa and Parts 2008; Ferragina 2017 
Informal network, formal networks and trust  Kroll 2010 
Interpersonal trust, Institutional trust, social activism and formal 
engagement  





2.12 The dimensionality of social capital  
To address the social capital welfare state relationship, we must explicitly account for its 
dimensionality. Social capital is a multidimensional phenomenon and must be conceptualised 
as such (Eastis 1998; Narayan and Cassidy 2001; Grootaert et al. 2003).  In order to import 
some clarity to the conceptualisation of social capital, some authors have specified the need 
to distinguish between the structural dimension of networks and the cognitive or relational 
dimension of trust (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Dasgupta 2000; Kaasa and Parts 2008). 
Acknowledging the multidimensional phenomenon of social capital (Eastis 1998; Narayan and 
Cassidy 2001; Grootaert et al., 2003) avoids the pitfalls of single composite indicators (e.g., 
Putnam 2000) and enables a comprehensive assessment of its relationship to the welfare state. 
To do this, we identify the aspects of each social capital dimension situated within social 
capital. 
 
Figure 2.2: Dimensions of social capital 
 
2.12.1 Networks 
Within the literature, there is a distinction made between the types of networks where social 
capital resides. Informal networks are those made up of the close ties between families and 
friends, whilst formal networks include membership to groups and associations (e.g., Putnam 












and Parts 2008; Gelissen et al., 2012). The distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) is commonly referred to as ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital 
(Woolcock, 1998; Putnam 2000). 'Bonding' (informal) is the strong homogenous ties of friends 
and family that are sources of help and support considered important for 'getting by in life' 
(Healy, 2003). 'Bridging' (formal) connects different types of people and groups derived from 
the weak ties of associations (Healy, 2003), providing links to colleagues (Woolcock, 2001), 
generating external assets and broadening identities (Putnam, 2000:23).  
Generating networks in the formal sphere through associational membership is at the heart of 
the society centred approach to social capital. Civic participation and social capital are 
considered synonymous, with voluntary associations acting as the schools of democracy for 
socialising cooperative values, norms and trust (Putnam 1993, 2000). Voluntary associations 
have an internal effect at the individual level that creates habits of cooperation, solidarity and 
public-spiritedness and has an external effect providing links between members and political 
institutions (Putnam 1993:90). However, there have been questions raised with this approach 
that places voluntary associations at the centre of social trust and civil society. It is also 
reasonable to consider participation as a self-selecting process based on existing levels of trust 
held, rather than the process of generating it (Stolle 1998; van der Meer 2003; Wollebaek and 
Selle 2003). Indeed, there is little evidence for associations producing the stated generalised 
attitudes and trust (Stolle 2003). The specified norms and socialising effects derived from 
associations may be more directed towards the domains of the family, which has a significant 
impact on trust levels (Stolle 2003; Newton 1997), as does the state (Levi 1996; Szreter 2002).  
Rather than associational membership being the key to social capital at the society level, it can 
equally be conceived at the individual level, as the potential resources derived from networks, 
group membership (Bourdieu 1986) and access to wider network structures (Li et al., 2005). At 
the Individual level, informal social connectedness and formal civic engagement (Halman & 
Luijkx 2006) enable the mobilisation of social contacts from which an individual can benefit 





assessment of the variation on both the levels and determinants of social capital- relative to 
the individual. 
2.12.2 Trust  
We find the centrality of trust to social capital throughout the literature (Coleman 1988; 
Putnam 1993; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009). Trust is a necessary 
condition for the creation of networks (Newton 1999), enables social relationships to emerge 
(Fukuyama 2000), facilitates collective action (Putnam 2000) and is essential for the 
functioning of social systems (Luhmann 1979). It is the resource that links citizens together, 
allowing them to pursue common goals (Arrow 1971; Hooghe and Stolle 2003) - vital for the 
smooth functioning of society and an essential resource for individuals (Hyggen 2006:495). 
‘Trust indicates the readiness of an actor to enter into communication and cooperation with 
unknown people' – the generalised other (Adam 2008:163). Given the importance of trust, 
understanding how to generate it has received considerable attention - of which cultural and 
experiential perspectives have been noteworthy (Sønderskov and Dinesen 2016). 
From the cultural perspective, trust is stable over time, something largely inherited through 
parental socialisation (Uslaner 2002). Although trust remains stable over the life course 
(Uslaner 2002; Stolle and Hooghe 2004; Bekkers 2007, 2012; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014), 
such a deterministic approach leaves little room for the social environment, where individuals 
are predetermined into a world of optimistic trust or pessimistic mistrust. The experiential 
account understands trust as developing throughout life - based on experiences - something 
that is malleable and affected by the social environment (Glanville and Paxton 2007). This is 
where a significant amount of social capital research is dedicated.  
For Putnam (1993; 2000), it is the vibrancy of civil society where we recognise the networks of 
civic participation that produce high levels of trust. Positive experiences through associations 
create the 'spill-over effects' influencing attitudes and values, generating social trust (van Ingen 
and Bekkers 2012). However, it is also possible that trust is a precondition of engaging in 
networks (Misztal 1996), with those who are more trusting joining associations (Stolle 1998). 





participation, suggesting the role of associations as the producers of generalised trust may be 
overstated (Stolle 2003; van der Meer 2003; Wollebaek and Selle 2003; Li et al. 2005; Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005; Neilson and Paxton, 2010). Rather, trust is the type of social capital that 
allows us to establish and maintain relationships with strangers (Torcha and Valenzuela 
2011:191). The exact direction of influence between trust and civic involvement, Putnam 
(2000:145) himself stated, is as 'tangled as well-tossed spaghetti', such is the mutually 
reinforcing nature of trust and participation.  
Given the somewhat conflicting evidence of the society-centred approach, other scholars have 
directed the experiential accounts to institutions. Here the perceptions of fairness and 
effectiveness of state institutions form the basis for trusting others (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; 
Freitag and Bühlmann 2009; You 2012; Nannestad et al., 2014; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014) 
and participation (van der Meer et al., 2009), as they provide the necessary structure for 
cooperation (North 1990) where social participation takes place. The 'trustworthiness of the 
social environment’ is central to Coleman’s (1988:102) understanding of social capital. Here, 
we recognise the role of institutions in generating the conditions and climate [of trust] 
necessary for the development and emergence of social capital (Levi 1996; Kumlin and 
Rothstein 2005; Larsen 2007). The evaluation of public services and trust in the performance 
of institutions provides a basis for social solidarity (Huysseune 2003) and collective activity, 
Letki (2006) with redistributive policies increasing trust (Uslaner 2004). 
Although Bourdieu does not explicitly identify trust in his theory of social capital, there are 
similar parallels to the social capital literature and the role of recognition (Siisiainen 2003; 
Frederiksen 2014). Here ‘the reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of 
sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and 
reaffirmed’ (Bourdieu 1986:250). This notion of endless affirmation and reaffirmation is what 
we might understand as the relational nature of trust. From a Bourdieusian perspective, 
Frederiksen (2014:175) argues that trust is a disposition, where the 'propensity to trust in a 
given situation generated between habitus and familiarity on one side and the nature of the 





situations. Here trust emerges through the familiarity of the situation and past experiences but 
can also arise in unfamiliar situations guided by formal institutions, as in the case of 
institutional trust.  
We understand from this that trust is a 'relational phenomenon created in the interaction 
between individuals and institutions, within social relations’ (Frederikson 2014: 169). Where 
there is trust in each other and trust in institutions, social capital can develop. Thus, there is a 
need to comprehend the dimensionality of trust, where social (interpersonal) trust relates to 
the trust between individuals - necessary for associational membership (Sønderskov 2010); 
while institutional trust identifies the trust in the governmental political institutions that frame 
the environment of trust Nannestad et al., 2014; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014). Accordingly, 
within the literature, we observe the distinction between interpersonal trust and institutional 
trust (e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen & Lehtonen 2006; Halman and Luijkx 2006; 
Kaasa and Parts 2008). 
2.12.3 Social Norms 
Alongside the dimensions of networks and trust, social norms are often included within the 
dimensional account of social capital (e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen & Lehtonen 
2006; Halman and Luijkx 2006; Kaasa and Parts 2008; Ferragina 2017). This inclusion is 
attributable primarily to the application of Putnam's definition of social capital that specifies 
the areas in which social capital resides (networks, norms, and trust). Social norms do not 
measure people's social relations or trust (van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Ferragina 2017) but 
are a behavioural characteristic that reflects the general civic commitment and morality at the 
society level (Putnam 2000). When social capital moves from resources to explained 
behaviours as a social function, it is perhaps where social capital is most contested.  
A problem with functionalist accounts of social capital (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000) is that 
the presence of norms does not justify inferring they exist to achieve some social function 
(Bicchieri et al., 2018). Moreover, norms themselves can be destructive and exclusionary to 
outsiders (Portes 1998). Conformity to the group can restrict individual freedom and autonomy 





example of how shared norms can be detrimental to the wider group or community. Both 
Putnam’s macro-sociological and Coleman’s rational choice position seeks to explain collective 
action through social norms. However, behaviours embedded within social relations are often 
context-specific and are not easily generalisable to society (Bicchieri et al., 2018). Presumably, 
producing the 'right' norm will enable the generation of social capital, and if it is the 'wrong' 
norm, it will not. Elster's (1989) conclusion on social norms and rational action sums this 
observation up remarkably well. 'Social norms spring from psychological propensities and 
dispositions that, taken separately, cannot be presumed to be useful, yet happen to interact in 
such a way that useful effects are produced’ (1989:112).  
The desire to widen social capital to the explanations of the social structure may be helpful for 
economic and functionalist explanations of social behaviour but does not help with the 
conceptual clarity of social capital as a resource. This study will adopt a more parsimonious 
account of social capital that focuses on the potential resources derived through social 
relationships. Networks are the structural dimension in which the individual or group mobilise 
resources, and trust is the relational dimension that enables the successful practices of the 
network and cooperation. Both dimensions are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, 
highlighting the nature of social relations within a structure.    
2.12.4 Summary of dimensionality  
The two principal elements of social capital are social networks and trust. Theoretically, 
Bourdieu draws our attention to the resources available within networks of social relations, 
available to both the group and the individual. At the same time, Coleman’s position also 
highlights the 'trustworthiness of the social environment’, where social capital is both an 
individual and collective resource. As the brief preceding discussion illustrated, in reality, all 
aspects of social capital are likely to be interrelated – found in the interactions of social 
relations (between individuals and institutions). The specified conceptual framework allows us 
to investigate social capital through separate analytical dimensions and unpack the relationship 





causal mechanisms of influence in detail in the third analytical chapter (seven). Now we move 
on to the discussion of the welfare state. 
2.13 Welfare state  
What countries spend on their social policies in terms of the welfare effort is naturally of 
interest to understanding potential variation in individual outcomes. How this is measured and, 
indeed, what is understood by the nature of the welfare state itself, presents a dependent 
variable problem (Clasen and Siegel 2007). Within the context of social capital and the welfare 
state, there have been two main strategies for analysing potential welfare state effects; i) 
expenditures data and ii) welfare regime classifications. Typically, social expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP is used to reflect countries' commitment to individual welfare (e.g., 
Oorschot and Finsveen 2010; Oorschot and Arts 2005; Scheepers et al., 2002). The social 
expenditure approach often becomes subject to the reductive ideological debate on the very 
nature of welfare itself. Communitarians highlight welfare dependency issues with the state in 
competition with individual rights and self-sufficiency (Nisbet 1962; Wolfe 1989; Etzioni 1995), 
whilst institutionalists embrace the state as enhancing individual rights and autonomy (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Skocpol 1996; Rothstein 2001). The concern with the size of the welfare state 
has been the central position for arguments regarding the dualism of the crowding-out thesis. 
As a result, whether high levels of social security have a detrimental impact on an individual's 
social capital has been consistently operationalised through social spending as a proportion of 
GDP (e.g., Oorschot and Finsveen 2010; Oorschot, Arts and Gelissen 2006; Koster and 
Bruggeman 2008; van der Meer 2009]. 
Despite its widespread availability for comparative analysis, social expenditure does not 
adequately reflect the welfare state’s effects on individual life chances (Scruggs and Allen 
2006) coverage and distribution. It fails to address the inherent problem that higher spending 
at the macro-level may not necessarily reflect the real generosity of welfare states at the micro-
level (Tamilina 2010). For example, it is not accounting for the size of the dependent population 
in times of economic downturn or understanding how the ageing population can generate a 





expenditures because of high unemployment levels under Thatcher in the 1980s, at the same 
time as dramatic cuts in the replacement rates. Clearly, the social policy context of social 
expenditure and generosity can produce widely different outcomes for individuals. Indeed 
Esping-Andersen (1990:19) argues that spending is secondary to the theoretical substance of 
welfare states themselves. As such, it understands that the welfare state’s influence should 
address both qualitative and quantitative dimensions that reflect wider welfare distribution 
(Hagfors and Kajanoja 2007; Pacek and Radcliff 2008). 
In an attempt to understand the qualitative elements of the welfare state that addresses the 
structured relationship between the state, market and family, welfare regime approaches 
highlight the commonality of decommodification and stratification experiences (Esping-
Andersen 1990). The institutional position aims to move beyond simple measures of social 
expenditure, instead opting for a more theoretical categorisation of 'ideal regime types'. Most 
notably, through the work of Esping-Andersen, welfare states can be classified according to 
patterns of historical institutional development. Accounting for the overall design of social 
policies adds a great deal to our understanding of the theoretical substance of welfare states 
and has been a valuable tool for operationalisation within the social capital literature (e.g., 
Scheepers et al., 2002; Oorschot et al., 2005; 2006; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006). Beyond 
the general concerns surrounding the number of regime types, or whether it is possible to 
place certain countries in multiple regime types (see Arts and Gelissen 2002 review). The real 
problem with combining various countries under a single regime is that it obscures the 
variation within and between countries that we hope to explore in this thesis. From a 
methodological point of view, this also allows us to use our degrees of freedom to add 
additional controls to our models.    
In order to overcome these limitations and add to the existing literature, this study will focus 
on two specific measures of the welfare state - generosity and universalism - that relates to 





welfare state classification. An assessment of social capital beyond expenditure and regimes 
types has been until now overlooked1.  
2.13.1 Research question  
Based on the existing literature and empirical evidence, the first research question seeks to 
address whether the welfare state's level of universalism and generosity is an important 
determinant of social capital. This is framed within the context of the crowding-out debate. 
Here we are interested in whether the claims of crowding-in and crowding-out hold across all 
dimensions of social capital. Identification of the specific hypotheses to test the influence of 
the welfare state (macro-level) on individuals' social capital (micro-level) takes place in the 
subsequent analytical chapter (five).  
So far, the literature has set out the need for assessing the dimensionality of social capital and 
sufficient welfare state measures to adequately address the relationship between the welfare 
state and social capital. There is also a need to address a further omission within the literature 
and crowding-out thesis - the differences in an individual's ability to generate social capital 















2.14 Social capital variation - Part two 
The assumption that the crowding-out thesis invokes is that if the state does not intervene, 
then individuals would be free to accumulate social capital. However, failing to acknowledge 
issues of structure and inequality may have significant consequences for individual outcomes. 
In order to understand how inequalities relate to social capital variation, we once again draw 
upon Bourdieu's work, which provides us with an opportunity to frame our understanding of 
the macro and micro level structures of capital accumulation. We begin by acknowledging the 
role of practice before addressing the relevant literature. 
2.15 Bourdieu and Practice 
The social world, according to Bourdieu, can be explained as objective structures that 
constitute fields. Individuals’ position within different fields and their potential practices are 
understood in terms of habitus and capital. The interpretation of this relationship Bourdieu 
(1996:101) defined as: [(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice. What this draws to our attention 
is that empirical analysis of the social world can be understood as; outcomes or practices that 
are dependent on individual characteristics and circumstances within a structure (habitus) that 
is specific to an environment (field). The habitus is a structured system of dispositions that is 
structured by past experiences, current circumstances and shapes future practices. It is not 
just the property of individuals but also includes groups and institutions (Maton 2008). The 
reason why habitus is important is that it links the individual to the social. Experiences of one's 
life may be unique but are shared in terms of their structure with others of the same socio-
economic groups (SEGs) (Maton 2008). This informs the possibility of assessing the variation 
between social groups whilst maintaining relevance to the possible experiences of individuals. 
In order to understand social capital outcomes, we need to consider the field in which practice 
takes place. For an individual to participate in a field, they require the necessary resources to 
produce practice. The resources required to play the game depends on the various forms of 
capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic). Capital acquired in one field can be used in 
another. There is not an equal footing to play the game within the field. Those who have the 





capital and advance their position. In this sense, privilege and capital become a positive circle 
of capital accumulation, one that is mutually reinforcing. The ability or success an individual 
has in accumulating social capital will have a strong association with their class habitus. 
2.16 Social capital inequality  
In Bourdieu’s forms of capital, we understand how the possession of economic capital can be 
converted into other forms of cultural and social capital. The advantage of this newly generated 
capital is that it feeds back into economic capital, which further elicits greater cultural and 
social capital. This mutually reinforcing process of capital accumulation is what Van Oorschot 
and Finsveen (2010) term `Vicious and Virtuous circles'. The ability to invest in social capital is 
directly related to the advantage of economic capital. It provides access alongside the 
opportunity to dedicate time and energy toward socially productive networks.  









In the opposite direction, those of a low socio-economic standing can fall into a vicious circle 
of social capital depletion. The reason for the inequalities of social capital and deficit return, 
Lin (2000) suggests, can be understood in terms of structure and homophily. Social groups 
occupy different socio-economic positions within a society that are a product of a historical 















with others of similar characteristics (or similar habitus). Those from lower economic groups 
will have less access to more extensive networks and be reliant on the limited resources within 
the same social standing. Although Lin's position is perhaps a little reductionist, it does draw 
our attention to the potential (re)production of social capital between (socio-economic) 
groups. 
Those with higher incomes have greater social capital across all dimensions (Van Oorschot et 
al., 2006). Income is positively related to volunteering (Wilson 1997; Christoforou 2004; Van 
Oorschot 2005) along with trust in others and institutions (Delhey and Newton 2003). In 
addition to income, those with higher education levels show greater participation in all social 
networks (Bekkers 2007; Gesthuizen et al., 2008), are more actively engaged in volunteering 
(Wilson 1998) and report higher levels of interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). 
Education has the potential to influence social capital from both socialisation and a resource 
perspective (Gesthuizen et al., 2008), encouraging individuals to internalise the norms of 
participation and collective interest (Durkheim 1956). Educated individuals are more likely to 
have higher educated parents (Blau and Duncan 1976) who are more likely to be socially active 
(Wilson 1997). We find empirical support of the 'intergenerational transmission of 
volunteering' between the children and parents who volunteer within the literature (Bekkers 
2007:111). It appears that differences between highly informal and formal activity are 
socialised through education processes (Gesthuizen et al., 2008).  
We find a similar process from the resource perspective, where the highly educated use their 
resources to perpetuate their status position and transfer resources to ensure their children 
succeed (Bourdieu 1977). The transmission of cultural capital norms that occupies a more 
formally active social position creates an unequal distribution of civic engagement. Those 
individuals without apparent access to resources that higher education and status provides 
may have to invest in more immediate informal networks for support (Pichler and Wallace 
2007).  
Within the empirical literature, we find that different social positions influence the forms of 





the way of neighbourhood attachment, social networks (informal networks) and civic 
participation (formal networks) find a socio-cultural distinction. Those from advantageous 
positions have access to resources and support from more extensive networks. In contrast, 
those from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to rely on neighbourhood relations for 
informal social support. This distinction of access between formal and informal networks is 
present in Hall's (2002) analysis. Hall finds a clear class distinction between the diverse 
networks and active participation of the middle classes compared to the limited social 
connections and reliance on informal networks of the working classes. 
Extending the resources perspective to fields of struggle, rather than mere production, we 
understand the potential conflict that can develop over competition for resources creating 
distrust. At the individual level, personality theory suggests trust is riskier for lower status 
groups who cannot afford to lose. Those with high resources have more to gain and 
comparatively less to lose from trusting behaviour (Delhey and Newton 2003). The capacity to 
control one’s own life leads to generalised trust (Uslaner 1999), whereas experiences of 
insecurity, anxiety and exclusion can diminish social trust (Patterson 1999). Lower status 
groups can experience a threat to their 'social value', whilst privileged groups can use their 
economic and cultural capital to secure social status.  As a result, high-status groups are more 
likely to be trusting of others. The potential for variation in trust to emerge with competition 
over resources is confirmed in Vergolini (2011), who finds that people with lower economic 
resources show a lower level of institutional and interpersonal trust compared to individuals 
who do not experience economic difficulties.  
Theoretically, it is the resource position that strengthens our understanding of the relationship 
between the structural inequalities within society and individuals' social capital. Here, the 
welfare state is a crucial equalising mechanism in resource distribution and inclusion, which 
can affect both the structural and social capital inequalities. 
2.17 The welfare state and social capital inequality 
The redistribution of resources is a vital function of the welfare state that reduces inequalities. 





progressive the interventions, the greater the likelihood of creating equality between socio-
economic groups. The success of interventions depends on the design of the welfare state itself 
and the social policies put into practice (Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano 2014). Through 
economic and cultural processes, the welfare state can influence the development and 
(re)production of social capital. This influence can happen through education policies, which 
help to reduce the cultural capital deficit. By reducing economic inequality, the welfare state 
can improve the opportunities to generate social capital, resulting in less social capital 
inequality.  
Providing access to generalised welfare institutional networks and services that individuals 
might not otherwise be able to access, such as health, care services and welfare rights (Van 
Oorschot and Finsveen 2010), provides opportunities to accumulate and maintain social 
capital. Social protection policies aim to keep individuals within market employment, reducing 
the potential risk of exclusion from social and labour market participation (Saunders 2010; Barr 
2012). In doing so, they can increase the potential for social capital accumulation. The 
solidaristic nature of the welfare state can also be an influential determinant in shaping the 
levels of trust (Rothstein 2001; Kumlin and Rothstein's 2005). Guaranteeing citizenship, 
through the universal provision and promoting solidarity through equality, can influence the 
outcomes of institutional and interpersonal trust (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Trägårdh 
2007). We now turn to the empirical literature to see if there is support for the welfare state 
reducing social capital inequalities.    
2.17.1 Empirical literature  
Within the empirical literature, there have been some attempts to address the differences in 
social capital inequalities between welfare states, both directly and indirectly. Pichler and 
Wallace (2009) use the Eurobarometer (2004) survey of 27 countries to explore the outcomes 
of formal (the number of memberships to different associations and frequency of active 
participation) and informal networks (frequency of contact with friends, colleagues or 
neighbours) between occupational groups. They find little variation in informal networks but 





of inequality (Gini coefficient), they found that in countries with higher inequality, working-
class groups reported lower levels of participation and professional/managerial class higher 
levels of participation - suggesting that inequality widens social capital inequalities between 
SEGs.  
Gesthuizen et al. (2008) confirm a similar outcome with education expansion2 reducing the gap 
in social capital inequalities between lower and higher educated, suggesting that the welfare 
state can affect cultural capital deficit and, in turn, a reduction in social capital inequality. Using 
the 2004 Eurobarometer survey in 29 countries, they operationalise scores of informal social 
capital through the frequency of contact frequency with friends, colleagues, or neighbours and 
formal social capital through membership, donations and involvement in voluntary 
organisations. They find that greater spending (social security as a percentage of GDP) reduces 
the importance of education for informal networks (contact with neighbours) but increases 
the effect of education on membership in voluntary organisations. This finding suggests that 
the welfare state could increase and decrease social capital differences between education 
levels. 
There is also some support for comprehensive welfare states reducing social capital 
inequalities in Oorschot and Finsveen (2010). Although there study is limited, relying on 
correlational evidence from pooled data of 13 countries (EVS and WVS 1981 and 1999/2000). 
They observed lower income and educational based inequalities in participation (number of 
voluntary organisations) in countries where spending was higher (social expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP), along with reduced interpersonal trust inequalities for education level.    
Although not directly concerned with social capital, there are two more studies relevant to the 
discussion. Van der Meer et al. (2009) observe a potential adverse effect of social expenditure 
on informal relations between SEGs. Using the 2001 ISSP with 20 countries, they distinguish 
between three forms of social participation providing average scores of the frequency of 
 
2 This is the percentage of people that left full-time formal education at age 19 or older (the higher educated), 






contact with (i) nuclear family, (ii) best friend, and (iii) extended family. When compared across 
income groups, they find greater spending results in crowding-out of informal networks, 
specifically, contact with the extended family, but more for lower-income groups. Finally, 
addressing participation inequalities (types of voluntary organisations), van Ingen and van der 
Meer (2011), utilising the ESS 2002, find that welfare state expenditure (social security and 
health care percentage GDP) reduces the participatory inequalities between both income 
groups and education groups. 
2.17.2 Summary and research question 
The crowding-out argument assumes that a reduced welfare state encourages individuals to 
generate social capital. Notwithstanding a limited rational choice position, this follows the 
premise that everyone has equal access to social capital. The literature shows that it is likely to 
be unequally distributed according to social dimensions and individual circumstances. Indeed, 
evidence suggests the removal of welfare structures is likely to undermine rather than 
encourage participation (Bartels et al., 2011; Davies and Pill 2012). The within-country variation 
between social groups has tended to be somewhat sidelined with the mainstream approach to 
social capital. A focus on promoting the positive potential of unlocking social capital through 
individual action has ignored issues of structure and inequality. What the empirical evidence 
suggests is that social spending has the potential to both widen and decrease network 
inequalities between education and income groups. There is also the possibility that spending 
may improve interpersonal trust inequalities between education groups. The one study 
following a dimensional approach is correlational and so does not sufficiently address the 
macro-micro relationship.  
To my knowledge, a complete account of the welfare state and social capital inequalities does 
not exist. Building on previous studies, chapter six will specifically address the importance of 





2.18 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a framework for answering two questions. Does the welfare state 
matter for social capital outcomes? Does the welfare state reduce social capital inequalities? 
In order to arrive here, the chapter highlighted the need for improved measurement of both 
social capital and the welfare state, along with a clear dimensional account of social capital. 
Acknowledging the limitations of the crowding-out debate, we ask not if the welfare state 
crowds-in or crowds-out, but how and under what conditions this may happen. We also 
identified the need to think more critically about what crowding-out means in terms of 
individuals' abilities to access resources. Here, Bourdieu was brought back into the debate to 
frame our understanding of how structural inequalities may translate into further social capital 







Table 2.4: Summary of empirical literature, the welfare state and social capital inequality between socioeconomic groups 
Study Social capital Socio-economic group Welfare state measure Relationship 
Gesthuizen et al., 
(2008) 
Contact frequency with 
friends, colleagues, or 
neighbours  
Education 
Social protection % 
GDP 
Greater spending (+) reduces the importance of 
education for neighbour – reducing inequality 
Membership,  donations & 
involvement in voluntary 
organisations 
Greater spending (-) increases the importance of 




Number and frequency of 
voluntary organisations 
Occupational class Social security % GDP 
Level of inequality increases social capital inequality 
between occupation class  
Contact with friends, 
colleagues or neighbours 
Oorschot and 
Finsveen (2010) 
Number of voluntary 
organisations 
Employment status, 
income group and 
education 
Welfare regimes & 
Social spending % GDP 
Greater spending (+) reduces network inequalities 
between income education groups 
Institutional trust No effect 
Interpersonal trust Greater spending (+) reduces trust inequalities 
between education groups 
van der Meer et 
al., (2009) 
Contact with family, friends 
and extended family 
Employment status, 
income group and 
education 
Social security % GDP Greater spending (-) reduces extended family contact 
for income groups 
van Ingen and van 
der Meer (2011) 
types of voluntary 
organisations 
Education and income  Social security and 
health care 
expenditure % GDP 
Greater spending (+) reduces participation 




3 Data and Methodology  
This chapter provides an overview of the chosen data for empirical analysis, which most 
appropriately enables us to address the research hypotheses given the practical limitations of 
data availability. Following on from that is a detailed account of the relevant methodologies 
applied throughout the thesis. Here the focus is on confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), 
multilevel analysis (ML) and structural equation modelling (SEM). After setting out the 
relevance of each approach and its importance for the area of our inquiry, I provide an 
overview of practical assessment. This overview will assist the reader in interpreting model 
results in the subsequent chapters. 
3.1 Data 
The availability of data to address research questions will always have some limitations. 
Surveys are expensive to implement and often designed to collect a broad range of data. At 
the European-wide level, this means cross-national longitudinal data sets are rare, and those 
such as the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) are not always 
able to provide the data required for analysis. Specific modules are usually undertaken 
alongside the key personal and household annual reporting- providing a snapshot of a 
particular area of social importance. Unlike longitudinal data, there are limits to cross-sectional 
data sets ability to show causal changes over time. That does not mean we cannot make 
reliable observations about the expected and observed relationships. A theoretically informed 
hypothesis of why an expected relationship should persist under certain circumstances 
provides the context in which to make statistical inferences.  
The proposed research provides a cross-country comparison of the social determinants of 
social capital. As such, cross-sectional data is both practical in terms of availability, and valid in 
explicitly allowing us to address the research aims reliably. After surveying the potential 
European data sets (The International Social Survey Programme, EU-SILC, European Social 
Survey, European/World Values Survey and European Quality of Life Survey). The EQLS was 
selected as the most appropriate to our area of inquiry that would best relate to the theory of 
social capital and provide a comprehensive measurement.   
Focussing on Europe to explore the social capital welfare state relationship makes intuitive 
sense. Firstly, in terms of identifying a reliable social capital model, the shared cultural 
similarities between Europeans ensure that our concepts measure the same things and provide 
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us with reliable comparisons. Secondly, established European welfare states provide the prime 
setting to address the crowding-out thesis, while having enough cultural variation to allow for 
reliable cross-national comparison. Finally, just on a practical level, there are limits to the 
availability of quality data beyond the EU to address adequately the research hypotheses 
proposed. 
3.1.1 European Quality of Life Survey 
The European Quality of Life Surveys (EQLS) is a European survey carried out every four years 
(2003-2011/2012), providing both objective and subjective measures of European citizen's 
lives and circumstances. It covers a broad range of issues such as; health, education, 
employment, life satisfaction, social relationships and trust, providing an essential set of 
indicators for understanding society.  
The EQLS is a random probability survey representative of the adult population (people aged 
18 and over) living in private households. The primary data collection method is face-to-face 
interviews, with first contact phone interviews in Finland, Sweden (to overcomes barriers to 
door-to-door sampling) and Iceland (given the geographical distances).  The sample size ranges 
from 1,000 to 3,055, with the minimum target number of interviews set at 1,000 interviews. 
The total sample size for the 2011/2012 survey for all 34 countries is 43,636.  Sampling stages 
follow geographical stratification and random selection of addresses within the primary 
sampling units, with address or population registers (where available) covering at least 95 per 
cent of persons or households.  
3.1.2 Sample selection 
In terms of a coherent sample, member states of the European Union provide an obvious 
grouping for comparative analysis. There are 28 member states currently within the European 
Union. Although not an official member state, Iceland is considered very much European, both 
by the majority of its citizens and its neighbours, and is included alongside the EU28. The 
cultural similarities and shared historical contexts, alongside the unified approach to policy, 
make the EU a prime candidate for sample selection. Perhaps most importantly, both input 
and output harmonisation provide standardisation of definitions and indicators across 
populations. Specific questionnaire translation with multi-stage testing and validation ensures 
accuracy and comparability of data, providing reliability of the measured concepts cross-
nationally. This comparability is particularly important where there may be some subjective 
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element to the questions. The questionnaire is translated into 25 languages for the EU27 
countries, plus Icelandic and Croatian. The final working data set has 29 countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, UK, Croatia and Iceland) with a sample of 37,517 and an average response 
rate of 39.68%.  
3.1.3 Limitations 
Perhaps the most significant limitation with this data set is the relatively low response rates for 
some countries. The lower than expected response rate is related to the reduced number of 
calls to each address. Costs of delivering the survey were limited; as a result, the conductors 
made 3 calls instead of the standard 6-8, which resulted in a high number of non-contact 
addresses and an averagely low response rate. The response rate for the UK was the lowest in 
the survey at 26%. (A full breakdown of individual country response rates is located in appendix 
B). Non-response analysis showed that most rural areas within the EU had a lower response 
rate than urban areas.  
Further paradata analysis comparing hard-to-find respondents with easy co-operators showed 
increased difficulty in obtaining responses for those between the ages of 28 and 38. To 
overcome issues of representation, the EQLS provides a post-stratification weighting to 
compensate for differential non-response amongst sub-groups that represents the entire 
population and the national level. Probability weighting ensures the correct eligibility of 
persons in households and cross-national weighting for the size of the country population. 
Alongside weights, the EQLS follows strict sampling procedures to ensure accurate estimation 
and representation of the population. What the EQLS does allow us to do well, which other 
surveys lack, is to address the construct of social capital. The available questions provide an 







This section details the variables used throughout the thesis and will be referred back to during 
the stages of analyses. 
3.2.1 Individual-level variables  
There are several socio-demographic variables of interest in this study, presented in Table 3.1. 
In the second analytical chapter, where the focus is specifically on country-level effects on 
social capital, they are included as control measures to ensure the observed effects are 
associated with the welfare state and not individual-level variance. This approach is in line with 
other studies on social capital (e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Pichler and Wallace 2008; 
Gesthuizen et al., 2008; van der Meer et al., 2009). In the third analytical chapter, where the 
substantive interest is on variation between SEGs in social capital outcomes across countries, 
there is a more explicit interest in their variance. 
The variables selected are those most relevant to understanding variation in social capital 
outcomes. Evidence from the literature suggests that men and women have different social 
capital profiles (Lowndes 2000). Gender makes a difference in how much people volunteer and 
what kind of work they do (Wilson 2000:227).  Typically, men have more formal active social 
networks (Van Oorschot and Finsveen 2010), and women report more trust (Elgar et al., 2011). 
A binary variable is created for gender, distinguishing between males and females.  
Education is a strong predictor of social capital (van Oorschot and Arts 2005). Those with higher 
education levels show greater participation in all social networks (Bekkers 2007; Gesthuizen et 
al., 2008), are more actively engaged in volunteering (Wilson1998) and report higher levels of 
interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). To understand the potential variation in education, 
we distinguish between three education levels derived from the (1997) International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED)- i) primary [combines pre-primary and primary], ii) 
secondary [lower secondary to post-secondary], iii) and tertiary [first and second stage 
tertiary].   
Income is also an essential factor in understanding individuals’ social capital (Oorschot and 
Finsveen 2009). Economic capital affords the resource of time and access to assist in 
generating productive formal and informal networks. Income is positively related to all social 
capital dimensions (Van Oorschot et al., 2006), including trust in others and institutions (Carmo 
and Nunes 2013; Delhey and Newton 2003). The selected income variable used is based on 
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purchasing power parity (PPP) to ensure cross-national comparability and standardised (0 to 1 
scale) for ease of interpretation. 
Age positively relates to trust (Siegler et al., 2015) and formal networks but is negatively 
associated with informal networks (Kaasa and Parts 2008). It is included here as a centred 
variable. Household living arrangements can also affect the resources individuals can access. 
Individuals who are married or cohabiting have greater informal network access and tend to 
be more trusting (Ravanera and Rajulton 2010). They are included here as one group, with 
divorced widowed and single, forming the non-cohabiting group. Whether someone lives in a 
rural or urban area may also influence the ability to access different networks, with city 
dwellers found to have less informal social capital (Fidrmuc and Gerxhani 2005). A binary 
variable is created, distinguishing between rural and city dwelling -combining i) countryside 
and village ii) town and city.   
Employment status is again likely to have a substantial effect on an individual’s willingness and 
ability to participate, along with the levels of trust reciprocated. Oorschot et al. (2006) find that 
compared to those in jobs, unemployed people show less interpersonal trust while reporting 
high levels of informal social capital (contact with friends and family). Here we include a dummy 
variable of whether someone is unemployed or not. The implication being that exclusion from 
the labour market will adversely affect the potential access to networks.   
Whether someone receives social benefits is likely to have a critical bearing on the levels of 
social capital. These individuals are most likely to feel the adverse effects of exclusion and social 
stratification, influencing participation (Ingen and van der Meer 2011).  A lack of economic 
capital relates directly to the ability to generate all forms of social capital. Individuals who find 
themselves in conflict over limited resources are also less trusting (Patterson 1999; Delhey and 







Table 3.1: Individual-level variables 
Indicator Category Frequency % N 
Gender Female 19,486 51.94   
 Male 18,031 48.06 37,517 
Married or No 17,378 46.32  
Cohabiting Yes 20,139 53.68 37,317 
Education Primary 3,891 10.44  
 Secondary 24,332 65.29  
 Tertiary 9,045 24.27 37,268 
Unemployed No 33,897 90.35  
 Yes 3,620 9.65 37,517 
Social Benefits No 31,425 84.43  
 Yes 5,795 15.57 37,220 
Domicile Urban 19,879 53.07  
 Rural 17,580 46.93 37,459 
Income Standardised 
Mean ( 2022.68 
Euros)  28,534 
Age Centred Mean (47.81) 37,517 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012, Weighted    
 
3.2.1.1 Limitations  
As often is the problem with survey data, there is a significant proportion of the data missing 
for the income variable (see Table 3.1). Although multiple imputations often provide a way to 
overcome this problem, it becomes increasingly complex with random slopes and cross-level 
interactions. The relation between X and Y is assumed to vary both systematically as a function 
of W (interaction effects), which is difficult to emulate in conventional software for multilevel 
multiple imputations (e.g., Kim, Sugar, & Belin, 2015). As the standardised approach of 
multilevel analysis grows, more advanced methods are being developed, although this is not 
available in standard software (Simon Grund et al., 2017). Income is a crucial variable in 
understanding social capital variation and must be included in the analysis. As a result, listwise 
deletion excludes around 25% of the sample. Ensuring the proportion of excluded cases does 
not disproportionately affect different groups, a comparison between samples was 
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undertaken, which showed close approximation between the two sets of data. Tables for the 
comparison are located in appendix E. 
3.2.2 Country-level: Independent variables 
Alongside the primary EQLS data set, this study draws upon country-level data from two data 
sources that specifically address the welfare state measures of generosity and universalism; 
the tax and benefits indicators database from the European Commission3 and the European 
system of integrated social protection statistics (ESSPROS4).  
3.2.2.1 Generosity  
In order to capture the real generosity of the welfare state, we employ the use of replacement 
rates. Replacement rates are a central component of Esping-Andersen's (1990) 
decommodification index, reflecting the welfare state's commitment to ensuring citizens can 
participate in society, irrespective of market provision. The central argument here is that as 
labour is commodified within capitalist societies, the welfare of individuals becomes 
dependent on the cash nexus (Esping-Andersen 1990). Within this context, the response of 
social policy and the welfare state is to meet the needs and demands of individuals. The success 
or degree to which each welfare state decommodifies its citizens is thus the measure by which 
we can differentiate variation in outcomes. The level at which income replacement alleviates 
unemployment reflects the level of the welfare state's generosity.   
The tax and benefits indicators database from the European Commission5 provides detailed 
information on the net replacement rates for social insurance, including unemployment 
benefits, housing benefit and social assistance. These measures account for the generosity of 
the welfare benefits system, taking into account the effects of other benefits, taxes and social 
security contributions. Replacement rates are defined as 'the net income of an unemployed 
person receiving unemployment and possibly other benefits expressed as a share of the 
income earned previously in the job before becoming unemployed'6. The higher the rate of 









qualitative and quantitative substance of welfare states, predicted to have an important 
bearing on social capital outcomes.  
Replacement rates are based on the average worker (AW) across several model family types7, 
expressed as a percentage of the average earnings of an AW. Rates are available for previous 
earnings at durations of 2, 7, 13, 25 and 60-month intervals. The generosity indicator selected 
measures the total replacement rate of unemployment benefit, housing benefit and social 
assistance for a single average worker. As benefit rates are often higher during initial periods 
of entitlement and not always available for a full year, an average entitlement across the 
duration is used. This approach acknowledges the decline in generosity over time and more 
adequately addresses countries generosity of provision. 
Unfortunately, there is a gap in the data for Cyprus 2007-2014, so it does not coincide with the 
2011 reference year of the EQLS. It has, however, remained at the same level since 2006, so 
the available data is included. Croatia's membership began in 2013, and I have included the 
first available year. With the replacement levels remaining stable across the period for all other 
countries, these are considered acceptable limitations that maximises sample size. The final 
indicator is averaged over the reference year 2010-2012 and is standardised for ease of 
interpretation.    
3.2.2.2 Limitations 
The available replacement rates from the tax and benefits database do not cover pensions. 
Pension entitlement is important for maintaining network structures later in life and a key area 
of welfare state support, which may reduce the overall picture of countries generosity. 
However, adding a separate pension indicator or combining it with the existing measure may 
raise other issues. Placing multiple benefits into a single scale can obscure significant 
differences between programs and alter the perception of generosity, as can be the case with 
the dual nature of pension entitlements (Kvist 2011). There is also the practical limitation on 
the number of macro-level variables we can use in multilevel models, making a single indicator 
more conducive to analysis. As our focus on variation between groups (chapter six) does not 
explicitly address age, this is perhaps not a limitation itself, rather something to bear in mind 
with comparisons of welfare state generosity.   
 
7 single person, single parent with 2 children, a one-earner couple without children, one-earner couple with 2 
children, two-earner couple with 2 children and a two-earner couple without children. 
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Another concern with averaged indicators is distributional effects; the impact of insurance 
design may affect high and low earners differently, where those on the margins of support can 
be adversely affected by differences in entitlements. The AW captures a comparable measure 
of income replacement for a typical standard worker across countries and time - one that 
provides a common metric for analysis. Whilst this is necessary for the research, it is important 
to bear in mind that there will still be some variation beyond the common average, an area for 
research in its own right.  
The household composition used to construct replacement rates can also alter the picture of 
entitlement and generosity. Robustness checks were conducted comparing the effect of 
generosity on each dimension of social capital across four household types [single, one-earner 
couple with two children, single parent with two children and one-earner couple with no 
children] to ensure the reliability of the generosity measure. The results of the analyses are 
presented in appendix D, which shows that the effects of generosity on social capital are 
broadly consistent across all household types. We will revisit this issue of composition in the 
following chapter.  
3.2.3 Universalism 
The second aspect of understanding the qualitative distinction of welfare states overlooked by 
measures of social expenditure is stratification- 'an active force in the ordering of social 
relations' (Esping-Andersen 1990:23). It is not merely that the welfare state provides social 
benefits, but it is the level of conditionality imposed on benefit recipients, which is of 
importance. This level is most recognisable by the varying degree of universalism present 
within the systems of welfare delivery. 
Universalism follows the guiding principle of 'equal concern and respect' (Rothstein 1998:38). 
Welfare is provided to all citizens, without distinction of whether some persons are worth more 
than others or application of needs-testing. Targeted benefits to the most disadvantaged 
groups are usually less generous and often stigmatised, creating stratification and distinctions 
of need by the ‘undeserving poor’ (Rothstein 1998; Larsen 2007). We follow Rothstein (1998) 
in identifying universalism through the absence of means-testing. In doing so, we aim to 
account for the perceived fairness of the welfare state (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005) and the 
degree of selectivism that exacerbates the cultural difference (Larsen 2007).  
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One of the advantages of the ESSPROS is that it also allows us to distinguish between those 
social benefits (transferred to households) provided as a matter of right and those delivered 
through means-testing. Social benefits are those received in 'cash or in-kind intended to relieve 
them from the financial burden of a number of risks or needs'. These include comprehensive 
cover for disability, sickness/health care, old age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, 
housing and social exclusion, providing a complete picture of the social protection given to 
individuals by each country (European Commission 2012). The net social protection measure 
as a proportion of GDP combines all social benefits and accounts for potential tax deductions. 
In doing so, it provides a comprehensive, comparable indicator of countries commitment to 
ensuring individuals have a comparable stake in society. The established indicator is the level 
of non-means-testing as a proportion of GDP 2010-2012, which is again standardised for 
comparison.  
3.2.3.1 Limitations 
Although the focus here is on social protection, arguably a core aim of the welfare state –there 
are broader elements beyond the 'cash nexus' in the universal provision of services 
unaccounted. Areas such as education, healthcare, childcare provision and transportation are 
important considerations that will affect individuals' outcomes and the broader notion of 
universalism present within countries. Therefore, the measure may slightly underrepresent the 
amount of universalism present. That said, the importance of means-testing to the discussion 
is that it represents a distinct form of stratification within welfare states, providing us with 
meaningful qualitative distinction with which to evaluate the underlying nature of welfare state 
provision; one that acknowledges the potential consequences of the stigma attached to social 
benefits that can be detrimental to the individual and society.  
[Note: Denmark has since revised its social protection statistics (from municipal reforms in 
2007), resulting in a percentage increase of means-testing because of a change in classification 
for some important cash benefits. Although considerations of existing distinctions are still 
ongoing, this does affect the picture of Denmark's universalism, and it would no longer rank 
highest on our universalism scale. Preliminary analysis shows that whilst this does not affect 
the overall relationship to social capital, there is a slight drop in the effect size].  
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3.2.4 Active Labour Market Spending Policies 
Alongside the qualitative measures of social protection, the welfare state can also alleviate the 
adverse effects of unemployment through active labour market policies (ALMPs). Re-entry into 
the labour market is a crucial mechanism in preventing marginalisation and social exclusion, 
enabling the prospect of developing economic and social capital. Of the nine potential labour 
market policies8, I focus specifically on the level of spending on training. Training has the 
strongest and most positive long-term effects of ALMPs (EU Commission 2016:7). It can directly 
affect lower socioeconomic groups' economic and cultural capital deficits through training 
opportunities and transitions to employment. In doing so, it can provide access to broader 
network structures and provide more opportunities to generate social capital, potentially 
reducing the level of social capital inequalities. Including a direct measure of social policy allows 
us to contextualise the models and enhance our understanding of the welfare state's role in 
influencing social capital outcomes.  
ALMP expenditure data is from the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion as part of the European Commission9, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Data10 for 
the reference year is unavailable in Greece, Croatia and the UK, so I use the 2010-2012 average 
to maintain comparability. As with other independent variables in the study, it is standardised 
for ease of interpretation and will be mean-centred for assessing random slope and cross-level 
interaction effects.   
3.2.5 Control variables  
In order to assess whether the chosen independent variables have an effect on the levels of 
social capital, it is necessary to include controls in the model. GDP is considered one of the 
most important predictors of social capital (Putnam 2000), making it an ideal indicator for 
comparison. GDP often represents social progress, with the belief that greater wealth at the 
macro level will ensure provision at the micro-level (Stiglitz et al., 2009). The importance of 
addressing the substantive function of welfare states is that it also aids in moving beyond a 
simple metric of growth. In doing so, it enables an assessment of how different welfare systems 
 
8, 1. Labour market services 2.Training 3.Job rotation and job sharing 4.Employment incentives 5.Supported 
employment and rehabilitation 6.Direct job creation 7.Start-up incentives 8.Out-of-work income maintenance 
and support 9.Early retirement 
9 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00076 
(accessed November 2016). 
10 There is no LMP data held for Iceland.  
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distribute for social capital outcomes. In line with other studies within the empirical literature 
(e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; van Oorschot et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2009; Gelissen 
et al. 2012) that measure the wealth of the country, as GDP per capita PPS; it is included as a 
control, to assess whether the proposed measures of generosity and universalism are of 
importance for the levels of individuals' social capital beyond GDP. As GDP may also account 
for a more general modernisation process, accounting for some of the cultural variation, it is 
worth pointing out that this may make the control tests a little conservative - something to 
bear in mind when assessing the significance of the welfare state measures within the models.    
Data taken from Eurostat national accounts11 is a weighted average of relative price ratios with 
respect to a basket of goods and services. The measure of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power 
Standards (GDP PPS) provides a meaningful comparison between countries that do not 
overinflate economic differences. Along with the other independent variables, GDP is 















(accessed March 2016). 
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Table 3.2: Country-level variables, standardised 
 Generosity Universalism Control Policy 






Austria 0.76 0.73 0.37 0.89 
Belgium 0.82 0.79 0.34 0.31 
Bulgaria 0.47 0.06 0.00 0.04 
Cyprus 0.50 0.22 0.23 0.10 
Czech 
Republic 
0.58 0.30 0.17 0.02 
Germany 0.61 0.61 0.36 0.50 
Denmark 0.91 1.00 0.38 0.73 
Estonia 0.38 0.06 0.11 0.17 
Greece 0.00 0.75 0.14 0.03 
Spain 0.59 0.41 0.22 0.37 
Finland 0.73 0.78 0.33 1.00 
France 0.79 0.82 0.29 0.71 
Hungary 0.26 0.39 0.09 0.05 
Ireland 0.79 0.06 0.39 0.76 
Italy 0.16 0.72 0.27 0.27 
Lithuania 0.20 0.05 0.09 0.04 
Luxembourg 0.95 0.41 1.00 0.09 
Latvia 0.61 0.00 0.05 0.28 
Malta 0.51 0.11 0.17 0.04 
Netherlands 1.00 0.64 0.40 0.25 
Poland 0.34 0.20 0.09 0.02 
Portugal 0.91 0.49 0.15 0.62 
Romania 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.01 
Sweden 0.61 0.80 0.37 0.19 
Slovenia 0.65 0.49 0.17 0.16 
Slovakia 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.00 
UK 0.48 0.64 0.27 0.03 
Croatia 0.51 0.27 0.06 0.10 
Iceland 0.75 0.20 0.32 : 
     







3.2.6 Dependent variables 
The theoretical and empirical work required for reliable social capital indicators is the focus of 
the next chapter. Here we present the detail of the variable composition as a reference guide 
that can be referred back to during the stages of analysis. As we identified in the previous 
chapter, there are four dimensions to the conceptual model of social capital, relating to 
networks and trust. 
Informal networks comprise of five observed variables that ask if an individual would get 
support in each of the following situations; [i) help around the house when ill ii) advice about 
a serious personal or family matter iii) help when looking for a job iv) someone to talk to if they 
were feeling a bit depressed v) able to borrow money in an emergency]. These measures are 
designed to precisely account for access to resources.  
Formal networks are measured through two separate indicators. Voluntary networks focus on 
how often an individual did unpaid voluntary work through the following organisations in the 
last 12 months; i) Community and social services ii) Education, cultural, sports or professional 
associations iii) Social movements or charities iv) Political parties, trade unions and v) Other 
voluntary organisations] designed to capture potential access in the broader network setting. 
These are variables considered most closely related to the perceived crowding-out within the 
welfare state. Political networks are derived from four questions that ask if an individual; i) 
attended a meeting of a trade union, a political party or political action group, ii) attended a 
protest or demonstration, iii) signed a petition, including an e-mail or online petition and iv) 
contacted a politician or public official (other than routine contact arising from the use of public 
services) in the past 12 months.   
The Institutional trust measures comprise of four observed variables; based on a scale of 1 to 
10 of how much an individual personally trusts - i) Parliament ii) the legal system iii) 
government iv) and local authorities] these variables reflect those institutions most related to 
the welfare state itself. Finally, there is a single indicator of interpersonal trust derived from 
the question; generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?, which also provides on a scale of 1 t o10].  
As will become apparent in the next chapter, these variables are themselves, not directly 






Table 3.3: Social capital dependent variables, standardised mean country scores 
Country Informal Voluntary Political Institutional  Interpersonal  
Austria 0.79 0.31 0.14 0.47 0.47 
Belgium 0.71 0.16 0.12 0.50 0.41 
Bulgaria 0.88 0.06 0.05 0.39 0.27 
Cyprus 0.68 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.33 
Czech Republic 0.86 0.21 0.10 0.33 0.30 
Germany 0.80 0.18 0.11 0.45 0.49 
Denmark 0.68 0.24 0.17 0.67 0.62 
Estonia 0.78 0.14 0.06 0.42 0.41 
Greece 0.86 0.12 0.09 0.36 0.18 
Spain 0.88 0.18 0.12 0.49 0.34 
Finland 0.69 0.27 0.14 0.69 0.60 
France 0.67 0.19 0.18 0.48 0.39 
Hungary 0.87 0.10 0.04 0.37 0.32 
Ireland 0.74 0.31 0.14 0.50 0.37 
Italy 0.81 0.13 0.11 0.43 0.27 
Lithuania 0.84 0.09 0.06 0.39 0.24 
Luxembourg 0.70 0.20 0.18 0.55 0.60 
Latvia 0.77 0.09 0.07 0.34 0.28 
Malta 0.79 0.13 0.07 0.41 0.43 
Netherlands 0.71 0.25 0.14 0.58 0.51 
Poland 0.88 0.11 0.06 0.42 0.30 
Portugal 0.83 0.15 0.05 0.36 0.28 
Romania 0.84 0.10 0.05 0.44 0.22 
Sweden 0.84 0.25 0.25 0.60 0.58 
Slovenia 0.90 0.15 0.06 0.47 0.25 
Slovakia 0.88 0.15 0.08 0.35 0.27 
UK 0.72 0.17 0.15 0.50 0.42 
Croatia 0.86 0.14 0.14 0.40 0.25 
Iceland 0.80 0.31 0.29 0.59 0.43 
      








3.3 Methodology  
With the data sources confirmed, I now explain the methods used to address the research 
hypotheses. Here I follow a multilevel modelling framework and a general structural equation 
modelling (SEM) framework that includes confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  
3.3.1 Factor Analysis 
All factor analytical methods involve the process of partitioning variance. Factor analysis 
assumes that the covariances (shared common variance) between a set of observed variables 
can be explained by a smaller number of underlying factors (Hox and Bechger 1998:357). The 
diagram (Figure 3.1) below illustrates the separation of variance and covariance. The unique 
variance is the specific variance (not explained by any factor in the model) plus measurement 
error - informing how well the observed variables are suited to a single factor. 
Figure 3.1: Partition of indicator variance in factor analysis  
  
Source: Kline (2015:190) 
 
There are two main reasons for employing factor analysis that directly relate to the 
appropriateness of the methodology. From one position, it is employed as a simple data 
reduction technique to reduce the number of observed variables into a common measurement 
system. The second is to address a theoretical hypothesis that combines seemingly 
uncorrelated variables into a single latent variable structure. Both are valid and well-explored 
approaches (Kline 2015). It is the second aspect of the methodology that is most significant to 
this study — allowing us empirically to confirm our theoretical positions while accounting for 
the unobserved or unknown of social capital. That is to say, social capital is not directly 
observable and must be approached as a latent variable construct. Unlike standard variables, 
such as occupation, income and education level, which have clearly defined measures, social 
capital resides within the structures of social relations. There is no simple scale to account for 
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the observation of social capital or the multifaceted nature of the proposed dimensions. The 
importance of acknowledging this proposition is that to address the theoretical construction 
of social capital and provide reliable indicators for analysis, we must employ the appropriate 
methodology; factor analysis.  
Factor analysis enables us to explore the relationship between data and theory in a meaningful 
way. The main distinction between exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) is the factor specification. EFA theoretically generates all possible solutions and 
is a statistical result led process. In CFA, the researcher specifies the number of factors and 
assignment of variables in advance. By testing the correspondence between indicators and 
constructs, CFA examines the extent to which a researcher's prior knowledge and theory is 
present within the actual data. The results of the tests tell us how well the data fit the 
theoretical construct - confirming or rejecting our theory. [Addressing measurement and 
construct validity is a central research aim of this thesis, which has not received the requisite 
attention within the literature].   
The purpose of CFA is to test a hypothesis about the factor structure. In order to do this, we 
must first obtain estimates of the model's parameters and second assess the fit of the model 
(Hox and Bechger 1998).  
3.3.2 CFA Model Parameters  
Each CFA model identifies factor loadings, unique variance and factor variance. Factor loadings 
are the regression slopes for the predicted indicators of the latent variable. Unique variance is 
the measurement error and the variance which is not accounted for by the latent variable. 
Factor variance indicates the sample variability between individuals for the latent variable. 
Where appropriate, a CFA model may also contain error covariances, signifying that two 
indictors covary (Brown 2015).   
Although we test for a two-factor model (formal social capital), the CFA models identified in 
the next chapter are primarily single-factor structures. The brief illustration below is 
representative of all CFA models applied, including the more complex models in chapter seven.  
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Figure 3.2: Two-factor CFA model, each with three observed variables and one error variance 
  
Name  Parameter Matrix Type Description 
Lambda 𝜆 Λ Regression  Factor loadings 
Theta-epsilon  𝜖 Θϵ   Variance–covariance  
Error variances and 
covariances 
Psi  𝜓 Ψ Variance–covariance  
Factor variances and 
covariances 
Tau  𝜏  Mean vector  Indicator intercepts 
Alpha  𝛼  Mean vector  Latent means 
Eta    Vector  
Names of 
endogenous variables 
Source: Brown (2015:49) 
Figure 3.2 provides a graphical representation of a simple CFA model with notation12. Factor 
loadings are represented by lambdas (𝜆), the unidirectional arrows (→) from the factors ( ) 
[represented as a circle] to the indicators (Y) [represented as a square] depict the direct 
(regression) effects. The curved bidirectional arrows symbolise the covariance; between the 
factors (𝜓) and the error covariances between the indicators (𝜖). All error variances and 
 
12 Although there is a slightly different notation between latent X and Y, for what is exogenous (X) latent 
variables and endogenous latent variables (Y), specification does not affect parameter estimates (Brown 2015). 




covariances are contained in the theta(Θ) matrix (Brown 2015). The corresponding data matrix 
is represented below (3.0). [Note: Latent variables are unobserved and have no scale of 
measurement, as such, one of the etas is constrained to 1 in each factor; each pattern 


























































The basic measurement model within the general CFA framework is: 
𝛾  =  +Λy +      (3.1) 
𝑥  =  + Λx 𝜉  +  𝛿    (3.11) 
The specific pattern of variances and covariances found within the observed variables are 
represented in matrix form as vectors. Where 𝛾 is a p × 1 vector of observed variables, eta (η) 
is an m-vector of latent variables, lambda (Λ) is a p × m matrix of factor loadings and epsilon 
( 𝑖) is a p × 1 measurement errors that are uncorrelated with the factors. Possible correlations 
may exist among the error terms, which are contained in the theta ( ) matrix.  (Heck and 
Thomas 2015:137). 
In a matrix form, the variance-covariance structure is represented as:  
Σ = ΛΨΛ + Θ    (3.2) 
Where psi (Ψ) is a m x m symmetric matrix of factor variances and covariances, and theta (Θ) 
is a p x p symmetric covariance matrix of residuals, normally distributed with a mean of zero. 
The observed variables link to the underlying factors through the factor loadings (Λ) (Heck and 
Thomas 2015:137). This structure allows us to specify each parameter of the CFA model. The 
notation for estimating the variances and covariances in the CFA model is presented in 
equations (3.3 to 3.5) below. 
𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑦2) = 𝜎22 = 𝜆21
       2𝜓11 + 𝜖2  (3.3) 
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑦2, 𝑦3) = 𝜎3,2 = 𝜆21𝜓11𝜆31  (3.4) 




3.3.3 Estimating Model Parameters 
Obtaining estimates for each parameter of the CFA model, estimation procedures derive the 
relation of the covariance matrix of the observed variables to the structural parameters (Bollen 
1998). A fitting function is applied to minimise the difference between the predicted 
covariance matrix (Σ) and the sample covariance matrix (Ѕ). The maximum likelihood (ML) and 
weighted least squares (WLS) functions are represented below (3.6 and 3.7).  
The ML fit function expresses the log of the implied covariance matrix, plus the sum of diagonal 
elements (trace operator) of the inverse of the implied covariance matrix, multiplied by the 
observed covariance matrix minus the log of the observed covariance matrix minus p, where p 
is the number of parameters estimated in the model (Davey and Savla 2010:29). (See Bollen 
1998, for full derivation).  
𝐹𝑀𝐿 = ln |Σ| + 𝑡𝑟(ЅΣ
−1) − ln|Ѕ| − 𝑝  (3.6) 
When the models are complex and comprised of categorical variables, ML estimation can be 
computationally demanding. In such instances, WLS estimation is applied. It follows the same 
principle of minimising the discrepancy between Ѕ (sample of polychoric correlations) and Σ 
(implied asymptotic covariance matrix) but uses a positive-definite weight matrix (𝑊) (Muthén 
1984). 
𝐹𝑊𝐿𝑆 = 1/2(Ѕ − Σ)𝑊
−1(Ѕ − Σ)  (3.7) 
 
3.3.4 Path Analysis  
Within the SEM framework, CFA is essentially the measurement part of the model imposed on 
the data (Hox and Bechger 1998). When our attention turns to understanding the relationship 
between the dimensions of social capital in chapter seven, we add a structural component to 
the model. Here the significance of path analysis is that it allows us to combine factor analysis 
with regression analysis. In doing so, we maintain the latent variable structures of our social 
capital dimensions while inferring the likely interrelationships between them. If we recall the 
factor model in Figure 3.2, the curved bidirectional arrows symbolised the covariance between 
the factors (ψ). In a structural model where we assume one factor to have an effect on the 
other, the covariance becomes a regression model (𝛾) indicated by a directional arrow. To 
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make this a little clearer to the reader, the example below taken from Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh (2004:87) provides the general form and path diagram of a structural model with four 
latent variables.  
In Figure 3.3, the structural model shows both latent dependent variables ( ) are regressed 
on (𝛾) both latent explanatory variables (𝜉) and one latent dependent variable is regressed 
on the other (𝛽), assuming 𝜉1𝑗 and 𝜉2𝑗 are correlated whereas 1𝑗 and 2𝑗  are uncorrelated. 




 ] = [ 
0   0
𝛽21 0
 ]   [ 
1𝑗
2𝑗





 ]  [ 
𝜉1𝑗
𝜉2𝑗
 ] + [ 
1𝑗
2𝑗
 ].  (3.8) 
In general matrix form, the SEM model is represented as; 
𝑗 = Β 𝑗 + Γ𝜉 + 𝑗      (3.9) 
Where eta ( ) is a vector of latent factors, Beta (Β) is a matrix of regression coefficients among 
the latent factors. Gamma (Γ) is a matrix regression of coefficients relating to the latent 
factors, and Zeta ( )  is a vector of residuals. This basic framework will be used in chapter seven 
when we explore the interrelationships between social capital dimensions.  
Figure 3.3: Path diagram for the structural equation model 
 


























Following estimation of the models' specified parameters, we still require an assessment of 
their validity and reliability. That is to say, how confident are we that the models proposed are 
correct and fit the data. There are several measures to test the underlying assumptions of 
model fit and data correspondence, which I now explore.    
3.3.5 Model Fit 
The statistical test applied to assess the model itself is the chi-square test, which indicates the 
models' reliability. This test is a rejection of the null hypothesis that 𝑆 = Σ; the observed 
covariance matrix is the same as the predicted covariance matrix, where 𝐹𝑀𝐿(3.6) and 𝐹𝑊𝐿𝑆 
(3.7) are the fit functions, and (𝑛 − 1) are the degrees of freedom. 
𝜒2 = (𝑛 − 1)𝐹𝑀𝐿   (3.10) 
An issue with the chi-square test of model fit is that large sample sizes and model complexity 
can sometimes obscure the actual observation. A large n increases the power of the chi-square 
test, which can lead to an over rejection of models, even if the residuals are small (Eskamp 
2017; Barrett 2007; Kline 2005). As a result, fit indices are applied to assess the level of 'misfit' 
or approximate level of model fit. They are not directly significance tests themselves but are 
continuous measures of model-data correspondence. There are four types of 'good' and 'bad' 
fit indices: i) Absolute fit indexes measure how well a priori model explains the data ii) 
Incremental (relative, comparative) fit indexes measure the relative improvement in the fit of 
the researcher's model over that of a baseline model. iii) Parsimony-adjusted indexes include 
in their formulas a correction or "penalty" for model complexity iv) Predictive fit indexes 
replicate model fit through multiple samples drawn from the same population (Kline 
2015:266). 
Practical cut-offs for observed models introduced to aid model assessment are by their very 
nature arbitrary and not a measure of statistical reliability (Kline 215). However, if there is 
theoretical support and confidence in the model, we can utilise them to assess and clarify the 
model. This does not mean that if the statistical reliability is missing, using fit indices can 
replace and justify the model. Rather that it adds contextual information to our understanding 
of the relationship between the model and data. 
The appropriate thresholds found within the literature considered as a guide for ‘reliable’ 
indices are:   
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i) The CFI (Bentler Comparative Fit Index) compares the researcher's model against that of the 
independence (null) model. A score of .90 indicates the fit of the proposed model is 90 per 
cent better than the baseline model, with a score ≥ .95 preferred (Bentler 1990).  
𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 1 − [𝜒𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
2 − 𝑑𝑓𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝜒𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙
2 − 𝑑𝑓𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙⁄ ]  (3.11) 
ii) The TLI (Tucker-Lewis Index) imposes a greater penalty for model complexity than the CFI, 
with scores of ≥ .90 and above indicated as acceptable.  
𝑇𝐿𝐼 =  [(𝜒𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙
2 𝑑𝑓𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙⁄ ) − (𝜒𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
2 𝑑𝑓𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙⁄ ) ]/[(𝜒𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙
2 𝑑𝑓𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙⁄ ) − 1] (3.12) 
iii) The RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) upper bound of the 90 per cent 
confidence interval should be ≤ .08. Hu and Bentler suggest (1999) .06 and Stieger (2007) .07 
as a more suitable cut-off.  This measure informs the probability that the model is correct and 
explains the data.   
RMSEA = √[𝜒𝑀
2 − 𝑑𝑓𝑀]/[(𝑁 − 1)𝑑𝑓𝑀]  (3.13) 
iv) The SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual) is a measure of the mean absolute 
correlation residual - the difference between the observed and predicted correlations. Here an 




𝑝(𝑝 + 1)/2 + 𝑝 
   (3.14) 
Where 𝑆 is               (3.16) 































𝑝 is the number of variables in the model, 𝑆𝑗𝑘 and 𝜎𝑗𝑘  is the sample and model estimated 
covariance between the 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ and 𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ variables. 𝑚𝑗 and 𝑢𝑗  is the sample and the model-
estimated mean of the 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ variable (Asparouhov and Muthén 2018:5). 
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The default estimator used for categorical data is the WLSMV. This estimation process provides 
a WRMR indicator as a replacement test to the SRMR, which is an experimental fit statistic. 
Although a cut-off around ≤ 1.0 is applied and increasingly reported with the literature, it is 
generally considered to be of low importance and does not significantly contribute new 




/𝑒𝑒𝑟    (3.17)  
 
 
3.3.6 Local fit testing 
Relying on the global fit statistics alone may still hide some model misspecification. It is possible 
to have a high CFI well above the threshold yet still have some misspecification within the 
model. The RMSEA is often a good indication of whether there is an internal inconsistency 
concerning the correlated relationship of the chosen variables. If there is any uncertainty of 
the model fit following the chi-square test and global fit statistics, the correlation residuals 
provide clarification over potential issues with data correspondence. Where variables appear 
correlated at the >.10 level, there is an indication that the model requires further specification 
or adjustment (Goodboy and Kline 2017). In such instances, it is also helpful to consult the 
modification indices. 
3.3.7 Modification Indices  
The fact that modification indices are available does not alone provide sufficient justification 
for application to improve model fit. Pursuing a lower chi-square score or p-value does not 
automatically guarantee an improved specified model. Relaxing parameters within a model, 
the change in degrees of freedom and parameterisation will often result in a change in the chi-
square statistic without necessarily improving the model. However, if there are theoretical 
justifications for specifying relationships between the observed variables within the models, 
we are on much safer ground to provide meaningful modifications that identify reliable models 
within the data. Theory first, data correspondence second, is the approach that I follow 
throughout model identification and application.     
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Following the construction and establishment of reliable indicators, the next step is to consider 
data extraction for analysis.  
3.3.8 Factor Scores 
The application of CFA allows the researcher to assess the suitability of generating latent 
factors from the data that can better represent the construct of social capital. By analysing the 
covariance between multiple observed variables, CFA draws our attention to what is 
unobserved within the data. After establishing a tested theoretical model, it is then possible to 
generate a single indicator of measurement that represents the specified structure, one that 
can be utilised as a dependent variable for multilevel analysis. There are a few approaches to 
generating factor scores, which results in different outcomes.  
Sum scores are the simplest way to estimate factor scores. This approach essentially sums the 
raw scores of item loadings for each individual. Each factor has an equal weighting regardless 
of the loading, so it cannot account for each variable's contribution to the factor. OLS 
regression scores predict the location of each individual on the factor, taking into account the 
correlation between the observed variables (DiStefano et al., 2009). 
It is also possible to generate factor scores through the maximum likelihood function, where 
the estimates taken from factors scores create a model for each individual [the likelihood of 
an estimated factor score given the data].  Using factor means and covariances to define the 
likelihood provides a significantly more reliable account of the data and individual's scores 
(Estabrook and Neale 2013). 
The final method for consideration is the expected posterior methods approach (EAP) which 
uses Bayesian estimation. Here a distribution of factor scores for each individual is taken as 
plausible values to generate multiple data sets and compute the posterior for each latent. 
Parameters are assumed to vary, so uncertainty in model estimation can be considered, with 
the Bayes estimator providing more reliable standard errors (Asparouhov and Muthén 2010).  
3.3.9 Selection  
The main difference between the Bayes and maximum likelihood approach regarding factor 
estimates and errors is its performance in small samples (Estabrook and Neale 2013).  As there 
are a large number of cases within the EQLS, the maximum likelihood should enable the 
production of reliable factor scores assigned to each individual in the data set. Remaining 
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within the Stata environment, factor scores are generated using the Bayes estimator, which 
provides a suitable and reliable form of data extraction.  
Following the extraction of factor scores, we are in a position to use these scores as single 
dependent variables in data analysis. The method most suited to our area of inquiry is the 
application of multilevel analysis. 
3.4 Multilevel Analysis 
In standard multiple regression, the units of analysis are independent observations, assuming 
that residuals are uncorrelated with one another. If the group effects remain unaccounted for, 
then the independence assumption will not hold. While fixed effects models with dummy 
group variables maintain independence, the reliability of parameter estimation of numerous 
countries can be problematic. It is also not possible to estimate the group-level predictors 
separate from the effects of the group dummies (Steele 2008). Multilevel (random effects) 
models, on the other hand, allow us to overcome this confounding problem, enabling the 
effects of both types of variables to be estimated. One further issue of ignoring the hierarchical 
structure of the data is underestimating the standard errors of the regression coefficients. This 
decision can lead to overstated statistical significance, which is more problematic at the 
country-level (Steele 2008), itself a significant area of the research focus. 
In summary, multilevel analysis allows us to reliably estimate the correct standard errors and 
analyse the within-group and between-group variance, explaining variability between 
individuals and between groups. By separating the individual-level from the country-level, we 
can take the context and environment of individuals into consideration.  
The level of variance that is present at the country-level is estimated through the intraclass 
correlation (ICC) - defined by the equation below (3.18). The ICC is the proportion of group-






              (3.18) 
Following a two-level model, understanding individuals (level 1) to be nested within countries 
(level 2), we aim to understand how the country-level effects of welfare state generosity (in 
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the form of replacement rates) and universalism (in the form of means-testing), relate to 
individuals outcomes of social capital (as measured through networks and trust). 
3.4.1 Random intercept model 
The simplest hierarchal linear model is the random effects model without any explanatory 
variables (at the individual or country level). The empty model contains random variation 
between and within groups, represented in the linear notation below (3.19). Where the 
dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the sum of the general mean 𝛾00, a random effect at the group level, 
𝑈𝑜𝑗, and a random effect at the individual level, 𝑅𝑖𝑗  (Snijders and Bosker 2012:49):  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00+ 𝑈𝑜𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗.        (3.19) 
The empty model identifies the partitioned variance between the two levels within the data. 
This is particularly useful, as it tells us how much country-level variation there is to explore. 
The total variance in the dependent variable is the sum of variance within the population and 
variance between countries around the true mean. The total variance of 𝑌 represents the sum 
of the level-two and level-one variances below (3.20). The random variables 𝑈0𝑗 and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are 
assumed to have a mean of 0 and to be mutually independent.  
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑗) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑈0𝑗) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖𝑗) = 𝜏0
2 + 𝜎2.   (3.20) 
The covariance between two individuals (𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖′) in the same group (𝑗) is equal to the 
variance of the contribution (𝑈0𝑗) that these individuals share, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑌𝑖𝑗, 𝑌𝑖′𝑗) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑈𝑜𝑗) =  𝜏0
2.      (3.21) 
The correlation between two random individuals drawn from the same group is essentially the 
interclass correlation (𝜌) and explains the total variability due to the group level.           
(3.22) 









3.4.2 Random intercept model with individual explanatory variables  
 
Introducing random parameters into the model allows regression coefficients to vary between 
groups, accounting for the fact that some groups, on average, will have higher 𝑌 responses and 
others will have lower ones. The random intercept model with explanatory variables at the 
176 
 
individual level includes those socio-demographic characteristics most relevant to 
understanding social capital variation [age, gender, marital status, education, income, 
employment, social benefits and citizenship]. All individual variables are included 
simultaneously as each is theoretically relevant to understanding social capital outcomes. This 
model contains unexplained variance at two levels, with the group effects 𝑈𝑜𝑗 left unexplained 
by explanatory variables (𝑥).  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + ∑  𝑝 𝛽𝑝𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑗+ 𝑈𝑜𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗       (3.23) 
𝑌𝑖𝑗= dependent variable, 𝑋𝑝 = individual explanatory variables, 𝛽0= coefficient for constant (intercept), 𝛽𝑝= 
coefficient for individual-level explanatory variables, 𝑈0𝑗: group level residuals, 𝑅𝑖𝑗: individual-level residuals. 
 
3.4.3 The random intercept model with contextual variables  
At the group level, each explanatory variable is included in turn to assess its effect before 
combining all other control variables. These are the specific welfare state measures of 
generosity (replacement rates) and universalism (non-means testing), alongside ALMPs and 
the specific control measure of GDP (per capita purchasing power parity), here indicated as 𝑍𝑞. 
Again explanatory variables providing the regression parameters for the average effect on (𝑦). 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + ∑  𝑝 𝛽𝑝𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑  𝑞 𝛽𝑞𝑍𝑞𝑗+ 𝑈𝑜𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗       (3.24) 
𝑌𝑖𝑗= dependent variable, 𝑋𝑝 = individual explanatory variables, 𝑍𝑞 = country level explanatory variables 𝛽0= 
coefficient for constant (intercept), 𝛽𝑝= coefficient for individual level explanatory variables, 𝛽𝑞= coefficient for 
country level explanatory variables, 𝑈0𝑗 : group level residuals, 𝑅𝑖𝑗: individual-level residuals. 
3.4.4 The random slope model 
The addition of  𝑈𝑜𝑗 in the random intercept model (3.19) expresses the potential for country-
level variation from the mean - social capital can vary between countries. In the random slope 
model, the inclusion of a second random effect ( 𝑈1𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗) represents the variation between the 
group and the explanatory variable. For example, as used in this thesis, the effect of 
socioeconomic status on social capital may differ between countries. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑗 + ∑  𝑝 𝛽𝑝𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑  𝑞 𝛽𝑞𝑍𝑞𝑗+ 𝑈1𝑗𝑋1𝑖𝑗+ 𝑈𝑜𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗   (3.25) 
𝑌𝑖𝑗= dependent variable, 𝑋1=individual level variable allowed to vary across countries, 𝑋𝑝= individual explanatory 
variables, 𝑍𝑞 = country-level explanatory variables 𝛽0= coefficient for constant (intercept), β1= coefficient for 
individual-level variable allowed to vary across countries,  𝛽𝑝= coefficient for individual-level explanatory 





In this model, the level-two residuals ( 𝑈𝑜𝑗) and ( 𝑈1𝑗), along with level-one residuals (𝑅𝑖𝑗), have 
a mean of 0, given the value of 𝑋. Where 𝛽0 is the average intercept and 𝛽1 is the average 
regression coefficient for 𝑋. The term  𝑈1𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the interaction term between the group and 
the individual. This model implies that for individuals within the same group, their correlation 
and variation of 𝑌 are dependent on the value of 𝑋. It also assumes that group-level random 
effects are independent of the level one residuals, which themselves are normally distributed 
(Bosker and Snijders 2012:75). 
var (𝑈0𝑗)         =   𝜏00      =  𝜏0
2     (3.26) 
var(𝑈1𝑗)          =    𝜏11    =    𝜏1
2 
cov(𝑈𝑜𝑗, 𝑈𝑖𝑗)   =   𝜏01 
What this means within the context of the hypotheses is that after observing the individual and 
country-level effects on social capital, we can assess whether the differences in social capital 
outcomes between groups are because of country effects. In order to identify whether the 
specific measures of generosity and universalism reduce social capital inequalities between 
SEGs (the aim in chapter six), we can add a cross-level interaction to the model. The aim here 
is further to reduce the unexplained variance of 𝑈𝑜𝑗 and 𝑈1𝑗. The introduction of the 𝑍1 term 
indicates that part of the variability in the intercept and slope is now explained through 𝑍. The 
product of this interaction between 𝑋and 𝑍 is a cross-level interaction as it involves an 
explanatory variable from both the individual and country levels. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑍1𝑗𝑋1𝑖𝑗 + ∑  𝑝 𝛽𝑝𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑  𝑞 𝛽𝑞𝑍𝑞𝑗+ 𝑈1𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗+ 𝑈𝑜𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗  (3.27) 
𝑌𝑖𝑗= dependent variable, 𝑋1=individual level variable allowed to vary across countries, 𝑍1= country-level variable, 
varies across groups, 𝑋𝑝= individual explanatory variables, 𝑍𝑞= country-level explanatory variables, 𝛽0= 
coefficient for constant (intercept), β1= coefficient for individual-level variable allowed to vary across countries,  
𝛽𝑝= coefficient for individual-level explanatory variables, 𝛽𝑞= coefficient for country-level explanatory variables, 
𝑈0𝑗 , 𝑈𝑖𝑗: group-level residuals, 𝑅𝑖𝑗: individual-level residuals. 
 
The importance of applying multilevel analysis in this thesis is that the approach specifically 
allows us to address the research questions whilst acknowledging the nature of our data.  In 
order to ensure that one can be confident in the model results, consideration also needs to 
address estimation procedures.   
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3.4.5 Estimation and sample size 
There are two main estimation methods for estimating parameters under the assumption of 
normal distribution - maximum likelihood (ML) estimation and restricted estimation (REML). 
The regression coefficients themselves differ little with respect to the estimation approach but 
vary in terms of the variance components. Simulation studies indicate that ML estimation of 
the variance components can have a downward bias compared to the REML estimator. When 
the sample size is large, which the literature indicates as ≥ 50, the type of estimator applied 
has no consequence (Snijders and Bosker 2012; Mass and Hox 2005). There is no specified fixed 
sample size; reviews of guidelines suggest 30 groups are required to ensure unbiased estimates 
(McNeish and Stapleton 2014), while others specify a minimum of 20 clusters (Snijders and 
Bosker 2012) for reliable results. 
Although we have large sample sizes at the individual level, our level 2 sample size is restricted 
to the number of countries within the data set and the geographical area of Europe.  With 29 
countries, the sample size is within the acceptable range for ML estimation. REML accounts for 
the uncertainty in the fixed parameters; it is more suited to estimating the variance 
components when the number of groups is limited (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and 
Bosker 2012). With this in mind, I apply both estimation procedures to ensure confidence in 
the results.   
It is not possible to perform log-likelihood tests when the parameters have been constrained, 
as in the case of REML estimation; ML estimation will assess the significance of the differences 
between models, whilst REML estimation will assess the final model. Comparison of the final 
models between estimation procedures should ensure confidence in the findings and draw our 
attention to any potential differences that may arise.  
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has broadly set out the data and methodology that will allow us to explore the 
research hypotheses and address the social capital welfare state relationship. In the next 
chapter, the focus is on the dependent variable. Here I specifically employ CFA to provide 





4 Dependent variable  
This chapter provides the theoretical and empirical work required to establish a reliable 
measurement of social capital. The work undertaken here will then inform the subsequent 
analyses, ensuring that the hypotheses test what they purport to measure. As our conceptual 
model illustrated in the literature review, social capital is a multi-dimensional construct and 
cannot be reduced single composite indicator. Social capital is also inherently abstract and 
requires subjective interpretation to translate into operational measures (Narayan and Cassidy 
2001:61). It is critical to ensure that there is sound reasoning behind the operationalisation 
and crucially that the operational measures themselves are statistically robust. Based on 
existing theory and empirical operationalisation, this chapter sets out the context for improved 
measurement before applying the methodology of CFA. The aim is to arrive at a position where 
we address the importance of social capital dimensionality while explicitly acknowledging 
social capital as a latent construct. This attention to the mechanisms and measures of social 
capital is of central importance to providing a coherent model for social capital. I begin by 
introducing existing approaches and operationalisation.  
4.1 Existing approaches 
As we illustrated in the literature review, there are multiple accounts of social capital. Some 
studies focus on the individual level, others at the collective level, while some combine both 
properties for measurement. Some studies focus on single dimensions of social capital, some 
include all dimensions, and others fall somewhere in between. While there are often 
substantive reasons for selecting some dimensions over others, this does not always help 
clarify the concept and interpret its relationship to the welfare state. When we factor in the 
various operationalisation, the comparison becomes further problematic.  
The conceptual framework specifies the need to account for dimensionality, which does have 
some support within the literature. Van Oorschot et al. (2006), who explore the social 
determinants of social capital within the EU, focus on the three dimensions of networks, trust 
and civism.  Networks are operationalised through two dimensions: i) the number of active and 
passive participation voluntary organisations individuals' are part of, ii) the amount of time 
spent with primary relations of family and friends. Trust is measured through the level of trust 
in i) welfare state institutions and ii) generalised trust in others. The third dimension is based 
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on civism and relates to the i) trustworthiness of civic commitment and morality, along with ii) 
individuals political engagement.  
Kaasa and Parts (2008) also observe the individual-level determinants of social capital from a 
dimensional perspective. They differentiate between the structural dimension: informal and 
formal social capital and the cognitive dimension: generalised and institutional trust. Informal 
networks are measured through i) frequency of spending time with friends and ii) the 
importance of spending time with friends and colleagues. Formal networks have an active and 
passive distinction measured by i) organisational membership and ii) unpaid voluntary work in 
associations. Trust is measured through i) generalised trust in others, ii) confidence in 
institutions (police, parliament and press). 
Oorschot and Finsveen (2010) provide a dimensional approach to exploring social capital 
inequalities within European welfare regimes. Networks are distinguished by i) active 
participation in unpaid voluntary organisations and ii) passive participation, providing a count 
of organisational membership. Trust is identified through i) interpersonal (trust in others) and 
ii) institutional measured through confidence in police, parliament and civil service. The final 
dimension of social norms addresses trustworthiness through four questions relating to 
acceptable moral behaviours. These papers highlight the prospect of addressing the 
complexity of social capital. Employing a dimensional approach allows us to understand the 
specific relationship to the welfare state. 
What these studies also have in common, along with a large number within the literature, is 
the operationalisation of measures.  Gelissen et al. (2012) operationalise the social capital 
dependent variable access to resources in informal networks through eight questions in the 
2004 Eurobarometer survey and sum the responses providing a scale of 0 to 8. They provide a 
Cronbach's alpha for the scale, suggesting it is a valid construct but give little detail. Koster and 
Bruggeman (2008) use how often they socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues on a 
scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (several times per week) as their dependent variable. 
Scheepers et al. (2002) employ two questions on the frequency of contact with family and 
friends, with frequencies ranging from every day to never, providing a simple scale. 
Carmo and Nunes (2012) operationalise informal networks through how often do you meet 
socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues? 'Compared to other people of your age, how 
often would you say you take part in social activities- each providing a scale. Formal networks 
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through whether they were or had ever been a trade union member or similar organisation, 
and are you a member of any political party? A scale is created for trust based on three 
questions that have a high alpha score. Halman and Luijkx (2006) employ factor analysis to 
analyse four dimensions of institutional and interpersonal trust, along with social activism and 
formal engagement. Although they provide little information on the reliability of the indicators, 
other than some form of factor analysis was carried out, and scores applied. It does 
acknowledge the dimensional approach required to deal with the uncorrelated measures that 
a single scale would ignore. 
Kääriäinen and Lehtonen (2006), distinguishing between bonding, bridging, informal support, 
and generalised trust again provide summed scales as operationalised dependent variables. 
Frequency of contact with family and friends, visiting family members, and the number of 
friends are initially scaled to 1 to 8 then summed. Seven questions on participation in voluntary 
organisations with categorical responses are assumed to be scale then summed. The same for 
informal support with 6 imposed scaled summations. Finally, generalised trust is a reverse 
coded Likert scale that is then summed for the three questions.  All are categorical response 
categories have been given the equivalence of a scale (given the limited number, whether this 
can be considered a scale is perhaps open to question) then summed to create a single 
indicator of each dimension for multilevel analysis.  
What we observe from these studies is an apparent attempt to generate a variety of coherent 
scales from multiple indicators. Whilst this is a sensible approach and theoretically informed, 
it is often difficult to observe the construct validity of these measures. There are some 
references to alpha scores but provide little justification beyond the practicality of data 
reduction. Data reduction in itself is not a limitation. Given the nature of the topic and the 
potential operationalisation of a vast number of variables, it is an appropriate solution. What 
is often overlooked is the fact that social capital is inherently a latent construct. If we take social 
capital to imply a potential resource that one can access through network structures, then 
proxies such as the frequency of contact are themselves not direct measures of social capital. 
It is not the summation of the observed variables, but what they imply that is important. What 
this means in a practical sense is ensuring that the theory which led to the dimensional 
construct should then be empirically substantiated. 
This is the position that Kaasa and Parts (2008) follow in exploring the individual-level 
determinants of social capital with the 2006 World Values Survey, taking 12 indicators to infer 
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five dimensions (adding norms alongside informal, formal institutional and interpersonal). They 
employ CFA to test the convergent and discriminate validity of the latent variables, confirming 
reliable operationalisation of each dimension, using the factor scores for cluster analysis. 
Guillen et al. (2011) also utilise the SEM methodology to explore social participation in the 2002 
ESS. Their social participation index is derived through informal, formal and trust latent 
variables - providing a statistically reliable composite score. 
4.2 A considered approach  
As previously indicated in the literature, the operationalisation of social capital comes in a 
variety of ways, with varying degrees of success. The outcome of which has led to an 
inconclusive picture of the welfare state's relationship to social capital. Part of this difficulty is 
resultant from theoretical approaches that have looked to operationalise social capital without 
entirely situating it within a comprehensive framework. Another issue is due to the selectivity 
of variables or aspects of social capital that often provide an incomplete picture. Here 
dimensions refer to social capital as a whole, which often cloud the welfare state-social capital 
debate. Such incidences are often influenced by data availability that restricts the ability to 
tackle the complexity of social capital fully. Within the context of these two positions, the 
methodological difficulties become apparent. Situating the dependent variable within the 
context of theory and related measurement also requires us to apply the corrected 
methodological tools that are both justified and rigorously assessed. 
To move the discussion on and provide some improved measurement of social capital that 
accounts for its multifaceted nature, I follow a strict multi-dimensional approach—focussing 
on social capital as informal and formal networks (structural), alongside institutional and 
interpersonal trust (relational). It is essential to bear in mind that as social capital is not directly 
observable, there is no simple metric that one can offer to account for the possession of social 
capital. In order to capture the presence and relational nature of capital, we aim to move 
beyond the observed to the unobserved. The idea of assessing latent variables is to examine 
the underlying data structure and empirically test our theoretical propositions. The statistical 
assessment and representation of our theoretical constructs within the data are obtained 




How we include a broad range of indicators to represent the specific dimensions is a central 
aim of this chapter. Here I rely on the application of CFA to ensure that both the theoretical 
and empirical conceptualisation of social capital.  Before we begin assessing indicators and 
models, it is worth showing some of the preparatory work that formed the basis of the CFA 
approach. [Specifically acknowledging the correlated nature of the observed indicators]. 
4.3 Preliminary data correspondence   
Although we commonly see summative indexes within the literature as a logical approach to 
data reduction, the relationship between the variables is not always singular. Uncorrelated 
variables are combined when they might be better suited to factor analytical approaches. In 
order to confirm the viability of the CFA approach, some initial analyses assessed the suitability 
of the data structure and the relationship between the variables.  
Correlation tests provided a quick clarification on the nature of the expected relationship 
between the variables. (See appendix C). Except for the institutional trust variables, which were 
reasonably correlated, all dimensions showed only a slight correlation with each other. The 
implication here is that simple counts might not adequately account for the composition of 
different observed variables as a single measure. Rather than summation as a proxy for social 
capital dimensions, factor analysis may provide greater insight into understanding the 
representation of indicators within the data. Specifically, the position taken in this thesis is the 
theoretical distinction of where social capital resides. It is found within the networks and not 
directly observed by adding up the number of networks. The summation is an inadequate proxy 
of an inherently latent construct, such as social capital.  
Exploratory factor analysis confirmed the expected dimensional separation of the social capital 
variables. Included are all those potential variables related to the social capital concept 
discussed in the operationalisation section. The scree plot below provides a graphical 
representation of the number of possible factors for extraction within the dataset. The 
separation of factors found here reflects the dimensionality of social capital; voluntary, political 
and social participation, along with trust and informal support. [Note: in this initial analysis, the 
sixth factor in the graph is mainly attributable to the religious participation indicator]. 
176 
 
Figure 4.1: Scree plot of potential social capital factors 
 
With the background for an alternative strategy of data reduction laid out, it is vital to consider 
the operationalisation of the variables themselves. It is not a simple fact of specific variables 
being available; their inclusion must also be theoretically justified. 
4.4 Operationalisation 
Returning to social capital theory, we understand social capital as the potential resources 
derived through the networks of relations (Bourdieu 1986) and the trust that resides within 
them, which is both individual and collective in nature (Coleman 1988). Theoretically and 
empirically distinguished by the structural (formal and informal networks) and relational 
(interpersonal and institutional trust) forms of social capital. I visit each dimension, in turn, 
drawing attention to both the conceptual and empirical clarification for model specification.   
4.4.1 Informal networks 
The majority of the social capital literature follows the premise that if a network exists, it can 
represent the accrual of social capital. However, whether questions relating to the frequency 
of contact [the most widely used and accepted proxy] measure an individual's social capital 
remain contested (Portes 1998).  
Alternatively, Finsveen and van Oorschot (2008) identify how we can better understand social 
capital through access to actual or potential resources derived through network membership 
rather than the network itself.  It is possible to provide a coherent approach for 
operationalising social capital, improving both measurement and representation. Here the 
onus is whether one can obtain or gain access to a resource when required. According to their 
networks, this approach understands that individuals have multiple needs, which may or may 
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not be met. By explicitly addressing access, it conceptually adheres to our understanding of 
social capital as an individual available resource. From a theoretical perspective, it remains in 
line with the individual level approach. Where 'the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources are linked to possession of a durable network' (Bourdieu, 1986:249).  This idea of 
the 'potential resource' adopted in this position explicitly accounts for an individual's social 
capital. 
Within the chosen data set, specific questions related to our distinction of access to potential 
resources from informal networks, five specifically relating to individuals' ability to get help and 
support. If you needed to, from whom would you get support; i) help around the house when 
ill ii) advice about a serious personal or family matter iii) help when looking for a job iv) 
someone to talk to if they were feeling a bit depressed v) able to urgently borrow money if 
they needed to. The response categories present an apparent distinction between formal and 
informal support provision (Table 4.1). In order to capture the 'crowding-out' effect, I created 
a dichotomous variable that combined the family and friends responses to indicate access to 
informal social capital. The response categories institutions and nobody was combined to 
indicate no access to informal social capital (Table 4.2). The distinction made here is that the 
implied 'crowding-out' effect of informal social networks is from both the displacement of 
social support provided through formal arrangements and from the wider detrimental impact 
the welfare state has on social ties, as a result of the weakened moral obligations to one 
another (Wolfe 1989). 
The obvious limitation with this approach is that there is a slight bias towards observing 
crowding-out by placing institutions in the no access category. Those who respond to receiving 
help and support through institutions cannot also report receiving help from family or friends. 
This limitation is inherent in the structure of the questionnaire. It does, however, still provide 
an opportunity to observe access to resources in informal situations, which is our primary aim 






Table 4.1: Response breakdown of access to informal networks 
Response 
category 
Help when ill 
able to get 
advice 
help looking 
 for a job 
Support when 
depressed 
Borrow money in 
an emergency  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Family  30,800 82.10 26,764 71.34 10,155 27.07 22,198 59.17 25,350 67.57 
Friend 
/neighbour 4,305 11.47 7,880 21.00 8,307 22.14 11,987 31.95 4,325 11.53 
Institution 
/service provider 1,399 3.73 1,395 3.72 7,616 20.30 1,017 2.71 3,395 9.05 
None 775 2.07 1,118 2.98 7,119 18.98 1,864 4.97 3,383 9.02 
Missing  21 0.06 32 0.09 982 2.69 62 0.17 132 0.36 
DK 217 0.59 319 0.87 3,268 8.95 379 1.04 927 2.54 
N 37,517 100 37,517 100 37,517 100 37,517 100 37,517 100 
 
Table 4.2: Breakdown of recoded informal social capital 
Variable No Yes Missing Total 
 N  % N  % N  
Help when ill 2,174 5.83 35,105 94.17 238 37,517 
able to get advice 2,513 6.76 34,644 93.24 360 37,517 
help looking for a job 14,735 44.39 18,462 55.61 4,320 37,517 
Support when depressed 2,881 7.77 34,185 92.23 451 37,517 
Borrow money in an emergency  6,778 18.59 29,675 81.41 1,064 37,517 
 
What is noticeable from the initial descriptive statistics is the large presence of informal social 
capital; over 90% of individuals report access to help when ill, advice and support, while only 
55% can find help looking for a job, and 81% can borrow money. The difference in access to 
jobs could indicate the presence of crowding-out, where statutory programs have created a 
reliance on the welfare state, reducing the importance of informal networks (20% relying on 
institutional support to find a job). Equally, it may highlight potential inequalities inherent 
within network structures where some networks provide access to job prospects, and others 
do not (Lin 2000). Variation in borrowing money could be influenced by access to payday 
lending schemes and the potential imperative to avoid the social cost of borrowing from family 
and friends for money (Lusardi et al., 2011). 11.5% of responses are missing for the variable 
help finding a job, which is noticeably higher than the other variables. Whether this results 
from deciding between the response categories or not identifying with the need for assistance 
in finding a job is difficult to determine, as 3,268 (9%) replied 'don't know'. There is a similar 
observation with the borrowing money question, where 927 (2.5%) of respondents are unsure 
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whether they can access money in an emergency. Although there is some potential variation 
in the two variables able to borrow money and help finding a job, all situations of help are 
considered an essential resource that individuals can potentially access and will be included in 
the CFA model. 
Table 4.3 provides the fit statistics for the specified informal network models containing all 
potential access to resources indicators. 
Table 4.3: Informal networks CFA model results 




RMSEA (90% C.I) 
0.022 (0.018  
0.026) 
CFI 0.996 
a5 indicators  
 
If we recall, the researcher is assisted in interpreting a reliable model based on four key 
measures: the chi-square and p-value, the RMSEA and the CFI. Although there is no definitive 
agreement on interpretation, the literature indicates that the initial assessment of a model 
should primarily be one of statistical significance. Support for the model is understood as a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis or the absence of statistical significance (p ≥ .05) (Kline 
2015). A higher p−value indicating the specified model is statistically different from the null 
specified model. As we can see from the table, there is no statistical difference from the null, 
suggesting an early limitation. 
However, obtaining a p-value may not always occur [owing to sample sizes] and does not 
guarantee the internal consistency of a model fit (Barrett 2007; Kline 2005). Here measures of 
approximate fit provide further clarification. Inspecting the model results, we do find 
agreement in the global fit statistics with RMSEA below .05 and the CFI above .90, suggesting 
that the model is plausible and forms a coherent latent variable. Ensuring that the global fit 
statistics are valid and not hiding miss-specification, an assessment of local fit is required. Here 
particular attention is given to the residual correlation/covariance matrix to observe potential 
errors. As indicated in Table 4.4, there are no apparent problems between the variables with 




Table 4.4: Model 1, correlation residuals 
Indicator Ill Advice Job Depressed Money 
Ill       
Advice 0.011     
Job -0.027 -0.013    
Depressed -0.007 0.033 -0.027   
Money 0.013 -0.041 0.039 -0.017  
 
One final check we can make is an assessment of the modification indices. Modifications 
without prior theoretical direction in an attempt to reduce the chi-square are prone to spurious 
findings. In our case, the model proposed selecting all five variables on the grounds of access 
to a potential resource; yet acknowledged the potential for some variation with the money and 
job indicators. The modification indices do indeed suggest a path between these two variables. 
Considering the original variables, one could conceive a potential difference, where one 
resource is more practical (money and job) and the other is perhaps more supportive (ill, advice 
and depressed). The resource variables may relate in terms of their access. Although all 
indicators conform to a single latent variable, their specification could be made more specific. 
With this in mind, a further model is illustrated, providing a path between money and job- the 
results presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Informal networks CFA modified model result, specified covariance between job and money 






0.019 (0.013  
0.025) 
CFI 0.998 
b Job with money 
 
The second modified model confirms a slight improvement in the 𝜒2 compared to the first 
model (Table 4.4). Employing a chi-square difference test, we can assess whether this 
improvement is statistically different from the previous model.  The chi-square difference test 
(see Satorra and Bentler 2010) examines whether the restrictions of the nested model 
compared to the specified model is significantly worse. This informs whether the proposed or 
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original model is retained (Muthén and Muthén 2017). The test results confirm that model 1 
is a worse fit, and the modified model should be retained.  
Table 4.6: Chi-square difference test against model 2 





Having performed a robust statistical assessment of the model composition, the second model 
with the specified pathway between job and money is retained. This model includes all access 
to informal resource variables; [help around the house when ill (I1), advice about a serious 
personal or family matter (I2), help when looking for a job (I3), someone to talk to if they were 
feeling a bit depressed (I4) and able to borrow money in an emergency (I5)]. Figure 2 provides 
a graphical representation of the latent variable model used to inform the construct of 
'informal social capital'. 
Figure 4.2: Informal social capital latent variable model (CFA) 
 
 
4.4.2 Formal Networks 
The second network dimension focuses on the potential resources gained through formal 
networks. Our theoretical distinction understands formal networks to be concerned with those 
resources gained outside the informal structures of friends and family. The resources found in 
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the broader networks of participation, which represent the potential resources derived from 
access to wider network structures (Lin 2001; Li et al. 2005).  
There are no obvious questions within the EQLS that enable us to measure the specific 
resources one obtains from formal networks - an endeavour beyond most wide-reaching 
surveys. There are, however, questions relating to the formal social environment where 
participation takes place. Much like informal social capital, it is the potential access to resource 
accrual within the specified network that we aim to capture. Within the literature, we often 
observe the frequency of participation in various formal voluntary organisations, social 
activities and political associations (Kasa and Parts 2008; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; 
Oorschot et al., 2006), which (are thought to) indicate the presence of 'formal' social capital. 
Participation in civil society provides a straightforward means of connecting individuals. 
However, are all associations the same? What constitutes a coherent measurement of formal 
social capital? In addition, how does it relate to the welfare state? Consideration will be given 
to each of those variables available within the EQLS that relate to the formal social 
environment.  
4.4.2.1 Frequency of participation  
I begin with consideration to the first four available questions; how frequently do you? i) Attend 
religious services, apart from weddings, funerals or christenings ii) Use the Internet other than 
for work iii) Take part in sports or physical exercise iv) Participate in social activities of a club, 
society, or an association. The response categories are 1) Every day or almost every day, 2) At 
least once a week, 3) One to three times a month and 4) Less often/never. 
The frequency of attendance in religious services links positively with membership in religious 
organisations, yet attending religious services on its own does not seem to be conducive to 
civic activity (Norris and Inglehart 2004). When we consider formal networks, we aim to move 
beyond the strong homogenous ties of informal networks, which literature describes as 
'bonding' social capital.  To the more heterogeneous wider 'bridging' networks understood as 
formal social capital. In this sense, the closed network of religious activity whilst a clear source 
of individuals' social capital does not ascribe to the idea of bridging. Rather, it represents a 
closed network of belonging- indicating perhaps the socialised environment for social capital 
rather than a measure. With this in mind, the decision was made not to include the variable 
relating to religious participation. 
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Accounting for online social networks would be of great value as they provide a prominent 
area for gaining resources, particularly in the context of understanding modern forms of 
participation. The question relating to online presence, whilst asked in relation to a subset of 
four questions on participating, is itself a little vague. Is shopping online the same as using 
social media or being engaged in an online chat room? The question provides no real way to 
distinguish between participating and what is just being on the internet. Although some studies 
(Portela et al., 2013) have included such a measure, it is rather difficult to see how it can 
account for social capital and is excluded. 
The third question asking respondents how often they participate in sports and physical 
exercise provides another difficulty. Whilst sports and exercise are essential for well-being, 
distinguishing between individual pursuit and active participation in formal networks is difficult 
to ascertain. It is only through membership to the group or network that provides the 
opportunity to access resources through social connections. It is excluded from the analysis as 
this does not meet the criteria. 
The fourth question is more specific to participation in formal associations asking how often 
individuals participate in social activities, clubs and associations and would indicate some 
frequency of active participation. Consideration to including this indicator alongside the final 
voluntary participation model was empirically tested. Although it did prove to be a viable model 
suggesting some coherence to a single latent variable, the more parsimonious model showed 
a significantly better fit within the data and was retained.  
In summary, except for the fourth question, the frequency of participation variables available 
within the data set, whilst important civic participation indicators were considered inadequate 
for measuring social capital. [It is vital to ensure that the data used to measure formal social 
capital is both conceptually and theoretically sound.]    
4.4.2.2 Voluntary participation 
The questions relating to active voluntary participation are perhaps the most specifically 
related to the position of crowding-out. It is here where the argument for the detrimental 
effects of substitution is likely to be most realised, as the formal functions of the state would 
intrude on the desire and ability to volunteer. Conversely, it is also where we expect the role 
of welfare provision to be positively related to participation levels - providing support and 
access to network structures. There are five questions broadly covering formal participation in 
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voluntary associations. How often do you participate in i) Community and social services ii) 
Education, cultural, sports or professional associations iii) Social movements or charities iv) 
Political parties, trade unions v) Other voluntary organisations. With response categories: 1) 
Every week 2) Every month 3) Less often/occasionally 4) Not at all.  
Given the compulsory participation of trade unions membership in some EU countries [such as 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Belgium] where trade unions are responsible for administering 
unemployment or disability-related benefits (Oorschot and Finsveen 2009), there could be a 
distortion to the reported rates. Whilst there is clear potential for accessing resources through 
trade union membership, its relationship to the specific crowding-out effect of the civic sphere 
could theoretically be considered distinct from the other types of voluntary organisations. As 
compulsory membership is likely to add bias to the understanding of formal participation 
between countries, it is excluded from the analysis. [As a sensitivity test, I compared a model 
of the four voluntary organisations with the inclusion of trade unions as a single latent variable. 
The results showed the viability of the trade union model, but statistical reliability confirmed 
the selection of the more parsimonious model appropriate]. 





cultural or sports 
unpaid work 
Charities or social 
movements  
Other voluntary  
 N % N % N % N % 
Every week 1,423 3.79 1,765 4.70 399 1.06 599 1.60 
Every month 1096 2.92 1,672 4.46 823 2.19 856 2.28 
Less 
often/occasionally 2,984 7.95 3,256 8.68 2,967 7.91 2,328 6.21 
Not at all 31,774 84.69 30,598 81.56 33,094 88.21 33,415 89.07 
Missing  46 0.13 42 0.12 48 0.13 59 0.16 
DK 193 0.53 182 0.50 185 0.51 257 0.70 
N 37,517 100 37,517 100 37,517 100 37,517 100 
 
As the breakdown of voluntary organisations in Table 4.7 shows, the level of those not 
participating is considerably high, and almost a reversal of the informal networks where 
between 81% and 89% do not volunteer. Considering the centrality of civic networks to 




With the four variables of voluntary associations decided upon, how should they be 
operationalised? Bourdieu (1986) emphasises the volume of social capital that is important for 
individuals to get ahead, as is the amount of participation (Wallace and Pichler 2009). It is also 
possible that multiple affiliations can have a moderating and cumulative effect on social capital, 
where multiple overlapping networks increase the probability of horizontal networks that 
bridge the gap between diverse backgrounds. This wider effect increases the potential for 
interaction, promoting trust and civic engagement (Selle 2003). Sarrancino (2010) suggests we 
should consider intensity and scope as different aspects of participation; intense involvement 
whilst fostering interest and support in the network may create barriers to outsiders and 
narrow the scope of the network. Within this in mind, it seems appropriate to account for 
participation that takes place across all associations with the cumulative effect of multiple 
memberships. 
Operationalisation within the literature is primarily concerned with counts of voluntary 
organisations. Oorschot et al. (2006) construct two count scales of the number of voluntary 
organisations individuals participate in and the importance of spending time with friends on a 
scale of 1 to 3. Sum scales are often derived from the frequency of categorical responses across 
any available voluntary participation questions (Guillen et al., 2011; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 
2006). However, there are reasons to suggest that giving categorical response categories the 
equivalence of a scale may not be the most appropriate form of operationalisation. Given the 
limited number of responses categories, typically 1 to 4, whether this represents a scale is 
perhaps open to question. Equally, there is a difficulty in inferring that once a week is twice the 
value of occasionally to which the scale implies. Creating a single indicator of sum scores in this 
way may provide a misleading picture of the value and meaning attached to represent social 
capital.   
Another issue with directly operationalising frequency is that it ignores potential changes over 
time. The amount of time one can dedicate to volunteering could fluctuate. For example, 
periods of unemployment, changes in family circumstances, health-related issues, or even 
wider factors such as a recession are likely to impact participation levels. Indeed income 
reduction is related to a decline in participation (Ferragina et al. 2013). More specifically, how 
does a decline in the amount of volunteering relate to social capital when the voluntary activity 
remains constant, yet the frequency of participation changes?  
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There is a tendency within the literature to present greater participation with the increased 
accrual of social capital. The actual interest is in access to the network and the potential 
resources derived through generating broader and more diverse networks. Does someone that 
volunteers once a week compared to once a month increase their resource potential? 
Alternatively, is it just a case of having access to the association that is essential for resource 
acquisition? Does it make sense to infer, if someone can no longer volunteer every day but can 
instead accommodate weekly or monthly participation, this mirrors a reduction in the level of 
social capital they possess? As we infer stability from generous replacement rates that enable 
individuals to maintain networks. It seems appropriate to account for whether they are present 
rather than their frequency.   
Therefore, the preference is to create a dichotomous variable of whether someone volunteers 
or not, as this most closely represents the idea of network access and the potential fluidity in 
maintaining networks. The second consideration is how to group the dichotomous indicator. 
The response categories every week and every month are indicative of the potential presence 
of social capital. Does the response category occasionally also elicit the same outcome and 
reliably inform the same intent? Occasionally perhaps indicates more of a passive relationship 
to volunteering rather than a commitment to a voluntary network of associations. However, 
potential access to the network remains.   
In order to ensure reliability in the preferred operationalisation, I conducted an empirical 
assessment of each variation. The results of the CFA models are in Table 4.8. Model 1 is our 
theoretically driven model that operationalises the dichotomous variable of access as every 
week and every month. The second model includes the response of occasionally into the 
dichotomous indicator of access. The third model applies a scale to the response categories in 
line with the existing literature. The variables have been reverse coded, 4 indicating 
participating every day and 1 as not at all. 
 
 
Table 4.8: Voluntary organisations CFA model fit comparison 
Measure Model1a Model2b Model3c 
(χ2) 0.884 10.998 5.761 
df 2 2 2 
P-Value 0.643 0.041 0.056 
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RMSEA  0.000 0.011 0.007 
(90% C.I.) (0.000  0.008) (0.005  0.018) (0.000  0.014) 
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 
aBinary (occasionally coded to 0), bBinary (occasionally coded to 1), cScale (1 to 4) 
 
Empirically, all models are valid, which confirms reliability in the composition of the voluntary 
latent variable itself. There is greater statistical support for the first model, with a noticeable 
p-value and lower 𝜒2. The theoretical distinction in terms of access to the network (rather than 
frequency) and specificity in actively participating confirm that the chosen preference for 
operationalisation is statistically informed. The final latent variable for voluntary participation 
is operationalised in line with the first model, comprising of community and social services (V1), 
education, cultural, sports or professional associations (V2), social movements or charities (V3) 
and other voluntary organisations (V4) (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3: Formal voluntary participation latent variable model 
 
 
4.4.3 Political participation 
As previously indicated, the EQLS also contains questions relating to political participation. 
Though such questions often represent civil society indicators, the approach taken here is the 
access to potential resources gained from the formal social environment. Like voluntary 
organisations, which offer the opportunity of a wider network structure, so too political 
participation provides a similar potential for accessing resources. I begin by addressing the 
suitability of the questions, which are then empirically tested. Following model selection, I also 
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confirm the reliability of a single formal networks model to understand whether there is a 
coherence to the construct of the formal social capital.   
The four questions relating to political participation are: 1) attended a meeting of a trade 
union, a political party or political action group, 2) attended a protest or demonstration, 3) 
signed a petition, including an e-mail or online petition and 4) contacted a politician or public 
official (other than routine contact arising from the use of public services). The response 
category is a binary yes or no. Here the category structure of a binary indicator is maintained 
for the operationalisation and assessment of the latent variable (Table 4.9). As the responses 
highlight, the level of political participation is relatively low, particularly for protesting (5%), 
while signing a petition is the highest at 15%, arguably requiring the least active intent.  
Table 4.9: Response breakdown of political participation 
Variable No Yes Missing Total 
 N  % N  % N  
Meeting 34,143 91.77 3,062 8.23 312 37,517 
Protest 35,348 95.02 1,854 4.98 315 37,517 
Petition 31,454 84.72 5,672 15.28 391 37,517 
Contacted 34,500 92.78 2,685 7.22 332 37,517 
 
The first two questions do specify the active notion of being present [by 'attended']. This does 
provide some indication of the potential to access social capital through the formal social 
environment and is in line with the notion of active participation (Oorschot and Finsveen 2010; 
Putnam 2000). Singing a petition may be considered somewhat limited as a resource, 
particularly in the context of active participation. Although, contacting a public official could 
create an environment to access information. Equally, such forms of contact may be a bridge 
to wider network structures. Perhaps this is where we observe the distinction between the two 
forms of participation - i.e. volunteering and accessing information. Remember, our position 
for networks is relational – the potential resources derived from network structures. 
 
Table 4.10: Political participation CFA model results 












Table 4.10 provides the model fit indices for the political latent variable, containing all four 
variables. The χ2 and p-value indicate that statistically, there is no difference between the null 
and specified model, though the CFI statistic indicates the model is reliable. An RMSEA below 
.08 is considered acceptable within the literature, though some suggest a stricter .05 may be 
more appropriate. Inspection of the residual correlation matrix (Table 4.11) indicates a slight 
correlated error between protest and contacting an official (.111), which is present within the 
modification indices. There is perhaps a possible relationship here between protesting and 
contacting public officials. In order to test this association, a further CFA model was explored 
(see table 12).  
Table 4.11: Political participation CFA, residuals for covariances 
  Meeting Protest Petition Contacted 
Meeting      
Protest 0.012    
Petition -0.060 0.043   
Contacted 0.057 -0.111 0.010   
 
Table 4.12 provides the modified model with covariance specified between protesting and 
contacting an official. There is an improvement in fit across all global measures. Although there 
is no statistical difference from the null model, we have accounted for the internal consistency 
at the local level. The final model to inform the political participation latent variable is 
represented in figure 4. It comprises the four variables:  attended a meeting of a trade union, 
a political party or political action group (P1), attended a protest or demonstration (P2), signed 
a petition, including an e-mail or online petition (P3) and contacted a politician or public official 
(P4), with the specified covariance between protesting and contacting an official. 
Table 4.12: Political participation CFA modified model 








aspecified covariance protest and official 
 
Figure 4.4: Political participation latent variable model with specified covariance 
 
In order to confirm the notion of formal social capital as a multi-dimensional construct 
consisting of voluntary and political participation, I compare a bi-factor CFA model to a single 
CFA model (Table 4.13). In model 1, all formal participation variables from the previous 
voluntary and political models are included under a single latent variable - the fit statistics 
indicating some model miss-specification with the CFI and RMSEA beyond the 'considered' 
thresholds. Model 2 shows the fit statistics of the bi-factor model (Figure 4.5) that 
acknowledges the separation of two latent variables. There are two points of interest here. The 
first is that the second model shows an improvement over a single latent variable, confirming 
the importance of dimensionality. The second is that the bi-factor model statistically shows a 
good fit. This fit implies a coherence to the understanding of formal social capital in the form 
of political and voluntary participation. 
 
 
Table 4.13: Voluntary and political latent variable bi-factor model 
Measure Model 1a Model 1b 
(χ2) 1855.552 42.321 
df 14 11 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 
RMSEA (90% C.I) 0.059 (0.057  0.062) 0.009 (0.006  0.012) 
CFI 0.886 0.999 
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aSingle latent, bBi-factor  
Figure 4.5: Formal social capital bi-factor graphical representation 
 
4.4.4 Trust  
The second aspect of the social capital construct is trust. Our theoretical position views trust 
as a relational phenomenon that is both individual and collective, created in the interaction 
between individuals and institutions (Frederikson 2014). Here we understand the critical 
importance of trust, both generated from networks and informing the environment of 
associations. The structure of trust resonates at an interpersonal level, as a form generalisable 
to all individuals. At the intuitional level, by informing 'trustworthiness of the social 
environment’ (Coleman 1988), where institutions generate the conditions and climate of trust 
necessary for the development and emergence of social capital.  
4.4.4.1 Institutional Trust 
Within the literature, we often observe institutional trust through confidence in institutions, 
operationalised through sum scales of low to high trust from welfare state related variables, 
such as parliament, civil service, the social security system and the healthcare system 
(Oorschot et al., 2005; Oorschot et al., 2006). As sum and factor scores of confidence in societal 
institutions; the police, press and parliament (Oorschot and Finsveen 2010; Kaasa and Parts 
2008). Through trust in government institutions, such as parliament, the legal system, the 
police, politicians, the European Parliament and the United Nations, creating a single high to 
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low factor score (Halman and Luijkx 2006). Some authors use all available institutional variables 
to generate factor scores for analysis (Chung et al., 2014). These examples highlight that there 
is no fixed operationalisation of institutional trust within the literature; often, it depends on 
the available data and the specific theoretical position.  
Within the EQLS, six variables within the dataset relate to trust in institutions. These questions 
ask 'how much you personally trust each of the following institutions; on a scale of 1 to 10, 
where one means that you do not trust at all, and ten means that you trust completely; i) 





Table 4.14 provides a breakdown of the responses, which shows trust in government and 
parliament to be the lowest while tending to be higher in the local authority, other people and 
the police. The non-responses are again populated by those reporting don't know.    
Institutions themselves cover the broad scope of the social order. The available questions seem 
to categorise both governmental and societal institutions. Here we look to those formal 
institutions that are likely to have an impact upon the social environment.  
We are interested in whether the contextual environment created by the institutional 
functions of the welfare state varies in individuals reported levels of trust. This is important not 
only in terms of the potential impact on interpersonal trust (Larsen 2007) but also as a potential 
effect on creating a climate of trust to participate and create networks (Uslaner 2002). This 
position would lead us to consider governmental institutions more relevant to the hypothesis, 
though all institutions are interrelated. As such, it is worth reflecting on their relationship. 
The local (municipal) authorities are perhaps where welfare delivery systems are likely to take 
place. In turn, this is influenced by the decision-making of parliament and government, with 
the legal system providing the foundations for rights and responsibilities surrounding welfare 
provision. The police are agents of the state, ensuring that people adhere to the rules imposed 
by the government. The press in advanced democracies is often considered independent of 
the state, though in practice often reflects the state's decision making. The press and police 
are both influential socialising institutions that uphold and frame the normative state 
apparatus. It is possible that as they are reflective of the governmental processes, they will 
relate to a different aspect of institutional trust. Equally, as influencing institutions in their own 
right, the relationship to the social environment on trust and participation is still likely to be of 





Table 4.14: Breakdown of institutional trust variables 
  
Trust in Parliament 
Trust in the legal 
system 
Trust in Press Trust in Police Trust in government 
Trust in local 
authority  
Trust in people in 
general  
 N  % N  % N  % N  % N  % N  % N  % 
1 - low 9068 24.86 5813 16.0 4917 13.37 2828 7.64 9345 25.41 4140 11.31 5075 13.6 
2 3397 9.31 3047 8.38 3270 8.89 1666 4.5 3859 10.49 2441 6.67 2225 5.96 
3 4188 11.48 3800 10.46 4518 12.28 2300 6.22 3836 10.43 3011 8.22 3382 9.07 
4 3582 9.82 3578 9.85 4658 12.66 2634 7.12 3420 9.3 3325 9.08 3177 8.52 
5 6260 17.16 6197 17.05 8308 22.58 6035 16.31 5732 15.59 6453 17.62 7361 19.73 
6 3096 8.49 3555 9.78 4278 11.63 4383 11.85 3230 8.78 4530 12.37 4046 10.85 
7 3166 8.68 3997 11.0 3469 9.43 5848 15.81 3236 8.8 5204 14.21 5034 13.49 
8 2236 6.13 3603 9.91 2178 5.92 5851 15.82 2334 6.35 4207 11.49 4459 11.95 
9 694 1.9 1556 4.28 675 1.83 2990 8.08 935 2.54 1757 4.8 1295 3.47 
10 - high 786 2.16 1194 3.29 517 1.41 2459 6.65 847 2.3 1545 4.22 1249 3.35 
Missing  133 0.36 82 0.22 66 0.18 62 0.17 143 0.39 92 0.25 41 0.11 
DK  904 2.48 1089 2.98 655 1.79 460 1.26 594 1.63 797 2.18 168 0.46 
N 37517 100 37517 100 37517 100 37517 100 37517 100 37517 100 37517 100 
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Table 4.15 provides the model fit statistics for the institutional CFA containing all six variables. 
Although the CFI for the model is within the acceptable range, the RMSEA would seem to 
indicate that there is misspecification. When we examine the structure of the model more 
closely, observing the local fit (Table 4.16), the residual inspection shows several large 
correlation/covariance residuals between the indicators, confirming issues with the latent 
variable. 
Table 4.15: Institutional trust CFA model results 




RMSEA  0.139 




Table 4.16: Residuals of covariances, Institutional trust (all variables) CFA model 
  Parliament Legal Press Police Gov LA 
Parliament         
Legal system 0.004      
Press -0.164 0.173     
Police -0.446 0.595 0.451    
Government 0.319 -0.293 -0.24 -0.259   
Local 
Authority -0.281 -0.019 0.318 0.522 0.026   
 
As these results indicate, we reject a single latent variable with all institutional variables as the 
model is poor fitting. We now move into an exploratory process to find what would be feasible, 
theoretically and empirically, to form a coherent latent structure. One approach is to remain 
within the CFA framework examining the modification indices, though given the large 
discrepancies, is unlikely to be a fruitful endeavour. The second is to run an EFA and assess 
potential alternative configurations, which we can also achieve within the SEM methodology 
in Mplus.  
The EFA (ESEM) results (Table 4.17) confirm that there are likely to be two factors within the 
data structure relating to institutional trust. The global fit statistics in model 2 (2-factor 
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solution), indicating an improvement over the previous single latent model with the CFI at 
0.992 and the SRMR at 0.012.  The RMSEA, however, is just below 0.08 and would still seem to 
suggest that some misspecification exists. The potential for there to be two factors is in line 
with the original position that made a distinction between governmental and societal 
institutions. However, the factor determinacy scores 0.982 and 0.899 would suggest there are 
still some reservations over a two-factor model. In order to achieve a reliable model removing 
potentially conflicting variables in line with the distinction of governmental and societal 
institutions is an appropriate next step. 
Table 4.17: Institutional ESEM results, single and two-factor solutions 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 
(χ2) 6773.508 798.896 
df 9 4 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 
RMSEA (90% C.I) 0.142 (0.139  0.145) 0.0973 (0.069  0.077) 
CFI 0.935 0.992 
SRMR 0.039 0.012 
 
Focussing on the governmental institutions only model 3, we notice (Table 4.18) that there is 
still some misspecification with the RMSEA 0.121. At the local level, the residuals and 
modification indices also show large expected parameter changes. As there is some similarity 
in what the questions ask in terms of governmental structures, perhaps the correlated nature 
of these indicators is unsurprising. If we consider the governmental processes, one expects 
there to be a close relationship between parliament and government both in how it operates 
and is viewed, particularly in terms of policy control. Equally, one might expect the government 
and the legal system to have a close relationship, with the latter considered somewhat an 
extension of the governmental structure and its mandate. 
Table 4.18: Institutional trust CFA, 4 governmental variables, model fit 





 (90% C.I)  (0.115  0.127) 
CFI 0.985 
SRMR 0.018 




With this in mind, I explore two further models Table 4.19). Model 4 specifies a pathway 
between parliament and government, and model 5 specifies a pathway between the 
government and the legal system. As the fit statistics indicate, the final model 5 shows an 
improvement on existing specifications. Except for there being no p-value, all other fit statistics 
support the model. Further inspection at the local level (Table  4.20) shows that by correlating 
the errors between the government and legal system, the residuals are no longer of concern. 
With both the global and local fit showing acceptable results, it would seem to confirm that 
this is a valid latent variable model for institutional trust. 
 
Table 4.19: Institutional trust CFA model fit comparison 
Measure Model 4b Model 5c 
(χ2) 687.683 45.917 
df 1 1 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 
RMSEA  0.137 0.035 
(90% C.I) (0.127  0.144) (0.027  0.044) 
CFI 0.991 0.999 
SRMR 0.013 0.005 
 bParliament with government, cGovernment with the legal 
system 
 








Parliament  0.000    
Legal system -0.031 0.000   
Government 0.018 0.000 0.000  
Local Authority 0.000 0.090 -0.052 0.000 
 
Considering the previous findings requires a decision as to whether a latent variable directly 
informed from only governmental institutions is more appropriate than a measure that also 
includes societal institutions. Within the context of the hypothesis, we are interested in 
exploring the relationship between welfare systems and social capital outcomes - specifically 
how universalism affects trust. The solidarity engendered by the welfare state creates trust in 
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the institutions that deliver them, which becomes mutually reinforcing and creates wider 
benefits for the other forms of social capital. Therefore, whilst societal institutions like the 
police are related to the welfare system, the specific governmental institutions are more likely 
to be directly influenced by welfare state variation. With this in mind, the final CFA model 5 
(Figure 4.6) will form the institutional trust latent variable. The four final variables included 
informing the latent variable are Parliament (G1), the legal system (G2), the government (G3) 
and the local (municipal) authorities (G4) 
Figure 4.6: Institutional trust latent variable model 
 
 
4.4.4.2 Interpersonal Trust 
Interpersonal trust or trust in the generalised other is another crucial aspect in understanding 
social capital (Coleman 1990; Uslaner 2000; Delhey and Newton 2005). It facilitates action and 
cooperation, is an important resource for individuals and is essential for the functioning of 
society (Hyggen 2006). Given the implicit importance of such a concept to understanding the 
societal environment, there are questions within surveys that specifically try to identify this 
valuable resource.   
Within the literature, we see consistent operationalisation of interpersonal trust through the 
question; 'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't 
be too careful in dealing with people?'. They are operationalised as a scale from low to high 
(Albrekt Larsen 2007), or as a binary indicator - yes and no (Oorschot and Finsveen 2010; 
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Oorschot et al., 2006; Oorschot and Arts 2005). Where available, factor scores combine the 
additional questions: 'Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?'. Would you say that most of the time, people try 
to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? (Halman and Luijkx, 2006).  
Within the EQLS, the question relating to interpersonal trust, as in most surveys, is 'generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people? On a scale of 1 to 10, where one means that you can't be too careful and 
ten means that most people can be trusted'. Unfortunately, there are no additional questions 
related to interpersonal in the trust EQLS that would allow us to construct a more 
comprehensive indicator. Given the importance of the concept and cross-country 
comparability, this is somewhat of a limitation. Regarding reliability, we can still have a certain 
amount of confidence in the measure due to the questionnaire design itself. The EQLS employs 
specific questionnaire translation with multi-stage testing and validation, ensuring the 
reliability of the measured concept cross-nationally.    
The final dependent variable is a single continuous variable, standardised in line with other 
variables providing a scale of 0 to 1. 
Combining the single measure of interpersonal trust alongside the institutional latent variable, 
we can create a bi-factor model to assess trust in a coherent dimension. The model results in 
Table 4.21 confirmed that both factors conform to the relational dimension of trust. 









As one final check on the coherence of social capital as a latent variable construct, a further bi-
factor model was tested - presented in Table  4.22. Although the CFI is not exceptionally high, 
it is within the threshold, and the RMSEA is also below .05, suggesting that there is some 










 (90% C.I)  (0.31  0.033) 
CFI 0.958 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has detailed the theoretical and empirical work required for establishing reliable 
measures for inference. Having acknowledged the limitations of existing approaches that use 
frequencies to assess the volume of an individual's social capital, I have empirically confirmed 
that the theoretical distinction of potential access to resources is present with the underlying 
data structure. Now that we have addressed the important issue of the construct validity of 




5 The social determinants of social Capital: Do welfare 
states matter?   
The second analytical chapter seeks to explore the welfare state social capital relationship. It 
is here where we find resolute and often conflicting positions on the welfare states necessity 
and inadequacy. While dualistic interpretations may aid in presenting a convincing position, 
the relationship may not be so straightforward. Building on the multi-dimensional account of 
social capital illustrated in the previous chapter and providing a greater qualitative distinction 
of the welfare state processes, the aim is to provide a more nuanced picture of the welfare 
state and its calibrating tendencies in its relationship with social capital. The chapter informs 
how the theories of substitution and complementarity sit with the likely mechanisms of the 
welfare state social capital relationship. Each dimension is assessed in turn, leading to a specific 
hypothesis. The second half of the chapter develops the analysis to test the hypotheses 
through multiple multilevel models, utilising the already established social capital latent 
variables. 
5.1 Welfare State and Social Capital 
Our methodological framework highlights the potential for cross-national variation in 
outcomes. It is this variation that leads us to explore the potential variation in an individual’s 
social capital as a result of differences in the social structure created by welfare states [The 
social determinants of social capital]. The crowding-out thesis (Nisbet 1962; Wolfe 1989; 
Etzioni 1995) implies that generous welfare systems are detrimental to social capital 
development, which the empirical literature supports (e.g., Scheepers et al. 2002; Kääriäinen 
and Lehtonen 2006; van der Meer et al., 2009; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Stadelmann-Steffen 
2011). However, there is also evidence to suggest the opposite, with generous welfare systems 
crowding-in social capital (e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; 
Larsen 2007; Gelissen et al., 2012).  
To clarify the relationship between social capital and the welfare state, I adopt a multi-
dimensional approach to social capital. This approach is critical in two respects. Firstly, social 
capital is a multifaceted construct, which I empirically substantiated in the previous analytical 
chapter. Secondly, the duality of the crowding-out argument overlooks the possibility of 
crowding-in and crowding-out across social capital dimensions and along socio-economic lines. 
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In addition, previous empirical studies have operationalised the welfare state through social 
spending (e.g., Scheepers et al. 2002; van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 
2006; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; van der Meer et al., 2009; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011; Gelissen et 
al. 2012), which does not adequately account for the generosity of the welfare state. To 
overcome this limitation, we focus on the generosity of the welfare state, alongside its level of 
universalism.  
Exploring the relationship between the welfare state (at the macro-level) and social capital (at 
the micro-level) requires us to identify the theory and mechanisms under which a causal 
influence may proceed. The dynamics of this relationship is often underexplored, with 
ideological narratives not sustaining adequate hypotheses.  In the next section, I address the 
evidence for the expected association and form testable hypotheses for each dimension of 
social capital.   
5.2 Welfare State on Informal Social Capital 
The processes of industrialisation and urbanisation have profoundly affected civil society, 
dramatically altering social ties (Wolfe 1989). Previous informal network structures that 
provided care and support moved to more formal institutional provisions. This transition was 
one borne of necessity, or rather failure of the market to ensure the individual’s welfare 
adequately. Where responsibility for subsistence is placed with the public instead of the 
informal support of family, the result is the expansion of the welfare state at the expense of 
social networks (Anderson 2009). This Andersen (1984:129) argued creates a vicious circle, 
with the weakening of social ties leading to more public sector demands and even greater 
dissolution of networks 
This line of enquiry that suggests a detrimental impact of the support from welfare systems is 
found in Scheepers et al. (2002), who relates the individualisation of modern society to the 
breakdown of social networks.  The processes of marketisation and decommodification have 
allowed individuals to make choices relevant to their life course. Specifically, the extent to 
which a welfare state decommodifies its citizens enables them to participate in society 
irrespective of failing market provision.  Where individuals are not exclusively reliant on their 
informal networks for economic survival, they are no longer compelled to foster and maintain 
their informal networks. As the responsibility for care and support is no longer with the 
individual, there will be an inevitable decline informal network structures (Kuhnle and Alestalo 
117 
 
2000), along with the informal solidarity that maintains network structures. In summary, the 
integrated state that promotes individual autonomy replaced the dependency on informal 
social capital (Pichler and Wallace 2007), one supported by the systems of universal provision 





Figure 5.1: Mechanism for welfare state crowding-out informal networks 
 
There is evidence for the welfare state crowding-out informal networks within the empirical 
literature (e.g., Scheepers et al. 2002; van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 
2006; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Koster and Bruggeman 2008; van der Meer et al., 2009). On their 
own, these studies advocate a clear sense of crowding-out, but how do they relate to our 
theoretical and analytical approach?  
Scheepers et al. (2002) provide a clear hypothesis on the role of decommodification in 
crowding-out informal networks, represented in Figure 5.1: Mechanism for welfare state 
crowding-out informal networks. There are two relevant points about the mechanism 
proposed. Firstly, they operationalise the welfare state through social expenditure and regime 
types. Although decommodification is a significant factor in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original 
regime classification, a more direct measure beyond the broad social policy context may be 
more suited to address the macro-micro relationship. Secondly, as with the vast majority of 
studies, networks are operationalised through the frequency of contact with family or friends. 
Here we might consider a potential difference in what is understood by access to support as a 
resource and what is considered family ties. An individual may not have to rely on informal 
networks if the state provides support for economic survival. Still, whether that affects the 
number of friends one has or the frequency of contact with friends and family seems open to 
question. The network specification, its measurement and quantification, is therefore central 











Specifically focusing on the available (as I have defined as potential access to) resources within 
informal network structures, we can observe whether the formal institutional provisions of the 
welfare state affect the reporting of informal social support. The hypothesised outcome is that 
informal networks' reported levels will be higher in countries with low decommodification. 
Here low welfare generosity implies that the welfare state does not interfere with the systems 
of support. Individuals rely on informal networks when there is an economic shortfall and, as 
a consequence, must ensure they can access the help from informal networks when required. 
H1: More generous welfare states with higher replacement levels will crowd out 
informal networks by decreasing individuals social capital  
From an economically rational position though slightly reductive, in a sense that all social 
contact represents a cost-benefit analysis, decommodification could have a negative bearing 
on the maintenance of informal networks (specifically resource-based). The same line of 
inquiry, however, does not automatically follow for formal network structures. The 
substitution argument implies a zero-sum game, where welfare states undermine civic 
participation by providing services previously undertaken by families and communities 
(Fukuyama 2000). This service infringement results in passivity within civil society. With the 
devolvement of responsibility to the welfare state, citizens become dependent and can no 
longer deal with problems themselves (Finsveen and Oorschot 2007).  At the same time, 
generous welfare support and high decommodification can be conducive to an individual’s 
ability to participate, providing the necessary resource support. The universal system increases 
individuals' rights and possibilities to engage in civil society (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006), 
actively encouraging participation in voluntary organisations (Pichler and Wallace 2007; Kuhnle 
and Alestalo 2000).  
5.3 Welfare State on Formal Social Capital 
As we have previously established, the empirical literature supports the crowding-in of formal 
networks (e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; van Ingen and van der Meer 2011) and crowding-
out (e.g., Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011).  
From the resource perspective, I consider welfare state mechanisms to be a crucial factor in 
providing the opportunity to access formal network structures (Li et al., 2005). It enables the 
mobilisation of social contacts from which an individual can benefit (van Schaik 2002:7) that 
they would otherwise be devoid of accessing. By insuring against risks, the welfare state 
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simultaneously increases an individual’s capacity to form and maintain network structures 
(Barr 2012). Generous social insurance systems can reduce the adverse effects of 
unemployment that may result in social exclusion and the breakdown of existing formal 
networks. Health insurance provides potentially critical support to treatments that would 
otherwise prevent participation, such as medicine, subsidised aids, or personal assistants 
(Saltkjel et al., 2013). Social benefits can open up the door to participation and inclusion that a 
lack of resources might otherwise prevent, particularly for the disadvantaged.  
Within the context of destructive market forces, the unrecognised central importance of 
benefits is that it relieves people from ‘the struggle for their existence …enabling social 
communication, participation and trust to flourish’ (Wallace and Pichler 2007:50). Suppose an 
individual is continuously preoccupied with their economic survival, investing in informal 
networks to survive. In that case, there is likely to be less actual or perceived time to generate 
formal networks. Decommodification then could substantially positively affect an individual’s 
ability to participate actively in civil society. It is not merely that social protection offered by 
the institutions of the welfare state has led to passive consumption; it is that they have led to 
more active and enriched lives, one that promotes civic-mindedness (Rehn 1984).  
H2: Welfare states with greater social protection through generous replacement rates 
support an individual’s formal network structures and provide access to new ones- increasing 





Figure 5.2: Mechanism for welfare state crowding-in formal networks 
The crowding-out debate primarily concerns itself with the detrimental effects the size of the 
welfare state has on individual’s networks. If civic associations are not the driving force behind 
the levels of trust, then identifying the role of the welfare state in shaping trust is essential to 









5.4 Trust and the Welfare State 
By guaranteeing extended citizenship rights through generous and universal provision, welfare 
states can engender trust in both institutions and each other.  The universal system ensures 
citizenship through welfare state solidarity, providing the basis for social solidarity and trust 
(Trägårdh 2007). The welfare state's institutional arrangements help create the context and 
shape attitudes towards the welfare state- generating a system of institutionalised solidarity 
(Gelissen 2000). Here the symbolic sense of community engenders feelings of belonging, trust 
and security (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006:33). Universal programs give rise to a sense of 
equal treatment and fairness within society (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005). It is the perceived 
fairness and impartiality of institutions that implement public policies, which serve as the 
foundations of the building and maintaining the levels of institutional trust (Rothstein and 
Stolle 2003:192). With a universal commitment to egalitarianism and equality, the generous 
welfare state is a trust-building institution (Trägårdh 2007). Although correlational, there is 
some evidence to support the positive effect of generous and universal welfare states on the 
levels of institutional trust (e.g., van Oorschot and Arts 2005; van Oorschot et al., 2006). 







The trust engendered in institutions through universal provision can also spill over to influence 
trust between individuals (Rothstein and Stolle 2003). When people interact with public 
institutions, not only are they concerned about the outcomes and success but also whether 
the process of obtaining the necessary support was fair in itself. This process is what Kumlin 
and Rothstein (2005) term ‘procedural justice’. Systems that employ means-testing can 
increase discrimination and suspicion, which creates demands on both the bureaucrat and the 











delivering means-testing encourages ‘prejudice, stereotype, and ignorance as a basis for 
determination’ (Lipsky 1980:69). Kumlin and Rothstein’s (2005) study utilising the 1999 West 
Sweden SOM Survey finds support for this position. Individuals who had contact with selective 
welfare services compared to universal services reported lower levels of interpersonal trust. 
While those who were in contact with universal services reported an increase in the average 
level of trust with the number of institutions they came into contact.  
Their findings support the hypothesis that needs-based welfare systems have more significant 
potential to spread mistrust. The relationship between interpersonal trust and welfare delivery 
influences trustworthiness, as people make inferences about others based on the experiences 
and perceptions of the public service bureaucrats. If individuals find themselves having to 
distort the truth to obtain assistance, or if administrators believe there is distortion, then such 
behaviours are thought to affect why others, in general, should be trusted (when the first-hand 
experience suggests otherwise). Although this does provide a realistic base to assess outcomes 
of generalised trust between universal and residual welfare systems, it predominantly 
accounts for those who come into direct contact with delivery systems. While this may be 
important to understand outcomes between benefits recipients, the spillover effect does not 
adequately address why there would be national trust variation across society.  
Moving to the aggregate level in explaining why social trust should vary between welfare 
regimes, Larsen (2007) proposes the idea of ‘cultural distance’ (Figure 5.4), highlighting how 
selective welfare policies and poverty exacerbate the cultural difference between those at the 
bottom of society and the majority of others. A generous welfare system allows the potentially 
poor to maintain a standard of living relative to other citizens- reducing the cultural distance. 
Where those on the fringes of society with limited economic resources are forced to live 
different lifestyles, the cultural distance almost inevitably increases. Selective welfare policies 
and means-tested benefits create stigmatisation of those in need, resulting in an ‘us and them’ 













Analysing data from the WVS (1990-1993 and 1999-2001), Larsen (2007) shows that trust in 
other people remains twice as likely in socio-democratic regimes than Anglo-Saxon regimes. 
The implication is that the smaller perceived cultural distance in universal systems help to 
develop interpersonal trust between individuals. He suggests that the dramatic reduction in 
trust for the liberal welfare states may be a direct result of welfare retrenchment and 
residualisation. As the basic principle of universal welfare policy is not to discriminate between 
citizens on economic grounds and not distinguish between the 'needy' and 'poor' (Rothstein 
1998:33), I expect the level of non-means-testing to affect the levels of reported trust 
positively. 
H3 A more generous and universal welfare state that promotes solidarity with less 
means-testing will increase the levels of reported interpersonal and institutional trust. 
 
5.5 Hypotheses Summary 
What is learnt from the theoretical and empirical literature is a definite sense of potential 
variation between welfare states and social capital outcomes. The research suggests that the 
welfare state may not have a detrimental impact on the forms of social capital, as often stated. 
Instead, there is the potentiality for both crowding-in and out. The specified research 
hypotheses acknowledge this potential of the welfare state to have a calibrating effect: i) High 
decommodification and welfare generosity may reduce the need for informal network 
investment. ii) At the same time, high replacement levels enable individuals to uphold a socially 
acceptable standard of living, providing support and opportunities for network investment.  iii) 
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trust, because generous universal systems promote solidarity through universal inclusion, 
increase the level of perceived fairness, and narrow the cultural distances amongst its 
population.  
5.6 Research Frame 
The research hypotheses are concerned with the determinants of social capital. Specifically, 
this chapter aims to address how variation in welfare state generosity and universalism affects 
the levels of an individual’s social capital in the form of networks and trust. Acknowledging that 
the data and inquiry are hierarchical, the methodology of multilevel analysis is employed to 
address this relationship. The detail for the data, variables and methods is located in the 
methodology section.  
5.6.1 Analysis  
This section sets out the mode of analysis that will take place for each dependent variable, 
followed by the reporting of results for each of the multilevel models. Remember, the purpose 
of employing CFA was to assess the theoretical proposition of what constitutes social capital 
empirically. The dimensional approach alongside latent variables aims to overcome the 
limitations of existing approaches [selectivity, composition and direct measurement]. By 
acknowledging the unobservable, we are better placed to address the unknown of social 
capital.  
As the concern is with the potential variation of the welfare state on individuals levels of social 
capital across all dimensions, each measure (dependent variable) of social capital is addressed 
as an outcome in separate multilevel models.  
5.6.2 Models 
In order to address how welfare state generosity [in the form of universalism and replacement 
rates] affects the outcome of each social capital dimension, I employ the method of multilevel 
analysis within Stata. Specifically, we are interested in explaining the variance in social capital 
outcomes between countries. The notation and statistical explanation for the types of models 
are in the methodology chapter. As a guide, I provide a brief description of the modelling 
process. The initial random intercept model identifies the partitioned variance between the 
two levels within the data. Here we can determine how much total variation exists in social 
capital (dependent variable) for individuals between countries. The second model adds the 
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individual-level explanatory variables [those socio-demographic characteristics most relevant 
to understanding social capital variation; age, gender, cohabitation, education, income, 
unemployed and benefit recipients]. The next two random intercept models include the 
country-level (independent) variables that measure generosity and universalism in turn (net 
replacement rate and non-means-testing proportion of GDP) to assess the effect of the welfare 
state on social capital. The final model includes the control GDP (per capita in Purchasing Power 
Standards), which contextualises the significance of the welfare state effects found.  
5.7 Results  
5.7.1 Informal Networks  
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 provide the results of the informal social capital random intercept 
models. Except for domicile and secondary education, all individual-level variables show a 
significant relationship with the informal latent variable. The fact that the tertiary education 
level is an influencing factor is surprising (𝛽 = .014, 𝑝 < .05). After all, these are direct often-
closed relationships that relate to friends and families and do not require specific cultural 
knowledge beyond immediacy. This finding would seem to suggest that there are educational 
advantages to informal resources that are at odds with the crowding-out argument. If we 
consider the observed indicators, such as access to jobs and money contained within the latent 
variable, it is possible to conceive how a structural element may lead to such an outcome.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that those who are married or cohabiting report greater access 
to informal social capital than those who are not (𝛽 = .038, 𝑝 < .001). Men report less 
informal social capital than females, which would seem to coincide with the potentially 
different social capital profiles and women as informal caregivers (Lowndes 2000).  
Another interesting finding is that both the unemployed and those who receive social benefits 
show an informal network deficit compared to the employed. The rational choice position 
tends to imply that those excluded from the market would have to invest more in informal 
networks to guarantee survival, which appears not to be the case. The income variable further 
contextualises the suggestion that access to the market is essential for individuals' informal 
networks. Here we find it to be the most significant predictor of the informal latent variable 
(𝛽 = .255, 𝑝 < .001), which is consistent with the social capital theory and the importance of 




Table 5.1: Informal social capital at the individual level 
Level 1 controls B SE  
Male -0.016*** (0.003) 
Age (centred) -0.002*** (0.000) 
Income (Standardised) 0.255** (0.066) 
Education (primary) . . 
Secondary  0.000 (0.005) 
Tertiary  0.014** (0.005) 
Unemployed -0.047*** (0.005) 
Cohabiting 0.038*** (0.003) 
Receives benefits -0.033*** (0.004) 
Domicile (rural) 0.005 (0.003) 
   
Constant 0.801*** (0.012) 
Variance country level 0.004*** (0.001) 
Variance Individual level 0.048*** (0.000) 
Log-likelihood 2733***  
N 28,032   
"* p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** 
p<0.001"   
 
The base model (1.0) itself shows the total country-level variance of the informal latent variable 
to be explored is 8.1%, which after adding all the explanatory variables is 4.8% of explained 
variance. The performed likelihood ratio (𝜒2) test statistically confirms the likelihood of 
improvement between the models. The final model (1.5) reports an r2 of .430 - indicating a 
reasonable model fit and explanation of the dependent variable. The second model (1.1) 
introduces the individual level controls, showing a slight increase in the unexplained variance. 
Although this seems counter-intuitive, the nature of multilevel modelling means that negative 
variances are sometimes observed within the iterations (Bosker and Snijders 2011; Hox 2013). 
The replacement rate variable (1.2) has a statistically significant effect on the informal latent 
(β = −0.132, p < .001), which is in line with the hypothesis. Indicating that greater welfare 
support for individuals [in the form of replacement rate generosity] can be detrimental to the 
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amount of informal social capital an individual possesses. Assessing the second welfare state 
measure (model 1.3), we again observe a negative relationship (β = −0.101, p < .01). When 
both welfare state measure are included (1.4), we notice a slight drop in the effect (β = −.112, 
p < .01), with non-means-testing found to be significant at the 90%-level (β = −.062, p < .10). 
After including the final control GDP (1.4), the significance of replacement rates diminishes (β 
= −.076, p < .10), making firm assertions about the effect of welfare generosity on informal 
networks difficult. That said, it is still significant at the 90% level and is in line with other studies 
that observed crowding-out in informal networks (e.g., Scheepers et al., 2002; van der Meer 
et al., 2009).  GDP itself has an adverse effect on the informal latent variable (β = −.135, p < 
.05), which is perhaps a little surprising and is revisited in the discussion section. 
 
(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽0𝑗 + ∑ 
𝑝
𝛽𝑝1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝3𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑝5𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝6𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝7𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝8𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑗
+ ∑ 
𝑞
𝛽𝑞1𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽𝑞2𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑞3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗+ 𝑈𝑜𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗
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Table 5.2: The effect of generosity on Informal social capital  
 Model 1.0 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  
Total net replacement rate     -0.132*** (0.037)   -0.112** (0.040) -0.076+ (0.042) 
Non-means testing %GDP       -0.101** (0.038) -0.062+ (0.034) -0.041 (0.033) 
GDP_PPS           -0.117* (0.058) 
             
Constant 0.813*** (0.011) 0.801*** (0.012) 0.855*** (0.019) 0.831*** (0.020) 0.867*** (0.019) 0.872*** (0.018) 
Variance country level 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.050*** (0.000) 0.048*** (0.000) 0.048*** (0.000) 0.048*** (0.000) 0.048*** (0.000) 0.048*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 8.1%  7.3%  5.2%  7.1%  5.4%  4.8%  
Log-likelihood  2009  2733***  2739**  2977*  2740*  2742+  
R2 level 1   0.046***  0.068***  0.068***  0.072***  0.078***  
R2 level 2     -0.017***   0.291***   0.162***   0.351***   0.430***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile,  
N level 2=29 countries, + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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5.7.2 Voluntary Participation 
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 presents the results of the first formal social capital model, derived 
from the voluntary associations latent variable. At the individual level both income (β = .302, p 
< .001) and education have a large positive effect. Tertiary education indicates a β=.162 
increase in the voluntary latent variable compared to those who are primary educated. Within 
the social capital literature, there is support for the importance of economic and cultural 
capital in generating and accessing formal networks (e.g., Wilson 1998; Christoforou 2004; van 
Oorschot 2005; Bekkers 2007). Those excluded from the labour market report a small but 
significant deficit (β = -.027, p<.001), indicating the importance of employment in accessing 
wider network structures. Those who receive benefits also show a negative relationship to 
voluntary participation, although this finding is only significant at the 10% level. Gender does 
not seem to affect the latent variable, which one might have expected based on the literature 
(e.g., Lowndes 2000; Wilson 2000; Lin 2000). Age has a very small negative effect on 
participation (β = -.001, p < .001). Finally, those who live in rural areas indicate a β=.012 
increase in voluntary participation compared to city dwellers.  
Table 5.3: Voluntary social capital at the individual level 
Level 1 controls B SE  
Male 0.005 (0.003) 
Age (centred) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Income (Standardised) 0.302*** (0.081) 
Education (primary) . . 
Secondary  0.057*** (0.006) 
Tertiary  0.162*** (0.006) 
Unemployed -0.027*** (0.006) 
Cohabiting 0.008* (0.003) 
Receives benefits -0.008+ (0.005) 
Domicile (rural) 0.012*** (0.003) 
   
Constant 0.088*** (0.013) 
Variance country level 0.004*** (0.001) 
Variance Individual level 0.070*** (0.000) 
Log-likelihood -2602***  
N 28,032   




The ICC reports 6.4% of the total unexplained variance lies between countries (2.0), dropping 
to 5.4% when both the individual and explanatory variables are included (2.4). The first model 
shows a significant improvement over the base model, with the individual variables reporting 
an r2 .202 (2.1). The inclusion of both the non-means-testing (model 2.2) and replacement 
rates indicator (model 2.3) indicates a significant positive effect on the voluntary participation 
latent of 0.083 and 0.163, a statistical improvement confirmed by the log-likelihood ratio. The 
effect size drops slightly when both indicators are included with the non-means-testing 
indicator no longer reporting significance (2.4). Introducing the final control GDP (model 2.5), 
the expected effect of net replacement generosity remains statistically significant (β=.115, 
p<.01). The significant result confirms the hypothesis that greater generosity increases formal 
social capital rather than crowding-out participation in formal networks. The positive influence 
of the welfare state on voluntary participation is contrary to studies that observed a negative 
effect of social spending on voluntary organisations (e.g., Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Stadelmann-
Steffen 2011). The final model predicts an r2 .596 suggesting the model provides a reasonable 
amount of explanation for the potential country-level effects (net replacement rates) on an 
individual’s voluntary participation. 
 
 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽0𝑗 + ∑ 
𝑝
𝛽𝑝1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝3𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑝5𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝6𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝7𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝8𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑗
+ ∑ 
𝑞
𝛽𝑞1𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽𝑞2𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠  𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗







Table 5.4: The effect of generosity on voluntary social capital 
 Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 
level 2 controls B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Total net replacement rate       0.163*** (0.035) 0.148*** (0.038) 0.115** (0.042) 
Non-means testing %GDP     0.083* (0.037)   0.028 (0.033) 0.016 (0.033) 
GDP_PPS           0.093 (0.057) 
             
Constant 0.177*** (0.013) 0.135*** (0.013) 0.101*** (0.018) 0.055* (0.021) 0.046* (0.021) 0.048* (0.021) 
Variance country level 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.074*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 6.4%  5.4%  4.6%  3.1%  3.0%  2.7%  
Log-likelihood  -3235  -2602***  -2598*  -2593*  -2593  -2592  
R2 level 1   0.055***  0.059***  0.077***  0.078***  0.080***  
R2 level 2     0.202***   0.326***   0.547***   0.558***   0.596***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile,  
N level 2=29 countries, + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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5.7.3 Political participation  
Presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 are the results of the second formal social capital latent 
variableTable 5.5Table 5.6. At the individual-level (Table 5.5), men show a small but significant 
increase in political participation compared to women, reflecting the gendered nature of 
networks, or more widely, female parliamentary representation (Electoral Commission 2004). 
As with the voluntary latent variable, education and income are both central in understanding 
political participation. Income shows a positive relationship of β=.300, p<.001 and tertiary 
education showing an increase of β=.132 compared to primary education. Considering the 
importance of education in deciphering the political system, this would seem to make sense. 
Again the unemployed show a small but significant deficit in participation (β=-.014, p<.01). 
Where previously those who reside in rural areas showed greater voluntary participation, they 
indicate a reduction in political participation (β=-.012, p<.001). Those receiving benefits 
indicate a slight increase in political participation (β=.007, p<.010). It is possible that having to 
engage with benefit systems demands a certain amount of political activity to ensure the 
provision, although this finding is only significant at the 10%-level. Age shows a small negative 
significant relationship, possibly requiring further breakdown to interpret any meaning. Finally, 
there is no significant difference in political participation between married or cohabiting 
individuals and those who are not. 
At the country level (Table 5.6), the total variance to be explained is 7.5%, which after the 
inclusion of all individual-level variables drops to 5.8%. Both the independent variables on their 
own are significant and report a positive effect on political participation 𝛽=.082, 𝑝=<.01, 
𝛽=.105, 𝑝=<.01 and a statistically significant improvement over the previous model (3.1). Net 
replacement rate remains significant when both measures are combined, although after the 
addition of the GDP control (3.5) is no longer significant. GDP remains the only significant 
predictor in the model (β=.115, p<.05), perhaps indicating a relationship between a prosperous 







Table 5.5: Political social capital at the individual level 
Level 1 controls B SE  
Male 0.017*** (0.003) 
Age (centred) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Income (Standardised) 0.300*** (0.065) 
Education (primary) . . 
Secondary  0.047*** (0.005) 
Tertiary  0.132*** (0.005) 
Unemployed -0.014** (0.005) 
Cohabiting 0.002 (0.003) 
Receives benefits 0.007+ (0.004) 
Domicile (rural) -0.012*** (0.003) 
   
Constant 0.051*** (0.011) 
Variance country level 0.003*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.045*** (0.000) 
Log-likelihood 3449***  
N 27584   
"* p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001"   
 
 
(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗
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𝑝
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Table 5.6: The effect of generosity on political, social capital 
 Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  
Total net replacement rate       0.105** (0.033) 0.077* (0.035) 0.035 (0.037) 
Non-means testing %GDP     0.082** (0.029)   0.055 (0.030) 0.039 (0.029) 
GDP_PPS           0.118* (0.051) 
             
Constant 0.119*** (0.012) 0.051*** (0.011) 0.055*** (0.015) 0.036* (0.019) 0.024 (0.019) 0.027 (0.018) 
Variance country level 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.048*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 7.5%  5.8%  4.6%  4.4%  3.9%  3.3%  
Log-likelihood  2705  3520***  3524**  3524**  3526*  3528*  
R2 level 1   0.069***  0.078***  0.084***  0.088***  0.094***  
R2 level 2     0.277***   0.433***   0.461***   0.516***   0.592***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile,  




5.7.4 Interpersonal trust  
The first trust dimension of the social capital framework is interpersonal trust. At the individual 
level (Table 5.7), greater income is once again positively related to social capital, this time 
indicating greater trust in others (β= .456, p < .001). Education also shows a statistically positive 
effect with those educated to a tertiary level or above, reporting a 10% increase in trust 
compared to primary educated (accounting for all other controls). Both those who are 
unemployed (β= -.029, p <.001) and those who receive social benefits (β= -.016, p <.01) report 
an adverse effect on interpersonal trust. It would seem to indicate that exclusion from the 
labour market has a broader impact of decreasing trust in others. Males report greater trust in 
others compared to females (β= .013, p < .001), which coincides with Halman and Luijkx’s 
(2006) findings. Although this may relate more to the abstract idea of trusting others and not 
in the specific sense where women report more trust (Soroka et al., 2003), this seems to 
challenge the literature that suggests that women are more trusting. Age, cohabitation and 
domicile all report to have no significant effect on the levels of interpersonal trust.  
Table 5.7: Interpersonal trust at the individual level 
Level 1 controls B SE  
Male 0.013*** (0.003) 
Age (centred) -0.000 (0.000) 
Income (Standardised) 0.456*** (0.077) 
Education (primary)   
Secondary  0.030*** (0.006) 
Tertiary  0.104*** (0.006) 
Unemployed -0.029*** (0.006) 
Cohabiting 0.004 (0.003) 
Receives benefits -0.016** (0.005) 
Domicile (rural) 0.006 (0.003) 
   
Constant 0.398*** (0.021) 
Variance country level 0.012*** (0.002) 
Variance Individual level 0.065*** (0.000) 
Log-likelihood -1415***  
N 28,032   




In Table 5.8, the base model (4.0) reports the total unexplained variance of 16.8% between 
countries, which drops to 15.6% after the inclusion of the individual-level explanatory variables 
(Model 4.1). The log-ratio test showed the final model is not statistically different from the 
previous model (4.4), with GDP not explaining the variance beyond the two welfare state 
measures. The inclusion of non-means testing in the model (4.2) and the net replacement rate 
in the model (4.3) are significant improvements. The initial inclusion of non-means testing 
reports a 𝛽=.212, 𝑝=<.01, which reduces after adding the two controls to 𝛽=.112, 𝑝=<.05, but 
still a significant positive result. The finding that non-means-testing is positively associated with 
interpersonal trust coincides with Kääriäinen and Lehtonen’s (2006) study who observe the 
positive effect of socio-democratic welfare regimes on interpersonal trust. Interestingly, the 
net replacement rate also has a positive effect reporting 𝛽=.161, 𝑝<.01, though when 
accounting for GDP, the significance falls to the 90%- level, 𝛽=.126, 𝑝<.10. It seems that both 
generosity and universalism are important factors for understanding the levels of interpersonal 
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Table 5.8: The effect of generosity and universalism on interpersonal trust 
 Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 Model 4.5 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  
Non-means testing %GDP       0.212** (0.059) 0.140* (0.060) 0.112* (0.053) 
Total net replacement rate     0.224** (0.032)   0.161* (0.069) 0.126+ (0.082) 
GDP_PPS           0.099 (0.081) 
             
Constant 0.453*** (0.022) 0.398*** (0.021) 0.331*** (0.031) 0.319*** (0.031) 0.277*** (0.033) 0.273*** (0.033) 
Variance country level 0.013*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002) 
Variance Individual level 0.066*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.001) 
Total variance (ICC) 16.8%  15.6%  12.4%  12.0%  10.2%  10.0%  
Log-likelihood  -1759  -1463***  -1459**  -1459**  -1456*  -1456  
R2 level 1   0.078***  0.072***  0.097***  0.100***  0.099***  
R2 level 2     0.342***   0.351***   0.452***   0.468***   0.469***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile,  
N level 2=29 countries, + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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5.7.5 Institutional trust  
The final dimension of the social capital framework is institutional trust. At the individual level 
(Table 5.9), income is by far the largest predictor of institutional trust (β = .328, p< 001). 
Perhaps wealthy individuals are more inclined to trust the state apparatus, as they do well 
economically within the system. In the opposite direction, the unemployed (β = -.039, p<.001) 
and individuals in receipt of social benefits (β = -.013, p<.01) show a small but significant 
negative relationship to trust (what one might identify as the difference between labour 
market insiders and outsiders). Here those who find themselves excluded may not be as 
inclined to trust the institutions considered key to determining their position. Individuals with 
tertiary education report an increase of β= .056 (p<.001) compared to those with primary 
education, while those with secondary education report no significant difference. There is the 
potential for a cultural distinction of inclusion from those who have acquired the requisite 
cultural capital through higher education. Gender, marital status and domicile show no 
statistical difference in the levels of reported institutional trust. Age had a very small but 
significant effect (β = -.001, p< .001).  
The total unexplained variance at the country-level (model 5, Table 5.10) is 24.2%, falling to 
23.4% after the inclusion of the individual-level variables (model 5.1), which is statistically 
supported by the log ratio. The large between-country variance is partly explained by the 
relatively low trust from some post-communist countries and Greece, where the effects of the 
2008 financial crisis and structural adjustment programs have damaged trust in institutions. 
Non-means testing (5.3) reports a (β=.201, p<.01) positive effect on institutional trust, which 
is in line with the hypothesis. However, the introduction of GDP in the final model is non-
significant. The second welfare measure shows a strong positive relationship to institutional 
trust (β=.301, p< .001, model 5.2) and remains significant after the addition of the final control 
variable GDP (5.5) (β=.139, p<.05). The positive influence of generosity is in line with van 
Oorschot and Arts (2005), who find social spending is positively related to institutional trust. 
GDP has the most influence on the reported levels of institutional trust (β=.312, p< .001) within 
the model. It seems that while non-means-testing may have an effect on the institutional latent 
variable, it is GDP and net replacement rates that may be of greater importance. The final r-
square value (0.648) is relatively high, suggesting that all contextual indicators may be 
necessary for understanding trust in institutions. 
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Table 5.9: Institutional trust (latent variable) at the individual level 
Level 1 controls B SE  
Male -0.002 (0.003) 
Age (centred) 0.001*** (0.000) 
Income (Standardised) 0.328*** (0.066) 
Education (primary)   
Secondary  -0.005 (0.005) 
Tertiary  0.056*** (0.005) 
Unemployed -0.039*** (0.005) 
Cohabiting -0.000 (0.003) 
Receives benefits -0.013** (0.004) 
Domicile (rural) 0.003 (0.003) 
   
Constant 0.366*** (0.023) 
Variance country level 0.014*** (0.002) 
Variance Individual level 0.047*** (0.000) 
Log-likelihood 2827  
N 28,032   
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Table 5.10: The effect of generosity and universalism on institutional trust (latent variable) 
 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 Model 5.5 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE  
Non-means testing %GDP       0.201** (0.066) 0.121* (0.061) 0.065 (0.053) 
Total net replacement rate     0.301** (0.031)   0.250*** (0.070) 0.139* (0.068) 
GDP_PPS           0.312*** (0.093) 
             
Constant 0.376*** (0.023) 0.366*** (0.023) 0.228*** (0.031) 0.282*** (0.034) 0.219*** (0.033) 0.206*** (0.029) 
Variance country level 0.015*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Variance Individual level 0.049*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 24.2%  23.4%  14.8%  18.7%  13.7%  10.2%  
Log-likelihood  2513  2896***  2900***  2904***  2907***  2910**  
R2 level 1   0.033***  0.012***  0.088***  0.141***  0.175***  
R2 level 2     0.066***   0.463***   0.293***   0.511***   0.648***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile,  
N level 2=29 countries, + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of the results and implications for the 
hypotheses, I address the robustness of the estimation and composition of the net 
replacement indicator.  
5.8 Sensitivity tests  
5.8.1 Standard errors 
To further contextualise the significance of the models in addressing the set hypotheses, each 
dimension was also estimated using robust standard errors and restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation (REML). This aimed to address any potential concerns over model specification, 
data normality, or the number of level-2 units. To refresh the reader, robust standard errors 
or sandwich estimator of variance uses the observed squared residuals to estimate the 
variance, which can vary between observations. The observed information matrix for standard 
ML estimation assumes a constant variance and homoscedasticity of residuals along a diagonal 
vector. REML, on the other hand, is a two-stage estimation procedure that uses residuals from 
level-1 to assist in the estimation of variance at level-2.  
It is important to bear in mind that by applying multilevel estimation, the researcher is 
confident that the data and model provided is valid. Automatically applying restrictions to the 
model would indicate some uncertainty within the data. As previously stated in the 
methodology estimation section, a low number of level-2 units can cause concerns over the 
predicted variance. With 29 groups and large sample sizes, we are expectant that the models 
will show minimal variation between estimation approaches. Table 5.11 to Table 5.15 provide 
the final model estimates across all estimation procedures. 
Comparison of the estimation types mainly shows consistent reporting across all dimensions. 
The results for the political and voluntary models remain unchanged. The robust standard 
errors increase the significance of the adverse effect of generosity on informal social capital to 
the p<.05 level and remains at the p<.10 level for REML. The influence of universalism on 
interpersonal trust is significant across all estimations. Generosity, on the other hand, is no 
longer significant with REML estimation but is at the p<.05 level for robust standard errors. 
Finally, the significance for universalism on institutional trust falls below the p<.10 for both 
robust and REML, while the effect of generosity remains statistically significant.  
141 
 
What we learn from this is that some caution is required when interpreting the significance of 
our findings when the margin for error is higher (at the 90% level). Where there is confidence 
at the p<.05 level, the estimation techniques applied to the multilevel models are reliable and 
consistent.  
Where there is perhaps some difference from the application of ML estimation and REML, is 
in the slight ICC increase and reduction in the r2 when REML is applied. REML takes residuals 
from the observations in the fixed-effects portion of the model then employs ML estimation 
to estimate the variance components. As it uses regression coefficients, it is not directly 
comparable with the fixed components of ML (Oehlrt 2012). Perhaps a reminder to remain 
conservative when expressing the power of the variance components. 
 
Table 5.11: Informal social capital, country-level estimation comparison (Robust and REML) 
 Model 1.3 Robust REML 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  
Total net replacement rate -0.076+ (0.046) -0.076* (0.037) -0.076+ (0.046) 
Non-means testing %GDP -0.039 (0.036) -0.039 (0.032) -0.039 (0.039) 
GDP_PPS -0.135* (0.063) -0.135* (0.055) -0.135* (0.068) 
       
Constant 0.864*** (0.020) 0.864*** (0.016) 0.864*** (0.021) 
Variance country level 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.001) 0.047*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 5.0%  5.0%  5.8%  
Log-likelihood  2995  2995  2941  
R2 level 1 0.090***  0.090***  0.085***  
R2 level 2 0.429***   0.429***   0.361***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and 







Table 5.12: Voluntary social capital, country-level estimation comparison (Robust and REML) 
 Model 2.3 Robust REML 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  
Total net replacement rate 0.115** (0.042) 0.115** (0.037) 0.115* (0.045) 
Non-means testing %GDP 0.016 (0.033) 0.017 (0.041) 0.017 (0.035) 
GDP_PPS 0.093 (0.057) 0.093 (0.093) 0.093 (0.062) 
       
Constant 0.012 (0.018) 0.012 (0.014) 0.012 (0.020) 
Variance country level 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.002) 0.070*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 2.7%  2.8%  3.2%  
Log-likelihood  -2592  -2566  -2619  
R2 level 1 0.080***  0.081***  0.078***  
R2 level 2 0.596***  0.595***  0.546***  
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and 
domicile, N level 2=29 countries, + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 5.13: Political social capital, country-level estimation comparison (Robust and REML) 
 Model 3.3 Robust REML 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  
Total net replacement rate 0.035 (0.037) 0.036 (0.031) 0.036 (0.040) 
Non-means testing %GDP 0.039 (0.029) 0.039 (0.029) 0.039 (0.031) 
GDP_PPS 0.118* (0.051) 0.116* (0.049) 0.116* (0.054) 
       
Constant -0.008 (0.016) -0.008 (0.010) -0.008 (0.017) 
Variance country level 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Variance Individual level 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.002) 0.045*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 3.3%  3.3%  3.9%  
Log-likelihood  27584  27875  27875  
R2 level 1 0.094***  0.094***  0.091***  
R2 level 2 0.592***  0.593***  0.544***  
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and 




Table 5.14: Interpersonal trust, country-level estimation comparison (Robust and REML) 
 Model 5.3 Robust REML 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  
Non-means testing %GDP 0.126* (0.061) 0.126* (0.053) 0.126* (0.065) 
Total net replacement rate 0.126+ (0.077) 0.126* (0.082) 0.126 (0.083) 
GDP_PPS 0.101 (0.106) 0.099 (0.081) 0.099 (0.114) 
       
Constant 0.273*** (0.033) 0.273*** (0.033) 0.273*** (0.035) 
Variance country level 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.001) 
Variance Individual level 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.001) 0.065*** (0.000) 
Total variance (ICC) 10.0%  9.9%  11.3%  
Log-likelihood  -1408  -1437  -1488  
R2 level 1 0.100***  0.099***  0.090***  
R2 level 2 0.468***   0.469***   0.405***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and 
domicile, N level 2=29 countries, + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
Table 5.15: Institutional trust (latent variable), country-level estimation comparison (Robust and REML) 
 Model 4.3 Robust REML 
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  
Non-means testing %GDP 0.085+ (0.053) 0.085 (0.058) 0.085 (0.054) 
Total net replacement rate 0.163* (0.068) 0.163* (0.077) 0.163* (0.071) 
GDP_PPS 0.251*** (0.093) 0.251** (0.087) 0.251* (0.102) 
       
Constant 0.219*** (0.033) 0.206*** (0.029) 0.229*** (0.026) 
Variance country level 0.008*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Variance Individual level 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.044*** (0.001) 
Total variance (ICC) 10.2%  9.4%  10.8%  
Log-likelihood  2841  4063  4010  
R2 level 1 0.175***  0.175***  0.169***  
R2 level 2 0.648***   0.667***   0.627***   
N level 1=28,032, Level 1  controls= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and 




5.8.2 Household composition  
The chosen generosity indicator accounts for the total replacement rate of unemployment 
benefit, housing benefit and social assistance for a single average worker - providing a 
comparable measure of entitlement across countries. However, the household compositions 
upon which the replacement rates are based can alter the picture of entitlement and 
generosity (see Table 5.16). If we consider the possible welfare-state stratification that exists 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), then depending on the type of household the generosity index is 
based on, the results of the models may result in different outcomes of social capital. For 
example, some countries may wish to provide more generous support to households with 
children; or decide that a one-earner couple with children is more deserving than a single-
parent household. In order to ensure the reliability of the generosity measure, I conducted a 
sensitivity analysis. This analysis compares the effect of generosity on each dimension of social 
capital across four household types [single, one-earner couple with two children, a single 
parent with two children and one-earner couple with no children]. The results of the analyses 
are in appendix D. The effects of generosity on social capital are broadly consistent across all 
household types, with a few exceptions. When replacing the generosity index with single-
parent households with two children, generosity is no longer a significant predictor of informal 
networks and voluntary participation. In most cases, generosity is less for single-parent 
households than one earner two children households. As such, it may not be enough to crowd-




Table 5.16: EU 29 AW replacement rates (2010-2012), by household composition








One earner no 
children 
Netherlands 64.1  Ireland 82.41  Lithuania 76.8  Ireland 75.41 
Luxembourg 61.57  Denmark 82.22  Slovenia 74.16  Netherlands 70.63 
Denmark 59.63  Netherlands 80.1  Denmark 73.81  Luxembourg 68.41 
Portugal 59.59  Luxembourg 78.44  Luxembourg 72.94  Iceland 63.19 
Belgium 55.25  Lithuania 75.43  Finland 68.82  Denmark 63.05 
France 53.9  Finland 74.6  Iceland 67.14  Portugal 62.12 
Ireland 53.58  Slovenia 74.43  Portugal 65.61  Finland 61.53 
Austria 52.36  Iceland 72.47  Netherlands 65.59  Slovenia 57.77 
Iceland 51.61  UK 72.32  UK 65.11  France 56.67 
Finland 50.66  Austria 72.07  Belgium 65  Cyprus 54.42 
Slovenia 46.87  Cyprus 70.85  Austria 64.36  Latvia 54.18 
Sweden 45.19  Latvia 70.2  Ireland 64.11  Austria 53.58 
Germany 45.16  Germany 68.57  Germany 63.59  Sweden 52.65 
Latvia 44.95  Portugal 66.81  France 61.9  Germany 52.1 
Spain 44.19  France 62.94  Sweden 60.59  Belgium 50.65 
Czech Republic 43.33  Sweden 62.67  Latvia 57.81  Czech Republic 50.43 
Croatia 40.13  Czech Republic 59.52  Cyprus 56.4  Spain 46.59 
Malta 39.85  Belgium 57.8  Czech Republic 55.08  UK 46.23 
Cyprus 39.31  Malta 54.88  Spain 54.69  Malta 43.88 
UK 38.43  Spain 54.25  Croatia 53.98  Bulgaria 42.41 
Bulgaria 38.24  Bulgaria 53.53  Malta 53.06  Lithuania 40.44 
Estonia 33.77  Poland 51.65  Poland 50.26  Estonia 38.88 
Poland 31.81  Croatia 50.55  Bulgaria 50.2  Croatia 37.79 
Slovakia 28.18  Estonia 47.31  Estonia 44.45  Poland 37.42 
Hungary 27.88  Slovakia 44.75  Hungary 40.82  Slovakia 35.17 
Lithuania 24.63  Hungary 42.86  Slovakia 38.12  Hungary 32.09 
Italy 22.89  Romania 33.1  Romania 31.44  Romania 25.1 
Romania 21.09  Italy 27.34  Italy 27.72  Italy 24.31 
Greece 15.01  Greece 21.02  Greece 24.03  Greece 16.51 
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5.9  Discussion  
Within the literature, there was an expectation that the welfare state affects the forms of social 
capital production. The picture presented was one of either crowding-out the informal and 
formal networks of civic participation (e.g., Nisbet 1962; Andersen 1984; Wolfe 1989; Lee 
2000; Scheepers et al., 2002). Or one that created the environment for networks to flourish 
(Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000; Dahlberg 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Pichler and Wallace 
2007; van der Meer et al. 2009), providing the necessary conditions for trust to emerge (Kumlin 
and Rothstein 2005; Albrekt-Larsen 2007; Trägårdh 2007). It is the potentially conflicting 
nature of the welfare state the led the research to seek a dimensional account of social capital, 
one that acknowledged the potential variation and the multifaceted nature of the concept 
(Eastis 1998; Dasgupta 2000; Grootaert et al. 2003). 
As was observed in the results section, the welfare state did indeed indicate the potential for 
conflicting effects on the forms of social capital. At the individual level, we find mixed support 
for the hypotheses. Net replacement rates do have a crowding-out effect on informal 
networks, though after controlling for GDP is only significant at the 10% level. This finding 
makes claims of welfare generosity crowding-out informal social capital challenging, though 
still negative. It is worth pointing out that the levels of informal social capital were relatively 
high across all EU countries and showed little variation, particularly when compared to formal 
networks. There was also a limitation in the composition of the dependent variable in terms of 
the either-or response category, making it difficult to determine whether welfare states are 
providing support where it is required or actively crowding-out. Perhaps an option to observe 
all instances in which an individual can access informal resources may have improved the 
interpretation.  
Relating this to the theory and the modernisation thesis, we can view the welfare state as a 
creation to meet the demands of insufficient market provision. Changes in demand and labour 
movements influenced previous familial informal network structures of provision. One borne 
out of necessity, one might argue. In this context, one has to consider what the implications of 
crowding-out are. The critical issue may lay with whether one has access to resources within 
networks, regardless of whether they are from the state or personal networks. Accounting for 
state support in the informal network setting increases the EU average from .81 to .92, 
suggesting that it could provide support beyond individuals’ informal networks. 
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Surprisingly GDP is also found to be significantly negatively related to the informal latent 
variable. Within the context of the hypothesis, this would suggest that individuals in countries 
with higher GDP are less concerned they will receive adequate provision and are less motivated 
to generate informal networks. Perhaps a more prosperous economy indicates the greater 
likelihood, or maybe the false notion of employment, and thus maintaining one's 
independence without needing support. It could also be that the economy's demands have 
reduced the possible time one can dedicate to informal networks. Or the monetary value of 
exchange influences individuals' relationship to informal support.  
The second network dimension is formal networks, explored through the two latent variables 
of voluntary and political participation. Both dependent variables reported a positive 
relationship to net replacement rates, although the certainty of our causal claims on the effect 
of generosity again remains mixed. We find support for the hypothesis regarding voluntary 
networks, which, after controlling for GDP, shows generosity to have an 11.5% increase in 
participation. Political participation, however, was found to be non-significant after the 
introduction of the control variables. This finding is perhaps a little surprising when considering 
the importance of welfare spending on political participation between income groups (Shore 
2014).  
Within the context of the crowding-out argument, voluntary associations are those positioned 
in direct competition with the public provision, with the welfare state substituting the need for 
a voluntary alternative (Dahlberg 2005). Here the detrimental impact of welfare state 
institutions on civil society should also be realised (Andersen 1984). The analysis provides an 
effective counter to this position finding that generosity is more likely to encourage and enable 
formal participation than deprive it. It is also worth noting that the significance of the voluntary 
model held across all applied estimation models, adding weight to the validity of the 
association. Furthermore, GDP reported being non-significant, confirming the importance of 
the generosity measure. Although political participation is not significant, it remained positive 
in direction. It also showed uniformity in the formal latent bi-factor model, which would seem 
to imply that civil society does not languish within the environment of welfare state generosity. 
Instead, as the hypothesis proposed, generosity supports formal network structures, 
increasing individuals’ formal social capital.  
There is support for the positive effect of the welfare state on interpersonal and institutional 
trust at the collective level. The hypotheses set out the primary importance of distinguishing 
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between universal and means-tested benefits. This distinction aimed to capture the social 
significance of universalism, explicitly acknowledging the process of creating solidarity and 
reducing the perceived social distance between groups. The analyses confirmed the 
importance of universalism for interpersonal trust. Reported as positively related to non-
means testing and significant across estimation applications. Interestingly, generosity is also 
positively related to interpersonal trust though at the p<.10 level in the final model level. GDP 
itself was not significant, indicating that the welfare state is an essential determinant in 
understanding social trust.  
It seems countries that are more generous and create a more socially cohesive environment 
through universalism are more likely to increase the trust between individuals, which is in line 
with Larsen’s (2007) findings. The implications of this are important not only for the perceived 
cultural distance but also for the broader social fabric. Without trust in the 'other’, there can 
be no civil society (Simmel 1950). As generosity also positively affects interpersonal trust, there 
is an argument to be made that the more comprehensive welfare system has a mutually 
reinforcing social capital effect. Universalism reduces the cultural distance increasing trust, 
which is essential for network formation. At the same time, generosity enables the opportunity 
to participate and maintain networks.  
The second collective aspect of social capital is institutional trust. The model findings were a 
little different from those expected. While non-means-testing reported initial significance, 
after the controls, this fell to the 10%-level, which is a tentative finding. There was, however, 
a reliably significant positive result for the generosity measure, which would seem to imply 
that more generous provision increases levels of trust. Feasibly this makes sense when we 
consider that a higher GDP also relates to greater trust in institutions. It seems through the 
prospect of provision, institutional trust is enhanced. Interestingly, within the context of the 
nature of welfare support, it appears that rather than a destructive force, greater welfare state 
support is conducive for trust. These findings suggest that the qualitative distinctions of welfare 
state generosity and universalism are essential considerations for understanding the levels of 
trust, both interpersonally and institutionally.  
By its very nature, measurement of the social world will involve some approximations and fit 
for purpose. As such, it may be worth revisiting how we arrived at the independent measures 
of the welfare state to aid in our judgment of these findings. 
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The selection of replacement rates as an indicator accounts for both qualitative and 
quantitative elements of the welfare state. The position of generosity overcomes existing 
limitations of macro-level influencing effects on social spending used throughout the literature. 
The indicator employed in the analysis was the total replacement rate of existing earnings for 
a single average worker (AW) averaged over a 7 to 60-month period.  Generosity typically 
varies with respect to this period and family model type, with provision increasing support to 
families. Further analysis showed that an averaged indicator across all family types coincides 
with earlier results, confirming some stability in the replacement rates measure. An 
assessment of individual household types indicated one difference in the significance of 
generosity of networks not holding for single-parent households. The dynamics of household 
composition the stratification processes of how the welfare state supports families differently 
would be a significant area for future research.   
The issue of dimensionality also needs to be raised. Each form of social capital is not entirely 
independent of each other but is interlinked due to the nature of social relations within a 
structure (Esser 2008).  The decision to take a dimensional approach was to assess the idea of 
calibration and explore the possible nuances of the welfare state’s effect. How the dimensions 
relate to one another is also likely to be of central importance. If we consider the importance 
of trust for participation (Coleman 1988; Newton 1999) and our findings suggest that 
generosity and universalism are essential determinants of trust, then it is likely to have a 
further impact on formal and informal relations. The implications being that in the process of 
austerity, the residualisation of welfare systems are likely to harm the levels of trust. As a result, 
it could have a detrimental consequence for individuals’ social capital and civil society at large. 
This relational nature of social capital is the subject of the fourth analytical chapter, which aims 
to further our understanding of the social capital relationship and provide a contextualised 
understanding of the welfare state.   
 
5.10 Conclusion 
The initial analysis has confirmed that a dualistic interpretation of the welfare states' influence 
on the social structure is likely to be an unhelpful position in deciphering the social capital 
welfare state debate. The evidence mainly pointed towards a positive association of welfare 
state generosity and universalism on an individual's social capital levels. There was, however, 
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the potential for crowding-out in regards to informal social capital. Whether crowding-out is 
an adverse outcome itself, in terms of access to resources and precisely what this means at the 
individual level, will require further analysis.  
This chapter has explored the between-country welfare state effect on social capital. The next 
stage is to combine these findings with an exploration of the within country-level variation so 




6 The Role of the Welfare State in Moderating Social Capital 
Inequalities between Socioeconomic Groups  
 
This chapter aims to address the critical issue of resources. Specifically, I wish to address 
whether the potential equalising mechanisms of the comprehensive welfare state can 
positively affect social capital inequalities. Having already theoretically framed our debate, the 
first part of the chapter briefly visits the literature to contextualise our previous analytical 
findings before identifying the specific hypotheses for analyses. The main body of the chapter 
will focus on trying to determine the role of the welfare state in moderating social capital 
inequalities. Here I address each social capital dimension in turn, first establishing whether 
there is cross-national variance through random slopes, then assessing whether the welfare 
state can explain the variance.  
The previous analytical aimed to provide a more coherent picture of social capital and its 
relationship with the welfare state, in particular, by exploring the dimensionality of social 
capital and the potential calibrating nature of the welfare state. Adopting this approach, we 
move beyond the simple binary observations and instead identify how dimensions might vary 
and how this relates to the substantive nature of welfare states. The empirical analysis 
provided support for the hypotheses that universalism significantly influences interpersonal 
trust and, to a lesser extent, institutional trust. Generosity was a reliable predictor of 
participation in formal networks and institutional trust. Therefore, both generosity and 
universalism appear to create conducive environments for the development of social capital.  
The previous chapter also highlighted the potential crowding-out of welfare state generosity 
on informal networks. The formal arrangements of the welfare state may have replaced some 
forms of social support, where the family was previously the primary source of individuals' 
provision. Whether this is an adverse outcome of continued welfare support or more a 
response to the individualised nature of informal structures as brought about by the economic 
system is an important consideration to bear in mind.  
Perhaps the more pressing question is what the variation in crowding-in and crowding-out of 
welfare state support means for different groups of individuals in terms of their access to social 
capital. If the welfare state facilitates social capital that individuals would not otherwise have 
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access to, then crowding-out may not necessarily be detrimental for overall levels of social 
capital, and indeed, could have an equalising effect. Equally, if the welfare state crowds-in 
more for some groups than others, this could exacerbate the inequalities between SEGs. 
The limited logic of the crowding-out debate is to assume that individuals free from the 
constraints of the welfare state can mobilise their resources for successful practices (which, as 
the literature suggests, are unequally distributed). Here, the onus of responsibility is on the 
individual to improve their circumstances through positive association. While we cannot deny 
agency in individual choices, this perspective overlooks structural inequalities in social capital 
outcomes. Given the policy emphasis on social capital, the lack of research into cross-national 
differences in social capital inequalities is notable. Perhaps the resource perspective, as 
opposed to the society-centred approach, naturally highlights the potential structural 
inequalities that may persist.   
6.1 Social capital inequality 
The unequal distribution of social capital between socioeconomic groups (SEGs) has both 
theoretical and empirical support within the literature. Bourdieu's (1986) forms of capital 
illustrate how the conversion and transformation of economic and cultural capital into social 
capital occur in a mutually reinforcing process. Having existing capital enables individuals to 
acquire more social capital due to their privileged position. Relating this to the findings in the 
previous analysis, where income signifies economic capital and education represents cultural 
capital, evidence supports the potential difference in capital production. Those who are 
tertiary educated reported greater social capital across all dimensions, consistent with the 
empirical literature (e.g. Bekkers 2007; Gesthuizen et al., 2008). Income was the most 
significant predictor across all dimensions, affirming the central importance of income as the 
potential ‘root of all other types of capital’ (Bourdieu 1986: 252), which is again supported in 
















6.2 The welfare state and social capital inequality 
As previously established, the welfare state can reduce socioeconomic inequalities through 
intervention and redistribution that address economic and cultural capital deficits. In turn, 
these improve opportunities to accumulate and reduce social capital inequalities. Generous 
and universal policies can ensure equality of access to resources to assist the production of 
social capital. As we are concerned with the distribution of resources, I also consider a direct 
social policy measure to be relevant to the discussion beyond the broader measures. As social 
protection policies aim to keep individuals within market employment, they reduce the 
potential risk of exclusion from social and labour market participation (Saunders 2010; Barr 
2012). In doing so, they influence economic and cultural capital shortfalls and increase the 
potential for social capital accumulation.  
Figure 6.2 illustrates the interaction between the welfare state, SEGs and social capital. Arrow 
(a) highlights the redistributive functions of the welfare state. Arrow (b) is the previously 
explored effects of the welfare state on social capital. Arrow (c) represents the influence of 
socioeconomic inequalities on social capital outcomes. The final broken arrow (d) is the 
relationship to clarify. In the next section, we revisit the evidence relating to the dimensions of 
networks and trust to understand how the welfare state might influence the social capital 





















6.2.1 Networks  
There is mixed evidence on the role of the welfare state in moderating network inequalities. 
Gesthuizen et al. (2008) find that greater social security spending reduced the importance of 
education for informal networks but increased the importance of education for formal 
networks. Counter to this, van Ingen and van der Meer (2011) found that social security 
reduces the participatory inequalities between both income groups and education groups, and 
van der Meer et al. (2009) find greater spending crowds out informal networks for lower-
income groups. The differing conclusions of van Ingen and van der Meer (2011) and Gesthuizen 
et al. (2008) emphasise the difficulty of addressing the social capital to welfare state 
relationship. Both studies use the same independent measure of social security but have 
different operationalisations of 'participation'. As I have previously addressed the construct 
validity of the formal network latent variable, we hope that the proceeding analyses will add 
some insight beyond the observed indicator approaches. In addition, we look to supplement 















6.2.2 Hypotheses  
In terms of SEGs, income positively relates to informal networks, which would suggest the 
potential for informal network inequality to be present. Generosity, therefore, has the 
potential to perpetuate this inequality or reduce inequality. Previous evidence suggests that 
spending can widen (van Ingen and van der Meer 2011) or decrease (Gesthuizen et al., 2008) 
informal network inequalities. If the generous system steps in and provides access to informal 
social capital, then the negative consequences of income inequality are likely to be 
compensated. The expectation then is that welfare state generosity will moderate the informal 
social capital inequalities between income groups, reducing the importance of income for 
social capital accumulation. 
Chapter 5 also confirmed a small significant adverse outcome for the unemployed and those 
individuals in receipt of social benefits. Whether this is a deficit in the informal network 
structure of individuals itself or due to crowding-out through welfare state generosity is 
unclear. When individuals are experiencing adverse effects or find themselves excluded (from 
the market), Informal networks can provide protection through direct or indirect paths into 
the labour market (UNDP 2013). Individuals of low socioeconomic status simultaneously find 
themselves at a disadvantage of limited capital to build or convert into social capital. At the 
same time, they have restricted access to networks that can potentially improve their 
employment and benefit outcomes. This situation is precisely the area where we expect the 
welfare state to have a moderating effect. Ameliorating network inequalities through 
generosity and ALMPs, and improving access through the universal provision, welfare states 
can provide access where otherwise individuals find themselves excluded.    
It was somewhat surprising that compared to primary educated, tertiary education reported 
greater access to informal social capital; after all, immediate informal networks should not 
have apparent access restrictions. That said, the type of networks individuals can access would 
understandably vary. As the composition of the informal latent variable includes indicators for 
accessing jobs and money, there is the possibility that acquiring greater cultural capital through 
education has improved the opportunities of access, enabling conversion into social capital.  
With this in mind, the welfare state has the potential to be an equalising force, providing 
alternative sources of access to networks for social capital production that may otherwise be 
missing from an individual's informal network. 
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H1 Differences in informal social capital across SEGs will be lower in countries with 
more generous welfare states. 
Providing support and access to resources, enabling individuals to access information and jobs 
that more privileged individuals already have access to, is a vital function of the possible 
equalising tendencies of the welfare state between social groups. The formal solidarity of the 
welfare state that insures against risks can also improve the opportunities to create formal 
networks and participation in civil society. Universal systems increase individual's rights and 
possibilities to engage in civil society (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006), where a national context 
based on solidarity and support can promote broader participation and inclusion (Kunemund 
and Rein 1999; Rothstein 2001; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). At the same time, the ‘safe 
refuge’ provided by the generous welfare state allows lower SEGs greater opportunity to 
dedicate time and energy in forming new and maintaining existing networks (Kuhnle and 
Alestalo 2000). In addition, ALMPs provide expanded opportunities and access to additional 
network structures that may otherwise be restricted. In short, the inherent inequalities faced 
by low socioeconomic status in accessing formal social capital can be moderated by the 
comprehensiveness of the welfare state. 
H2 Differences in individual's formal networks across SEGs will be lower in countries 
with more comprehensive welfare states. 
6.2.3 Trust  
The literature so far has mainly addressed the network inequalities between SEGs. The 
potential inequalities in trust outcomes are still relatively underexplored. The first analytical 
chapter confirmed the positive relationship between the reported levels of trust and both 
universalism and generosity. Particular emphasis was on the inclusive solidaristic environment 
created by the universal welfare state. Reducing the cultural distance between the 'us' and 
'them' is an essential prerequisite for maintaining trust. Whether the generalised levels of trust 
found within countries follow the trust levels between SEGs is an interesting and important 
question. The initial analysis would seem to indicate that there is likely to be some variation 
between SEGs in their levels of trust. We begin by addressing the evidence within the literature 
for this potential variation. 
How the levels of trust vary between SEGs may not be as one might expect. Support for greater 
welfare state redistribution is higher in lower socioeconomic groups (Fernandez and Manzano 
157 
 
2016) and less so for the more upwardly mobile, who are less likely to benefit from 
redistributive welfare policies (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). The same association may not 
follow for trust. Instead, the unequal distribution of resources and risks associated with market 
participation set within the welfare state structure may reflect the socioeconomic position 
(class stratification) individuals find themselves in (Edlund and Lindh 2013). Those groups 
considered to be in a more precarious position within a market economy, the low-status low 
education, are simultaneously more likely to feel the adverse effects of the market while the 
least able to demand support from the welfare state. This position was indicated in the 
previous chapter, with the higher educated and those with higher income more likely to report 
higher levels of trust.  
This role of inequality shaping trust is a central focus for Uslaner (2010:128-130), who suggests 
the unequal distribution of resources creates low trust, creating more inequality. [This position 
is reminiscent of the vicious circle of social capital decline advocated by the capital-
accumulation thesis in the first chapter - see van Oorschot and Finsveen 2010]. Where people 
understand the system as stacked against them, it can create a bleak future and a perceived 
lack of control over an individual’s circumstances. This distorted notion of fairness from the 
top down is then replicated horizontally, undermining trust in others. Here, the normalisation 
of inequality provides a fertile ground for conflict between groups [creating a cultural distance] 
that leads to institutional and interpersonal distrust.  
There is a clear equalising potential for the welfare state in addressing conflict and inequality. 
By promoting solidarity through universalism and social inclusion through generous welfare 
provision, the welfare state can moderate inequalities between SEGs. This position of 
inclusivity is where Larsen (2007) distinguishes between the trust outcomes of universalism 
and selective welfare policies. Much in the same way as inequality can breed distrust, residual 
welfare systems have the potential to generate cultural distance. In residual systems, the lower 
SEGs are often stigmatised as the undeserving poor, who exploit the system and cannot be 
trusted. More generous welfare systems that direct resources to the less well-off can assist 
them in being able to maintain an equivalent social standing. It is the process of inclusion, 
which can increase the trust of lower SEGs, thus reducing the variation and inequality between 




Employing the WVS (1990), comparing 27 market economies, Knack and Keefer (1997) find 
that interpersonal trust13 is positively related to low levels of polarisation- as measured 
through income inequality14. This suggests that welfare systems can have a role to play in 
reducing inequalities and the social cleavages between classes, potentially resulting in the 
equalising tendencies of social trust. This finding is corroborated by Delhey and Newton (2003), 
comparing seven nation-states from the Euromodule survey (1999-2001). They observe 
greater social trust where perceived conflict [measured through a summation of six social 
conflicts15] between social groups is at its lowest. Oorschort and Finsveen (2010) also find a 
reduction in interpersonal trust inequalities with larger social expenditure. Counter to this, 
Vergolini (2011), using the ESS (2002), after accounting for economic and social stratification, 
finds very little evidence for the positive effects of socio-democratic welfare systems on social 
cohesion between SEGs (as measured through institutional and generalised trust).  His results 
are somewhat surprising in that they show the weakest effects of stratification within the 
liberal regime. These studies provide a mixed picture of the welfare states influence on social 
capital inequalities. Social expenditure shows a reduction in interpersonal trust in some cases 
(Oorschort and Finsveen 2010), while in others, more residual systems indicated greater 
equality in levels of trust (Vergolini 2011).  
6.2.4 Hypothesis 
Acknowledging the potential for conflict between socioeconomic groups, which the literature 
suggests will result in different outcomes for trust, the importance of the universal solidaristic 
welfare state is a critical factor in understanding social capital inequalities between different 
SEGs. Here more generous welfare provision is expected to reduce the perceived conflict 
between SEGs. 
Where universalism is more substantial, the cultural distance between SEGs should be less. It 
is also possible that ALMPs will have a positive effect, with welfare systems actively providing 
greater inclusion through generous social policies. Enhancing or improving connection to the 
labour market can improve the perceived difference in opportunities, with better integration 
 
13 (Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing 
with people?)      
14 Gini-coefficient 
15: poor and rich people, unemployed and people with jobs, management and workers, young and older people, 
men and women, nationals and immigrants 
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leading to greater trust in the systems of delivery. As such, the levels of inequality faced 
between SEGs in trust outcomes will be moderated by generosity.   
H3 The difference in the levels of an individual’s institutional and interpersonal trust 
between socioeconomic groups will be more equal in more generous and universal welfare 
states. 
 
6.3 Data and Methods 
The detail for the data, variables and methods is located in the methodology section. 
6.3.1 Research Frame 
As in the previous analytical chapter, my research hypotheses are concerned with individuals 
clustered within countries and the influence of country-level characteristics on individual social 
capital. Multilevel models are therefore adopted to reflect the hierarchical nature of the data. 
Previously the linear model incorporated random intercepts, allowing differences between 
countries in the average value of the dependent variable (social capital). There is also the 
expectation that the relationship between the explanatory (welfare state characteristics) and 
the dependent variable will differ between groups (Bosker and Snijders 2012). Given the focus 
in this chapter on country differences in the effect of socioeconomic factors on the levels of 
individuals' social capital, random slopes are introduced to the model to allow regression 
coefficients to vary across countries and enables us to address the within-country welfare state 
variation. 
The detail for the data, variables and methods is located in the methodology section. 
6.3.2 Individual-level  
The central individual variables of interest for this analysis are socioeconomic groups, which 
within the context of the hypothesis are those groups where competition over resources is 
likely to be most significant. Education provides access to cultural capital found to be important 
for all forms of social capital. Income is the most significant predictor of social capital. It is an 
essential resource mobilised to generate all forms of social capital. Although not always 
significant in the previous models, receiving social benefits is vital when we consider how 
variation in social policy design will affect their access to networks, ability to participate, and 
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trust in the system of provision. Generous entitlement can ensure adequate coverage, while 
more universal systems can reduce the stigma associated with support and encourage take-
up. Similarly, variation in how much welfare states reduces the risks of unemployment, 
enabling individuals to maintain existing networks, or provide access to new networks through 
policies, will affect the inequalities experienced between the employed and unemployed 
groups. 
6.3.3 Random Slope Model 
In assessing the specific variation between SEGs, a random slope model is conducted for each 
variable (the statistical notation is located within the methodology chapter). To maintain the 
dimensionality of social capital, this means applying several models for each dependent 
variable. To make this manageable to the reader, we report the information of substantive 
interest to the central questions of this chapter: Are there cross-national differences in social 
capital inequalities between SEGs, and can the welfare state explain these differences?      
Each set of analyses began with the random intercept model (chapter five), containing all 
individual-level variables, before introducing the slope to observe its significance and viability 
for further investigation. Country-level variables are included before testing for the interaction 
effects, along with country controls, to confirm the significance of the findings. 
6.4 Results  
6.4.1 Cross-national differences in informal network inequalities   
In the previous chapter, we confirmed the significant positive effect of income (𝛽=.250) and 
education (𝛽=0.14) on informal networks, while the unemployed (𝛽=-.051) and benefits 
recipients (𝛽=-.031) were less likely to have access to informal networks. In the random slopes 
model, these effects are allowed to vary across countries. Table 6.1 provides the results of the 
slopes models without country-level controls. The average effect reported in the table is the 
overall association between each socioeconomic factor (𝑥) and social capital (𝑦) across 
countries. The slope variances (U) confirm whether the effects of each socioeconomic factor 
varies significantly across countries, with the 95% (C.I) showing the range of estimated effects 
across countries. The likelihood-ratio (LR) test provides statistical confirmation for the 
improvement of the random slopes model over the previous intercept model. All slope 
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variance estimates are significant across all socioeconomic factors. The variance for income is 
particularly large (𝑣𝑎𝑟=0.327, 𝑝=<.05).  
Figure 6.3 presents the differences in income slopes across countries, which shows the 
importance of income for informal networks is the least in Spain and the largest in the 
Netherlands (compared to the global average). The variance estimates for tertiary education 
(𝑣𝑎𝑟 =.000, 𝑝=<.001), the unemployed (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.001, 𝑝=<.001), and benefit recipients 
(𝑣𝑎𝑟=.001, 𝑝=<.001),  are all relatively small, though do confirm there are differences between 
countries and fit the data better, compared to the previous random intercept models. Figure 
6.4 illustrates the cross-national differences in benefit slopes. Here the negative association 
between receiving benefits and informal networks is the largest in the UK and the least in 
Denmark. The significant variance estimates for all socioeconomic factors show there are 
differences in informal network outcomes across countries. With this in mind, the next 
question seeks to address whether the welfare state can explain these differences in informal 
network inequalities as the hypothesis predicted.  
 
 
Table 6.1: Multilevel random slopes model: the country effects of socioeconomic factors in informal 
networks 
  Income Tertiary education Unemployed Benefit recipient 
Average effect 0.494** 0.014** -0.052*** -0.031*** 
95% range (C.I) 0.187,   0.801 0.004,   0.024 -0.065,  -0.040 -0.044,   -0.018 
Slope variance (U) 0.327* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
LRa 21.04*** 30.97*** 10.57** 24.42*** 
df 13 14 13 13 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012. 
N level 1=28,032; N level 2=29 countries Level 1 controls(all models)= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, 
























Figure 6.4: Ranked country benefit slopes: the association between receiving benefits and informal 




































































































































































































































































































6.4.2 Generosity and informal network inequality 
Table 6.2 provides the random slopes and cross-level interactions for generosity and each SEG. 
The slope is the average effect of each socioeconomic factor in countries with average levels 
of generosity. The interaction between each SEG and net replacement rate indicates whether 
the individual effects vary significantly across countries according to generosity levels. Our 
hypothesis predicted that generosity would reduce the informal networks inequalities 
between SEGs. The results of the models do not support this prediction. The interactions for 
individuals who are unemployed and those in receipt of benefits are non-significant. Therefore, 
while there are country-level differences in the outcome of informal networks for these two 
groups, generosity does not explain the differences.  
Both income and tertiary education interaction terms were significant, although they were not 
as expected. The interaction term with income and net replacement rate reports a positive 
significant coefficient, 𝛽=.025, 𝑝=<.05, suggesting that income is slightly more strongly related 
to informal networks in countries with greater generosity than countries with less generosity. 
Figure 6.5 presents the interaction effect. These findings suggest that in countries with high 
net replacement rates, the gap between income groups is larger. In contrast, countries with 
low net replacement rates have slight income differences in informal social capital. In other 
words, inequality in access to informal networks across income groups is larger in more 
generous welfare states.  
The interaction term between tertiary education and replacement rates, although small, was 
positive and statistically significant 𝛽=.001, 𝑝=.05. Once again, this suggests that generosity 
widens the informal network inequalities, in this case, between the tertiary and non-tertiary 
educated. Therefore, while the average levels of informal social capital decrease with 
generosity, the effect is more negligible for those with higher incomes and tertiary education. 
These findings align with van der Meer et al. (2009), who find greater spending crowds out 
informal networks for lower-income groups and counter to Gesthuizen et al. (2008), who find 
greater spending reduces the importance of education for informal networks. 
Based on the results of the analyses, we reject the first hypothesis that generosity reduces the 
informal network inequalities between SEGs, with evidence to suggest that the gap between 
SEGs increases. In the next section, we move on to formal networks to assess whether there 
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are cross-national differences in the outcomes of political and voluntary networks between 
SEGs.  
Table 6.2: Moderation effects on informal networks (random slopes model with cross-level 
interactions) 
  Income Education Unemployed Benefits 
Average effect 0.659*** 0.012+ -0.052*** -0.031*** 
Total net replacement rate -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.162*** 
c_Net replacement rate × Income 0.025*    
c_Net replacement rate × Education  0.001*   
c_Net replacement rate × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Net replacement rate × Benefits    -0.001 
cons 0.876*** 0.854*** 0.874*** 0.858*** 
var(individual) 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
var(country) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
var(Slope) 0.453* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
LRa 3.95* 3.99* 0.16 1.06 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012 
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 control variables = gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, 
benefits and domicile, N level 2=29 countries, level 2 controls=Net replacement rate, Non-means-testing, 
GDP, + p<0.10  *p<0.05 **p<0.01  ***p<0.001,  LRa Null=random slopes model with controls 
 




6.4.3 Cross-national differences in formal network inequalities   
The results of the fixed models highlighted the importance of education (vol𝛽=.162, pol𝛽=.132) and 
income (vol𝛽=.300, pol𝛽=.132) for voluntary and political networks with lower levels of participation 
for the unemployed (vol𝛽=-.014, pol𝛽=-.027) and benefits recipients (𝛽=-.008). Perhaps surprisingly, 
benefit recipients indicated greater political participation compared to non-recipients (𝛽=.007).  
Table 6.3 provides the results of the random slopes models, where we observe whether the 
effects of socioeconomic factors on formal networks vary across countries.  
The income slope variance is considerable for voluntary networks (𝑣𝑎𝑟=1.068, 𝑝=<.05), 
suggesting considerable variation in income inequalities across countries. The slope variance 
for political is only significant and the 90%-level (𝑣𝑎𝑟=0.257, 𝑝=<.10), though the LR test 
confirms a better fitting model (LR=6.68, 𝑝=<.05). The slope variance is significant for the 
unemployed group (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.000,𝑝=<.001) in voluntary networks. However, the LR test does not 
confirm a better fitting model than the previous intercept model, suggesting that the cross-
national differences are relatively small. All other models confirm the addition of the slope is a 
better representation of the data, except for the benefit slope for voluntary networks, which 
is only significant at the 90%-level (LR=5.42, 𝑝=<.10).  
Even though the education slope variances are small for both voluntary (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.001, 𝑝=<.001) and 
political networks (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.001, 𝑝=<.001), there is cross-national variation, which is more easily 
interpreted in Figure 6.6 and  
 
Figure 6.7. Here the importance of education for access to voluntary networks is higher in the UK and 
Ireland and the least important in Bulgaria (compared to the global average). Education is also highly 
important in the UK for political participation, along with Germany and the least in Estonia and Romania.     
According to the results of the random slope models, the effect of socioeconomic factors on 
formal networks varies cross-nationally. In the next section, we examine whether the welfare 




Table 6.3: Multilevel random slopes model: the country effects of socioeconomic factors in formal social 
capital  
    Voluntary Political 
Income Average effect 1.034*** 0.532*** 
 95% range (C.I) 0.534 < 1.533 0.259< 0.831 
 Slope variance (U) 1.068* 0.257+ 
 LR
a 10.63** 6.68* 
Tertiary education Average effect 0.158*** 0.125*** 
 95% range (C.I) 0.143 < 0.174 0.110 < 0.140 
 Slope variance (U) 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 LR
a 14.29*** 66.29*** 
Unemployed Average effect -0.028*** -0.011 
 95% range (C.I) -0.040 < -0.156 -0.024 < 0.003 
 Slope variance (U) 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 LR
a 0.84 14.17*** 
Benefit recipient Average effect -0.008+ 0.009* 
 95% range (C.I) -0.018 < 0.005 0.000< 0.018 
 Slope variance (U) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  LRa 5.41+ 14.17*** 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012. 
N level 1=28,032; N level 2=29 countries Level 1 controls(all models)= gender, age, income, education, unemployed, 
cohabitation, benefits and domicile, +p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001, LRa= difference between random slope 










Figure 6.7: Ranked tertiary education slopes, the association tertiary education and political 



































































































































































































































































































6.4.4 The welfare state and formal network inequality 
Building on the random slopes models, Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 includes the cross-level 
interactions for both generosity and universalism with each SEG, indicating whether the 
combined effect of our welfare state measures and socioeconomic factors have an additional 
impact on the outcome of formal networks. The hypothesis predicted that generosity would 
moderate the formal network inequalities between SEG. However, none of the interactions is 
significant for voluntary networks (Table 6.4). Suggesting that while there are cross-national 
differences in the association between each socioeconomic factor (income, tertiary education, 
benefit recipients, the unemployed) and voluntary networks, generosity does not explain the 
inequalities between SEGs and voluntary networks. Previous studies have indicated that 
greater social spending can both decrease (van Ingen and van der Meer, 2011) and increase 
(Gesthuizen et al., 2008) the importance of education for formal networks, which we are 
unable to clarify.  
We do, however, notice a moderating effect with the universalism measure. The interaction 
term with income and non-means-testing reports a significant negative coefficient (𝛽=-0.137, 
𝑝=<.01), suggesting that income is less important for voluntary networks in countries with a 
greater universalism. Figure 6.8 presents the interaction effect, which shows that income is 
positively associated with voluntary networks in countries with low universalism and has no 
effect in countries with high universalism. In other words, income only matters for voluntary 
networks in countries with low levels of universalism.  Arguably, this represents an equalising 
mechanism; in the sense that in countries with high universalism, income is no longer 
associated with voluntary networks.   
In terms of political participation (Table 6.5), the interactions terms with generosity and 
income, unemployed and benefit recipients, were all non-significant. The interaction terms 
with universalism and the unemployed and benefit recipients were also non-significant. We 
did, however, find a significant interaction term with income and universalism reporting a 
negative coefficient (𝛽=0.052, 𝑝=<.10), although this is only significant at the 90%-level. The 
LR test also confirmed an improvement over the random slopes model at the 90%-level 
(LR=2.74, 𝑝=<.10). The interaction term is illustrated in Figure 6.10, which shows that in 
countries with high universalism, income is less important for political participation than 
countries where universalism is low, where income matters more. Although the significance 
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level suggests some caution, the interaction term indicates a reduction in inequalities for 
political participation outcomes across income groups in more universalist welfare states. 
Where we do notice a significant moderating effect of generosity and universalism is with 
tertiary education. The interaction term with tertiary education and net replacement rate 
reports a positive significant coefficient (𝛽=0.001, 𝑝=<.05), and the interaction term with 
tertiary education and non-means-testing reports a positive significant coefficient (𝛽=0.004, 
𝑝=<.001). In these instances, both generosity and universalism increase the importance of 
education for political participation, implying a widening of social capital inequalities instead 
of the equalising effect predicted. Although the overall effect of generosity and universalism 
on political participation is non-significant, individuals with a tertiary education will benefit 
more from increasing welfare state support. Figure 6.9 presents the interaction effect between 
universalism and tertiary education, which illustrates the slight increase in political 
participation outcomes for tertiary-educated when universalism is larger.  
We reject the second hypothesis that generosity reduces participatory inequalities between 
SEGs. We also note that generosity and universalism have the potential to widen inequalities 
between tertiary and non-tertiary educated in political participation outcomes. There is an 
indication of a potential equalising effect with universalism reducing the importance of income 
for political participation and cancelling out the effect of income on voluntary networks, 











Table 6.4: Moderation effects on voluntary networks (random slopes model with cross-level 
interactions) 
  Income Education Unemployedb benefits 
Average effect 1.034*** 0.158*** -0.028*** -0.008+ 
Total net replacement rate 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
c_Net replacement rate × Income -0.005    
c_Net replacement rate × Education  0.000   
c_Net replacement rate × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Net replacement rate × Benefits    0.000 
LRa 0.03 0.04 - 0.52 
Non-means-testing 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
c_Non-means × Income -0.137**    
c_Non-means × Education  -0.001   
c_Non-means × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Non-means × Benefits    0.001 
LRa 9.98** 0.34 - 1.22 
cons 0.055* 0.008 0.055* 0.061** 
var(individual) 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
var(country) 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
var(slope) 0.470+ 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012 
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 control variables = gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and 
domicile, N level 2=29 countries, level 2 controls=Net replacement rate, Non-means-testing, GDP, + p<0.10  *p<0.05 
**p<0.01  ***p<0.001,  LRa Null=random slopes model with controls bReml estimation was applied, this prevented between 
model significance testing 
 





Table 6.5: Moderation effects on political participation (random slopes model with cross-level 
interactions) 
  Income Education Unemployed Benefits 
Average effect 0.532*** 0.125*** -0.011 0.009* 
Total net replacement rate 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
c_Net replacement rate × Income 0.007    
c_Net replacement rate × Education  0.001*   
c_Net replacement rate × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Net replacement rate × Benefits    0.000 
LRa 0.48 7.70** 0.52 0.05 
Non-means-testing 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
c_Non-means × Income -0.052+    
c_Non-means × Education  0.004***   
c_Non-means × Unemployed   0.001  
c_Non-means × Benefits    0.000 
LRa 2.74+ 11.44*** 0.34 0.01 
cons 0.090*** 0.052*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
var(individual) 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
var(country) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
var(slope) 0.212* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012 
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 control variables = gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits 
and domicile, N level 2=29 countries, level 2 controls=Net replacement rate, Non-means-testing, GDP, + p<0.10  
*p<0.05 **p<0.01  ***p<0.001,  LRa Null=random slopes model 
 











6.4.5 Cross-national differences in trust inequalities   
The previous random intercept models confirmed the significant associations between SEGs 
and trust outcomes. Income (𝛽=.456) and tertiary education (𝛽=1.04) was positively related to 
interpersonal trust. In contrast, the unemployed (𝛽=-.029) and benefits recipients (𝛽=-.016) 
reported a negative association. We observe similar effects for institutional trust outcomes 
with income (𝛽=.328), education (𝛽=0.56), the unemployed (𝛽=-.039) and benefits recipients 
(𝛽=-.013). In this section, we explore whether these differences in trust outcomes between 
SEGs vary across countries. Table 6.6 provides the results of the random slope models with and 
without country-level controls. All slopes are statistically significant, with the LR test confirming 
the slopes models are a better fit than the previous random intercepts models.  
The slope variances for both interpersonal (𝑣𝑎𝑟 3.888, 𝑝=<.05) and institutional trust (𝑣𝑎𝑟 
1.011, 𝑝=<.05) are again large, suggesting there may be considerable variation in income 
inequalities across countries. Although the slope variances for receiving benefits (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.000, 
𝑝=<.001), tertiary education (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.001, 𝑝=<.001) and the unemployed (𝑣𝑎𝑟=.001, 𝑝=<.001) 
are small, they are all significant. Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 illustrates the cross-national 
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variance in trust outcomes for benefit recipients. Here the adverse effect of receiving benefits 
on interpersonal trust is the largest in the UK and the lowest in Denmark and Spain (compared 
to the global average). The UK also reports the largest negative effect of receiving benefits on 
institutional trust, while the lowest is in Bulgaria (compared to the global average).  
The statistically significant slope variances, supported by the LR tests, confirm cross-national 
differences in the effect that socioeconomic factors have on trust. In the next section, we 
address whether the welfare state measures of generosity and universalism can explain these 
differences. 
 
Table 6.6: Multilevel random slopes model: the country effects of socioeconomic factors in trust 
    Interpersonal  Institutional 
Income Average effect 1.704*** 0.897*** 
 95% range 0.922 < 2.486 0.426< 1.368 
 Slope variance (U) 3.388* 1.011* 
 LR
a 25.36*** 26.09*** 
Tertiary education Average effect 0.105*** 0.056*** 
 95% range 0.090< 0.120 0.039< 0.072 
 Slope variance (U) 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 LR
a 16.47*** 70.30*** 
Unemployed Average effect -0.029*** -0.040*** 
 95% range -0.043< -0.014 -0.053< -0.026 
 Slope variance (U) 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 LR
a 7.26* 11.78** 
Benefit recipient Average effect -0.014* -0.010+ 
 95% range -0.026< -0.002 -0.021< -0.002 
 Slope variance (U) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  LRa 8.93* 13.02** 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012. 
N level 1=28,032; N level 2=29 countries Level 1 controls(all models)= gender, age, income, education, 
unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile, +p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001, LRa = 




















































































































































































































































































































6.4.6 Generosity, universalism and trust inequalities 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 provide the random slopes and cross-level interactions for generosity 
and universalism with each SEG. These models allow us to observe whether the combined 
effect of our welfare state measures with socioeconomic factors has an additional impact on 
interpersonal and institutional trust outcomes. Our hypothesis predicted that generosity and 
universalism would moderate the influence of socioeconomic factors, reducing trust 
inequalities between SEGs. The results of the analyses do not support this prediction. There 
are no significant interactions observed for income, benefit recipients or the unemployed with 
the net replacement rate and non-means-testing. The two significant moderating interactions 
observed are again with net replacement rate and education. The positive result (𝛽 
=.001, 𝑝=.05) found in both trust models suggests the generosity increases the gap between 
tertiary and non-tertiary educated, widening the institutional and interpersonal trust 
inequalities. As average levels of generosity are associated with an increase in interpersonal 
trust, people who are tertiary educated will have an additional benefit from an increase in 
generosity. We reject the third hypothesis that generosity and non-means testing reduces trust 
inequalities between SEGs and acknowledge the potential of generosity to widen the gap 
between tertiary and non-tertiary educated in trust outcomes.       
6.4.7 Summary  
The results of the random slope models confirmed that the effect of socioeconomic factors on 
social capital varies cross-nationally. In exploring this variation, introducing cross-level 
interactions enabled us to understand whether generosity and universalism would moderate 
the social capital inequalities between SEGs. The analyses suggested little support for 
generosity and universalism, explaining the slope variance. Where we did find evidence of 
moderating effects, it was often counter to our predicted hypotheses. It appears that 
generosity provides an additional benefit to tertiary educated people across all dimensions of 
social capital, except voluntary networks. Universalism also provides an additional benefit for 
tertiary educated people in terms of political participation outcomes. There was also a 
widening of inequalities in access to informal networks, with generosity increasing the 
importance of income. Where we did notice a potential reduction in social capital inequalities 
is with universalism reducing the importance of income for formal networks. Before we move 
to a more detailed discussion of these results and contextualise the findings, we consider a 
direct social policy measure.  
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Table 6.7: Moderation effects on interpersonal trust (random slopes model with cross-level interactions) 
Table 6.8: Moderation effects on institutional trust (random slopes model with cross-level interactions) 
  Income Education Unemployed Benefits 
Average effect 0.922*** 0.056*** -0.040*** -0.009+ 
Net replacement rate 0.143* 0.143* 0.143* 0.143* 
c_Net replacement rate × Income 0.022    
c_Net replacement rate × Education  0.001*   
c_Net replacement rate × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Net replacement rate × Benefits    0.000 
LR 1.51 7.26** 0.05 .00 
Non-means-testing 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 
c_Non-means × Income 0.012    
c_Non-means × Education  0.002   
c_Non-means × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Non-means × Benefits    0.000 
LR 0.05 1.05 .036 0.43 
cons 0.189*** 0.257*** 0.187*** 0.858*** 
var(individual) 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
var(country) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
var(slope) 1.001* 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012,N level 1=28,032, Level 1 control variables = gender, age, income, education, 
unemployed, cohabitation, benefits and domicile, N level 2=29 countries, level 2 controls=Net replacement 
rate, Non-means-testing, GDP,  + p<0.10  *p<0.05 **p<0.01  ***p<0.001,  LR, Null=random slopes model 
  Income Education Unemployed Benefits 
Average effect 1.642*** 0.105*** -0.028*** -0.014* 
Net replacement rate 0.126+ 0.126+ 0.126+ 0.126+ 
c_Net replacement rate × Income 0.013    
c_Net replacement rate × Education  0.001*   
c_Net replacement rate × Unemployed   0.000  
c_Net replacement rate × Benefits    0.000 
LR 0.54 4.84* 1.87 1.69 
Non-means-testing 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
c_Non-means × Income -0.012    
c_Non-means × Education  0.002   
c_Non-means × Unemployed   0.002  
c_Non-means × Benefits    0.000 
LR 0.37 2.49 3.62 1.19 
cons 0.285*** 0.257*** 0.303*** 0.276*** 
var(individual) 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
var(country) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
var(slope) 2.974* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Source: EQLS 2011/2012 
N level 1=28,032, Level 1 control variables = gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits 
and domicile, N level 2=29 countries, level 2 controls=Net replacement rate, Non-means-testing, GDP,  
+ p<0.10  *p<0.05 **p<0.01  ***p<0.001,  LR, Null=random slopes model 
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6.4.8 Additional welfare state analyses 
So far, we have illustrated that, except for informal networks, average levels of generosity and 
universalism are associated with positive social capital outcomes. However, when exploring 
how social capital varies between SEGs, welfare state generosity does not appear to help 
reduce inequalities and may have an unintended exacerbation of existing inequalities, 
particularly regarding education groups. To contextualise this observation, we consider a direct 
measure of social capital beyond the broad qualitative measure of welfare generosity. 
6.4.9 Active labour market spending on training and social capital inequalities  
Having already discussed the significance of the variances in the initial analysis, the focus here 
is solely on the outcome of the interactions effects that can further explain the slope variance. 
Table 6.9 provides the results of the slope and cross-level interactions for ALMP spending on 
training with each socioeconomic factor across all dimensions of social capital. The average 
effect reports the slope model for each socioeconomic factor on each social capital dimension 
(average increase in DV). Centred LM spending on training is the main effect. The interaction 
terms and corresponding LR tests represent five separate models and statistical confirmation 
per socioeconomic factor (5 DVs × 4 SEGs= 25 cross-level interactions, 25 random slope 
models). The final group of results are the slope variance for each SEG and each social capital 
dimension.  
ALMP spending on training reduces the importance of income for voluntary social capital (𝛽=-
3.673, 𝑝<.05). As illustrated in, income is increasingly important for voluntary participation 
outcomes in countries with low labour market spending and less so in countries with higher 
spending. The implication being that greater spending on training may reduce income 
inequalities in voluntary networks. While all individuals benefit from an increase in LM 
spending, associated with a 0.220 increase in voluntary networks, those with lower incomes 
benefit more. This finding is in line with Anderson (2009), who finds the beneficial outcomes 
of ALMPs on voluntary associations are more pronounced for labour market outsiders.  
Assessing the moderating effects between education groups, we notice one significant 
interaction for political participation (𝛽= 0.091, 𝑝<.05). Here ALMP spending provides an 
additional benefit to participation outcomes for those who are tertiary educated. Once again, 
increased spending suggests a slight widening of inequalities between tertiary and non-tertiary 
educated groups, which is counter to our predictions. Figure 6.14 illustrates that while both 
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tertiary and non-tertiary educated see an increase in political participation with increased LM 
spending, the increase is greater for tertiary educated. There are two further significant 
interactions within the models at the 90%-level, both for informal networks. ALMP spending 
has a positive effect on the unemployed (𝛽= 0.072, 𝑝<.10) and benefit recipients (𝛽= 0.005, 
𝑝<.10). As receiving benefits and being unemployed negatively relates to informal network 
outcomes, increased spending can moderate this adverse effect, reducing the informal 
network inequalities. Although the significance of the findings suggests some caution, 
Anderson (2009) finds a similar result of ALMPs improving social ties for those who receive 
unemployment benefits.     
 
6.4.10 Summary of additional welfare state analyses 
There is some evidence of the moderating effects of ALMP spending reducing socioeconomic 
inequalities regarding voluntary and informal networks, but not for trust outcomes. There is a 
reduction in the importance of income for voluntary networks, which is more in line with the 
expected hypothesis. There were also positive effects of spending for the unemployed and 
benefit recipients, in access to informal networks, in line with the first hypothesis. We also 
observe a similar widening of inequalities present in the previous analyses, this time with 
spending widening inequalities between tertiary and non-tertiary educated in political 
participation. In the next section, we discuss these findings and the earlier analyses within the 










Table 6.9: Moderation effects on social capital (random slopes model with cross-level interactions) 
 
  Informal Voluntary Political Interpersonal  Institutional 
Average effect      
Income 0.667*** 1.047*** 0.528*** 1.818*** 1.035*** 
Education 0.013+ 0.158*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.055*** 
Unemployed -0.040*** -0.026*** -0.010 -0.014+ -0.032*** 
Benefit recipient -0.038*** -0.009 0.007 -0.020** -0.013* 
      
c_LM training spending -0.158+ 0.220*** 0.046 0.250+ 0.193+ 
      
c_LM training × income -0.892 -3.673* -0.704 -2.533 -1.445 
LRa 47.44*** 6.56* 3.06+ 17.05*** 29.06*** 
c_LM training × Education 0.014 0.007 0.091* 0.045 0.039 
LRa 0.16 0.03 4.69* 1.28 0.74 
c_LM training × Unemployed 0.072+ -0.017 -0.052 0.037 0.053 
LRa 3.00+ 5.30* 1.00 0.44 1.52 
c_LM training × benefits 0.005+ -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004 
LRa 3.43 1.37 0.10 2.05 5.95+ 
Constant  0.848*** 0.017 0.009 0.300*** 0.237*** 
var(country) 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
var(individual) 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.044*** 0.065*** 0.047*** 
Slope variance      
Income 0.437*** 0.922*** 0.261*** 3.469*** 1.111*** 
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Unemployed 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
Benefit recipient 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
      
N level 1=27,212; N level 2=28 countries Level 1 controls = gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, 
benefits and domicile, level 2 controls= GDP, Net replacement LM spending, +p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001, LRa, 
Null= Random slopes with controls 
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6.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The overarching aim of this chapter was to understand whether cross-national differences 
could explain variation in social capital outcomes between different socioeconomic groups. 
Broadly speaking, there was evidence to suggest country-effects matter and can in part explain 
social capital differences. The vast majority of random slopes were statistically significant, 
indicating that the effect of socioeconomic factors on social capital varies cross-nationally. The 
evidence for the welfare state in explaining this between-country variance was somewhat 
limited. Where we do notice a consistent moderating effect is in the opposite direction 
expected. It seems that generosity maintains existing class cleavages through educational 
advantage.  
I hypothesised that welfare state generosity and universalism could reduce social capital 
inequalities between SEGs. As income is central to social capital formation, the expectation 
was that the welfare state could provide access to capital for those who are economically 
disadvantaged through generous entitlement, which would offset the adverse effects on 
income inequality and provide the opportunity to develop networks. The results of the analyses 
are mixed. On the one hand, universalism reduces the importance of income for voluntary and 
political networks; on the other hand, generosity increases the importance of income for 
informal networks. It seems that individuals with higher income are likely to benefit more from 
greater access to informal networks in countries with higher generosity. In contrast, 
universalism creates a national context of solidarity and equal opportunity for access to formal 
networks.   
The fact that generosity assists those with higher incomes, improving access to informal 
networks may relate to greater autonomy. [Particularly in light of the informal social capital 
dimension composition, which leans towards a slight bias of crowding-out.] Where low-income 
groups are encouraged to establish informal networks through need, high-income groups can 
rely on generous systems to provide informal support. At the same time, they can maintain 
their independence, using existing capital to invest time in informal networks. In such 
instances, the observation of the increasing importance of income with generosity makes 
sense. What seems to be the case for low-income groups is that with less access to networks, 
they are relying on the provisions through welfare state structures for informal social capital, 
which manifests itself as crowding-out. As a result, we see generosity widening informal 
network inequalities between income groups.  
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Another central aspect of understanding social capital outcomes is cultural capital. Once again, 
our expectation was for the welfare state to reduce social capital inequalities between tertiary 
and non-tertiary educated. The moderating effects for tertiary education were more consistent 
across the social capital dimensions, though not in the expected direction. Generosity provides 
an additional benefit to the tertiary educated for the informal, political, institutional and 
interpersonal dimensions of social capital. At the same time, universalism shows an increase 
for tertiary-educated in political participation. This finding suggests that the welfare state 
supports capital accumulation for the higher educated but does little to increase the social 
capital potential for those not tertiary educated. It seems that those with existing cultural 
capital are able to use their advantage to ensure successful practices within the welfare field.  
Observing a greater effect of education on trust in comprehensive welfare states does have 
some concurrence in the broader literature. Frederiksen et al. (2016), using the World Values 
Survey 2005 to 2009, based on 48 countries and Charron and Rothstein (2016) original survey 
of 24 European countries in 2010 and 2013, find that the effect of education on trust depends 
on the level of corruption and the quality of public institutions. Only when the quality of 
government is sufficiently high does education lead to higher generalised trust  (Charron and 
Rothstein 2016). Where corruption is low, education has a significant positive effect on trust, 
while in high-corruption settings, education negatively affects trust (Frederiksen et al., 2016). 
The implication here is that context matters. Where universal and generous welfare systems 
reflect a similar institutional environment, it perhaps makes sense that we also observe an 
increase in the effect of education on trust. The higher educated are more reflexive and attune 
to the institutional context and systems of provision. 
Additional analyses using ALMPs provided contextual understanding alongside the applied 
welfare state measures. Here we did notice that specific active policies towards training did 
see a reduction in the negative effect of receiving benefits and being unemployed through 
greater labour market spending for informal social capital. It would seem that some form of 
increased entitlement is necessary for reducing inequalities in informal network formation 
between benefit recipients and the unemployed. However, these findings were only significant 
at the 90%-level, which, considering the number of significance tests, suggests we should be 




It is essential to bear in mind that our analyses are limited to describing associations, relying 
on cross-sectional data of a fixed point in time. In order to improve the robustness of the 
findings, we could test these hypotheses using longitudinal data to confirm that generosity 
causes social capital inequalities to widen between education groups. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, the analyses have provided compelling evidence of the potential unintended 




7 The interrelations of social capital: Exploring a ‘causal’ 
model 
In order to understand the determinants of social capital, this thesis focuses primarily on 
analysing the separate dimensions of social capital. In doing so, it aims to provide some clarity 
over the potential calibrating effects of the welfare state and its potential for moderating 
effects on social capital inequalities. While this separation is essential for understanding the 
welfare state social capital relationship, there is a need to explain how each dimension relates. 
These relationships are important not only for understanding individual outcomes, as access 
in one dimension may affect the accrual in another but also in highlighting the potential areas 
of importance for welfare state policy regarding how to improve an individual's social capital 
outcomes. Much of the literature explores social capital outcomes by addressing certain 
aspects or dimensions, yet the specific dynamics of how they relate is often underexplored and 
requires further clarification. 
Addressing the 'trustworthiness of the social environment' (Coleman 102:1988) is a critical 
aspect of understanding social capital. It is also centrally important to consider the role of state 
institutions and their potential influence, both as shapers of trust within society (Rothstein and 
Stolle 2003) and as structures that provide the basis of participation (North 1990). 
Acknowledging the centrality of trust to social capital (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Newton 
1999; Fukuyama 2000), this chapter focuses on social trust determinants. The objective here 
is to test a theoretical model of social capital that fully identifies the relationship between social 
capital dimensions. In doing so, the aim is to provide greater clarity surrounding the society-
centred and institutionalist approaches, to understand better the direction of influence 
between trust and networks, and institutional and interpersonal trust. Providing further insight 
into this complex relationship is of added importance to interpreting individual outcomes, 






7.1 Social capital theory 
As previously suggested, trust is central to social capital formation, creating the necessary 
conditions for network formation (Newton 1999) and providing the basis for collective activity 
(Letki 2006). Returning to the social capital literature and our theoretical account, social 
capital, is understood as the resources an actor can mobilise from their embeddedness in the 
network of social relations. We also noted the distinction between the individual and collective 
aspects, accounted for through the separation of networks and trust. The relationship between 
these two dimensions is at the centre of the division for social capital explanations. For Putnam, 
trust is derived from the network [where social capital is defined as]; "the connections among 
individuals' social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them" (2000:19). Specifically, voluntary associations have an internal effect [at the individual 
level] that creates habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness (Putnam 1993:90). 
An external effect [at the collective level], garnering trust from the cooperative values and 
reciprocity generated through voluntary associations. 
For Coleman, social capital is both an individual and collective property; the individual's 
interaction within the collective social structure [understood as a property of networks] 
produces social capital. Here social capital depends on 'the level of trustworthiness of the social 
environment [and] the actual extent of obligations held' (1988:102). Thus, the creation of social 
capital suggests an alternative direction, with trust as the basis for network formation. 
These two perspectives provide an understanding of social capital where trust is either derived 
from network participation or a requirement for network formation. In the following section, I 
address this relational nature of social capital, drawing on the literature to examine the theory 
and empirical evidence of the expected relationship between social capital dimensions.  
7.2 Determinants of interpersonal trust  
Although there may not be a universal agreement on what defines trust, there is little question 
about its importance to individuals and society. Understanding why we trust someone is 
evident in its conceptualisation, whether from a genetic, evolutionary, rational or cultural 
perspective. Specific to the area of inquiry, I focus here on the institutional and society-centred 
approaches to help explain how social trust and networks are related.  
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7.3 The relationship between social capital and interpersonal trust   
7.3.1 Formal Networks 
The society-centred approach holds the view that through interactions in civic associations, 
people learn the virtues of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. Voluntary organisations are 
essential because active engagement brings local people into face-to-face contact (Putnam 
2000). Positive experiences through associations create the 'spill-over effects' influencing 
attitudes and values, generating social trust (van Ingen and Bekkers 2012). Although a defined 
interest can create opportunities for social relationships (Hardin 2002), it is difficult to see how 
one sustains networks unless there is some trust to start with (Newton 1997). Trust may be a 
precondition of engaging in networks with those more trusting, more likely to join associations 
(Stolle 1998). Here the ‘excess propensity to cooperate' allows the transference of trust from 
the individual to the group, which is reciprocated and reinforced, creating a climate of trust 
(Meulemann 2008:10).  
7.3.2 Empirical evidence  
With the widespread appeal of civic participation to improve our lives and democratic 
institutions, there has been a great deal of literature dedicated to the positive relationship 
between participation and trust (Almond and Verba 1963; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Stolle 1998; Stolle and Rochon 2001; Wollebaek and Selle 2002, 2003; Delhey and 
Newton 2003; Herreros 2004; Paxton 2007). Except for Brehm and Rahn (1997), whose 
structural model using pooled data (General Social Surveys from 1972 to 1994), find the 
stronger relationship is from participation to interpersonal trust rather than the reverse; not 
all other studies sufficiently explain the directionality (Nannestad 2008).  
Uslaner (2002), in his simultaneous estimations using the General Social Survey (1996), finds 
that group membership does not affect trust, with the direction moving from trust to 
engagement. The self-selection process, where those who trust are more likely to join 
associations, has some support within the literature (Stolle 2001; Uslaner and Brown 2003; 
Stolle and Hooghe 2004; Bekkers and Bowman 2009; Bekkers 2012). Stolle and Hooghe's 
(2004) longitudinal study using the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel study (1965-1982) 




By building on previous studies that aim to improve our understanding of directionality, van 
Ingen and Bekkers (2013), using the Swiss Household Panel Survey (2004-2008), measure 
whether there is any change in the levels of trust for those who participate. Measuring civic 
engagement through active and passive membership in voluntary associations and 
volunteering. With the standard generalised trust survey question16 forming the dependent 
variable. They find no effect for volunteering enhancing generalised trust and small effect size 
for membership. Their repeated analysis with panel surveys from the UK, the Netherlands and 
Australia, provide consistent results. They conclude that civic engagement brings trusting 
individuals together but does not enhance generalised trust (van Ingen and Bekkers 2013:21). 
Together these empirical studies inform an alternative to the society-centred approach, where 
rather than an outcome of formal associations, interpersonal trust enhances participation.   
7.4 Informal networks 
The social capital literature is primarily preoccupied with addressing the role of voluntary 
organisations. Nevertheless, there is some consideration to the role of informal networks as a 
potential determinant of trust. Much like the experiential account of formal networks, informal 
social ties can build trust through continued interaction over time (Offe 1999). Interactions 
with friends, family, and neighbours all encourage social trust development (Putnam 2000; 
Delhey and Newton 2003; Li, Pickles, and Savage 2005; Paxton 2007). Positive social interaction 
within close relationships can serve as a reinforcement of trusting others where obligations are 
met (Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland 2007). 
When considering the specific relationship of informal social capital, it is crucial to consider the 
conceptual and operationalised indicator used. The theoretical position taken is off access to 
resources embedded with social relations. Therefore, it seems necessary to consider the 
relationship from a position of access, not just experience. Does access to a network resource 
require social trust, or does access increase trust? The more trust an individual possesses, the 
increased likelihood of greater access to networks (Offe 1999), although this says nothing 
about the generalised other. Is an individual with reduced access to informal social capital likely 
to report less trust in others? Trustworthy individuals are more likely to trust others (Glaeser 
et al. 2000) and believe that others share the same trusting values (Uslaner 2002). As such, 
 
16 Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 0 Can’t 
be too careful to 10 Most people can be trusted 
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social trust may lead to stability in a shared network. It is possible then that the rewards from 
obtaining access to informal social capital increase interpersonal trust in a relational manner. 
7.4.1 Empirical evidence  
There is some support for the positive relationship between informal relations and social trust. 
Delhey and Newton (2003) comparing seven17 countries from the Euromodule survey (1999 
and 2001) find that social networks (measured as the number of close friends and the 
frequency of social contacts) are significantly related to social trust across all countries. Further 
correlational evidence points to a positive interaction with neighbours (Letki et al. 2005) and 
neighbourhood attachment (Li, Pickles and Savage 2005), predicting greater interpersonal 
trust. Uslaner (2002:114) finds some support that people with support networks, who talk to 
their neighbours, and who are satisfied with their friendships are more trusting, although the 
directionality is unclear. 
Glanville, Andersson and Paxton (2013), using the General Social Survey panel (2006–2008), 
find that informal ties18, are significant predictors of changes in trust, suggesting that social ties 
actually enhance trust. Glanville and Paxton (2007), undertaking confirmatory analysis on two 
US surveys (Social Trust Survey 1998) and the national component of the Social Capital 
Benchmark Survey 2000), find support for the development of trust from the particular to the 
general. They observe that more trust within the family and neighbourhood setting produces 
higher levels of generalised trust. This implies that in the formation of informal networks, the 
process of familiarity through familiarisation (Möllering 2006) may precede trust in creating 
the environment for trust to develop.  
7.5 Institutional trust 
From the institutional-centred perspective, the institutions themselves are considered 
essential in creating the climate necessary for trust to flourish (Levi 1996; Rothstein and Stolle 
2002; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). The informal constraints and formal rules derived through 
institutions reduce uncertainty in exchange (North 1990). When information or knowledge is 
lacking, institutions can provide the necessary structure for cooperation (North 1990). The 
capacity to generalise from the particular to the other is bound within the belief systems that 
 
17 Germany,  Hungary,  Slovenia,  South Korea,  Spain,  and  Switzerland 
18 how often they engage in various forms of socialising, including spending the evening with friends, relatives, 
neighbours, and at bars or taverns 
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correspond to the individual and institutional (North 1998). State institutions perceived to be 
fair and effective positively influence generalised trust (Levi 1996; Rothstein 2000; De Cremer 
et al. 2005). 
'Because it is impossible to know the trustworthiness of most people in society, people must 
rely on imperfect information when they form their beliefs about social trust' (Rothstein 
2013:1020). The key for Rothstein is how the behaviour of public officials acts as a mechanism 
for filling the gap in information and, subsequently, the decision of whether someone should 
be trusted or not. Corrupt and untrustworthy officials convey the message that those who 
enact laws cannot be trusted and that corrupt or clientelistic practices are acceptable to 
replicate. According to Rothstein, this leads to the inference that, in general, people cannot be 
trusted. 'When institutions serve as a source of trust between actors, those institutions 
become objects of trust, too' (Mollering 2006: 54). As such, state institutions can form the basis 
for trusting others (Rothstein and Stolle 2008) and facilitate interpersonal trust amongst 
strangers (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994).    
7.5.1 Empirical evidence  
There is mixed evidence within the empirical literature for the influence of institutional trust 
on interpersonal trust. Brehm and Rahn (1997) find support for the positive effect of 
confidence in institutions on interpersonal trust in their structural model. Freitag (2003) finds 
the increased likelihood of trust with confidence in institutions, and Zmerli and Newton (2008) 
find significant correlations between generalised social trust and confidence in institutions. 
While the efficiency of institutions (Public Institutions Index) also increases the levels of social 
trust (Herreros 2008). Uslaner (2002), on the other hand, finds little evidence of the 
relationship between confidence in institutions and interpersonal trust, stating that trust in 
government and trust in people do not have much in common (Uslaner 2002:158). Mishler and 
Rose (2001) support this finding, observing no discernible impact of institutional trust on social 
trust in countries in Eastern Europe.  
In their use of the Danish Social Capital project (2004) with four immigrant groups (Turks, 
Pakistanis, Bosnians and Ex-Yugoslavians) in Denmark, Nannestad et al. (2014) find a causal link 
between the levels of trust in institutions on the levels of social trust and not the other way 
round. The suggestion being, the quality of institutions is vital for increasing interpersonal trust, 
rather than trust remaining stable as a cultural norm. Sønderskov and Dinesen (2016), using 
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data from Danish panel surveys (1990-2008), measuring institutional trust through a composite 
indicator of trust in parliament, the judiciary, the police and politicians, and social trust through 
the standard generalised trust question.19, find strong evidence of institutional trust exercising 
a causal impact on interpersonal trust. Testing the reverse relationship, they find that social 
trust has little or no effect on institutional trust, confirming the importance of institutions.  
These recent studies, although specific to a single country, along with the existing empirical 
correlational evidence, would seem to support the idea that institutions, specifically the levels 
of trust individuals place in them, can affect the individual outcomes of interpersonal trust.  
7.6 Model Hypotheses 
In exploring the determinants of interpersonal trust, the exiting theory and evidence indicate 
the expected relationship of interpersonal trust leading to formal networks. Although there 
was evidence to suggest that informal ties lead to an increase in interpersonal trust (Glanville, 
Andersson and Paxton 2013), the theoretical distinction for informal networks is one based on 
access, which implies a level of trustworthiness required to enter into an exchange. Therefore, 
I expect a positive influence of interpersonal trust on informal networks will be greater and 
model accordingly. A causal relationship was established for Institutional trust influencing 
interpersonal trust, yet the question remains whether institutional trust directly affects the 
other network dimensions beyond interpersonal trust. 
In line with the institutionalist literature that predicts a positive relationship between 
institutional and interpersonal, I also expect the direction of influence to follow from 
institutional to voluntary participation, as institutions provide the necessary structure for 
cooperation (North 1990). Likewise, trust in institutions may affect perceptions of provision 
and inclusion that may influence informal network investment strategies. Given the nature of 
the political participation questions, it is unclear whether there will be the same relationship 
with trust as with institutions and voluntary associations. Political participation does not 
necessarily require one to trust institutions. If anything, holding institutions to account or 
protesting may require a certain amount of distrust in a healthy democracy. I would argue that 
institutional trust does not directly influence political participation in the same way as 
voluntary networks. Institutional trust, while reducing uncertainty in exchange or signifying a 
 
19 ‘Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing 
with other people?’ 
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cooperative structure for interaction (often with participatory frameworks built into voluntary 
organisations and government), may be directly at odds with political protest. 
We can, however, observe whether institutional trust has an indirect effect on political 
participation. If we consider that institutional trust has a positive effect on interpersonal trust 
and voluntary associations, and participation in voluntary associations, along with 
interpersonal trust, leads to greater political participation. We may expect to observe an 
indirect effect of institutional trust on political participation. 
For the theoretical model proposed, the expectation is that those with greater access to 
voluntary associations are more likely to increase potential access to political networks through 
increased association rather than political participation leading to formal associations. This 
direction would align with Putnam's suggestion that voluntary associations act as the schools 
of democracy (Putnam 2000). There is also evidence to suggest that informal networks 
influence political participation, providing access to information and the opportunity to accrue 
resources that lower the barriers to political participation (McClurg 2003:7). With this in mind, 
we expect the direction of influence to extend from informal and voluntary networks to 
political participation. 
The final relationship for consideration in the model is between informal and formal networks. 
It is conceivable that the possession of a robust informal network base would provide the 
opportunity for access to broader formal network associations. On the other hand, formal 
associations could provide opportunities for closure into a more informal network setting. At 
the same time, if we consider the distinction made within the literature between bonding and 
bridging social capital. Here, informal social capital is derived from the strong homogenous ties 
of closed networks, and bridging is the weak ties of associations essential for broadening 
identities (Putnam 2000). As such, a causal relationship may not follow. Where access is 
restricted, as in the case for some SEGs, individuals might rely solely on informal networks (Hall 
2002; Li et al., 2005); if this closed network remains stable, it is unlikely to lead to wider 
participation. Equally, someone choosing to invest solely in informal social capital will not affect 
his or her participation in voluntary associations. Therefore, I expect there to be no direct 
causal relationship between the two forms of social capital. 
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The theoretically established pathways represent two central hypotheses. The first challenges 
the society-society approach to social capital formation, and the second seeks to establish 
whether institutional accounts of social capital hold. 
H1: Interpersonal trust determines network outcomes. 
H2: Institutional trust is central to social capital formation. 
With the hypotheses established, we now move on to testing.  
 
7.7 Research Frame 
This chapter aims to address the nature and direction of the relationship between the social 
capital dimensions. Specifically, I wish to understand the relationship between networks and 
trust and shed light on the institutionalist and society-centred approaches to social capital. In 
order to accomplish this, I draw upon the framework of structural equations methods (SEM). 
Applying methods such as path analysis allows the researcher to test whether proposed 
models are represented within the data and confirms the theory. 
7.8 Method 
Structural equation modelling provides a very general and convenient framework for statistical 
analysis - allowing the assessment of complex relationships between multiple independent and 
or dependent variables. It enables us to combine regression and factor analytical approaches 
that make it the most suitable method for illuminating the multidimensional construct of social 
capital. The SEM comprises a measurement model and the structural model. 
The measurement model is what informed the theoretical propositions concerning the latent 
variable dimensions of social capital carried out in the dependent variable chapter. CFA was 
used to assess whether a subset of observed variables considered theoretical relevant is 
consistent with the observed matrix within the dataset (Heck & Thomas 2015). The structural 
model describes the relationship between each of the variables. It enables us to specify the 
type of relationship through regression or path coefficients and identify the covariances. Doing 
so provides the opportunity to assess the hypothesised relationships between each of the 
latent variables. Due to a large number of categorical variables and model complexity, model 
estimation is achieved using Mplus, applying the default WLS estimator.  
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7.9  Covariance model 
It is important to bear in mind that the data for this analysis is cross-sectional, so causal claims 
are restricted. While it is possible to test whether a theoretical model fits the data, attributing 
causal arrows between the dimensions can only be substantiated through theory. With this in 
mind, I begin with a full covariance model that identifies the strength of the correlates between 
each of the social capital dimensions, initially establishing if the expected relationships exist 
before moving on to a proposed theoretical model.  
Figure 7.1 provides a graphical representation of the social capital dimensions of the first 
specified model. The circles represent which dimensions are latent variables, and the square 
box indicates the observed variable. Within the model, the curved two-headed arrows indicate 
that the two variables correlate. As indicated, there is a specified covariance between each 
dimension of social capital.   
Figure 7.1: Social Capital Latent Variable Covariance Model 
 
7.10 Results 
The results in Table 7.1 provide the standardised estimates for the specified covariances 
between each dimension of social capital. Except for interpersonal trust, all other dimensions 
of social capital report a significant negative correlation with informal networks. The 
implication is that there might be a small trade-off between formal [𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙(𝛽 = −.023, 𝑝 =
< .05) 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦(𝛽 = −.040, 𝑝 =< .01)] and informal networks, where investment in the 
network may be selective in terms of the time individuals have available or the level of access 
individuals may have.  
The positive relationship found between informal networks and interpersonal trust (𝛽 =
.065, 𝑝 =< .001) suggests a potential socialising effect of informal networks providing an 
environment conducive to social trust development, which aligns with previous findings 
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(Glanville, Andersson and Paxton 2013; Glanville and Paxton 2007). That said, there is still the 
possibility that trust is a prerequisite to access and maintain informal networks.  
The negative coefficient observed between institutional trust and informal 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 (𝛽 =
−.059, 𝑝 =< .001) is interesting. It could be that individuals invest in informal networks 
because of a lack of confidence in the institutions to provide for their needs. Alternatively, 
individuals with restricted access to informal social capital distrust institutions because of their 
lack of social capital. Either way, this implies a slight discord between the formal state 
apparatus related primarily to the welfare state and the closed informal networks of 
individuals.       
The voluntary latent variable is positively related to both institutional (β = .218, 𝑝 =< .001) 
and interpersonal trust (𝛽 = .233, 𝑝 =< .001) and political participation (𝛽 = .543, 𝑝 =<
.001). The relationship between voluntary and trust is comparable across both dimensions, 
suggesting that an increase in voluntary activity could result in the same increases (around a 
fifth) for institutional and interpersonal trust. Whether participation leads to increased trust is 
still open to question. It could be that people participate because they have trust in others or 
that trust increases through the formal sphere. Trust in institutions may also be symbolic of a 
socially conducive environment to participate. The correlation between voluntary and political 
is the largest effect found within the model, indicating that a unit increase in one dimension is 
likely to increase the other dimension by half. Such an observation adds further weight to 
exploring a dimensional account that would otherwise be unrealised with a single formal 
network indicator.   
Both institutional (𝛽 = .126, 𝑝 =< .001) and interpersonal (𝛽 = .201, 𝑝 =< .001) trust are 
significantly positively related to political participation. The larger beta (.2) would seem to 
indicate the interpersonal trust holds more importance for political participation than 
institutional trust.  While the relationship between social trust and participation is open to 
question, it seems more plausible that trust is a precondition to participating. This specification 
is in line with Kasse (1999), whose analyses of the Eurobarometer and European WVS find 
social trust to be a precondition for political involvement. This does not rule out the potential 
for political participation to increase interpersonal trust; indeed, there may be some form of 
reciprocity between the two. 
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Whether institutions create an environment conducive for political participation or individuals 
who participate, believe in the democratic process and thus trust institutions to fulfil their 
obligations is difficult to determine. Political participation, particularly in the form of protest, 
does not require one to trust institutions and may inform a certain amount of distrust (normal 
in healthy democracy). Political action may lead to trust in institutions to hear and respond to 
those actions. This view would be in line with Braun and Hutter (2016), whose multilevel 
analysis with the ESS (2002-2010) find distrust in institutions to increase the likelihood of 
political participation.   
The final relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust is significant (𝛽 =
.357, 𝑝 =< .001), suggesting that a one-factor increase in one dimension is likely to increase 
the other by around a third. Whether more trusting individuals are more likely to trust 
institutions or institutional trust acts as a source for increased interpersonal trust is still open 
to question. The latter assertion is firmly grounded within the institutionalist literature 
(Rothstein 2013; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; De Cremer et al. 2005; Rothstein 2000; North 














Table 7.1: Standardised covariances between the dimensions of social capital 
 (with) Est S.E 
Informal Institutional -0.059*** 0.008 
 
Interpersonal  0.065*** 0.007 
Political -0.023* 0.011 
Voluntary -0.040** 0.013 
Voluntary     
 
Institutional 0.218*** 0.010 
Interpersonal  0.233*** 0.009 
Political 0.543*** 0.012 
Political    
 
Institutional 0.126*** 0.009 
Interpersonal  0.201*** 0.008 
Interpersonal     
 Institutional 0.357*** 0.005 
 
 
7.11 Theoretical Social Capital Model 
Having previously empirically confirmed that there are significant correlations between the 
dimensions of social capital, I seek to explore an alternative theoretical model that further 
elucidates the specific relationship between the dimensions. Here I look to confirm the 
centrality of interpersonal trust whilst acknowledging the importance of institutional trust in 
creating the social environment for social capital to develop.  
As indicated in the previous discussion, interpersonal trust is central to social capital formation 
rather than an outcome of association. That is not to say, associations do not provide 
opportunities for the development and reciprocation of trust, but there is evidence to suggest 
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the direction will follow from interpersonal trust to formal networks. The previous covariance 
model has confirmed the positive relationship, and I now test whether the pathways from 
interpersonal trust to the latent variables representing political, voluntary and informal social 
capital are empirically substantiated.  
In line with the institutionalist literature, there is an expectation that institutions themselves 
are an essential determinant of social capital. Based on the existing evidence, the proposed 
model tests the direct influence with a path from institutional to interpersonal. I also examine 
the potential effects of institutional trust on the social environment, specifically, the potential 
for increased participation in voluntary associations and the indirect effects of institutional 
trust on political participation. Given the previous negative relationship found between 
institutional trust and informal networks, it will be interesting to observe whether this effect 
changes with the direction specified.          
7.12 Results  
The final specified social capital model is presented in Figure 7.2. Each of the latent variables 
is represented by a circle, with squares indicating the observed variables. The arrows within 
the path model indicate the direction of influence on which each variable is regressed on, with 
the standardised coefficients indicating the size of the effect. For ease of reference, all model 
results are contained in Table 7.2.  
With the exception of informal networks on institutional 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (𝛽 = −.094, 𝑝 =< .001) and 
political on informal (𝛽 = −.026, 𝑝 =< .001), all predicted path coefficients are positive. The 
latter association would indicate a greater focus on immediate close relationships at the 
expense of broader political involvement. Institutional trust directly having a negative effect 
on informal networks is surprising. Individuals with high trust in institutions may have low 
informal social capital because the welfare state institutions provide access to informal 
resources where required.   
In line with institutionalist theory, institutional trust has a large positive effect on interpersonal 
trust (β=.356, p=<.001) and voluntary associations (β=.148, p=<.001). This corroborates the 
findings of Nannestad et al. (2014) and Sønderskov and Dinesen (2016), who observed a causal 
influence from institutional to interpersonal trust. It seems that trustworthy institutions 
positively affect the formal social environment, one that encourages participation and trust 
between individuals, which is in line with Rothstein's work. Having considered that institutional 
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trust may not be necessary for political participation, I also model indirect effects via 
interpersonal trust and voluntary networks. The total indirect effect was significant (β=.136, 
p=<.001), with indirect pathways from institutional to political via interpersonal (β=.025, 
p=<.001), voluntary (β=.077, p=<.001), and voluntary then interpersonal (β=.034, p=<.001). 
Therefore, while institutional trust may not be a prerequisite for political participation, it may 
still have a positive effect through interpersonal trust and voluntary networks. 
The predicted model also placed interpersonal trust central to network formation. The 
implication being that social trust was a precondition of participating and accessing networks. 
The model results show a direct positive influence on informal (β=.096, p=<.001), voluntary 
(β=.182, p=<.001), and political (β=.071, p=<.001). This result supports the idea that trust is 
central to the social environment and social capital formation (Coleman 1988; Newton 1997; 
Fukuyama 2000). The final specified relationship predicted that voluntary participation would 
likely increase political participation. The confirmed positive relationship between the two 
formal latent variables was the largest in the model, reporting (β=.521, p=<.001) and supports 
Putnam’s (2000) position of associations acting as the schools of democracy. 
The results briefly described here (except the negative institutional informal relationship) 
broadly support the theoretical model and existing literature. The question remains as to what 












Table 7.2: Theoretical social capital model, standardised regression estimates 
Social capital dimension Est S.E 
 Institutional  →  
 
Interpersonal 0.356*** 0.005 
Informal -0.094*** 0.008 




Informal 0.096*** 0.008 
Voluntary 0.182*** 0.011 
Political 0.071*** 0.010 
Informal  → 
 
Political -0.026*   0.011 
Voluntary → 
 
Political 0.521*** 0.013 
Indirect 
Institutional  to Political via  
 
Total 0.136*** 0.006 
Interpersonal 0.025*** 0.004 
Voluntary 0.077*** 0.006 
Voluntary -> 






7.13 Model assessment  
7.13.1 Model Fit 
As with the CFA models earlier in the thesis, an initial assessment of the suitability of the 
proposed model is achieved with an inspection of the p-value and global fit statistics. The 
model itself is not statistically different from the null model indicated by the non-significant p-
value. However, the global fit statistics do report RMSEA below .05 and the CFI above .90, 
suggesting that the model is valid and represented within the data. For comparison, I present 
the model fit statistics of the initial covariance model alongside the established theoretical 
model. As the covariance model has a lower degree of freedom and larger chi-square (𝜒2), it 
would suggest the theoretical model fits the data better (although there is little difference in 
the global fit statistics and no change in the p-value). In order to confirm this, a chi-square 
difference test assesses whether the restricted model (H0) is a worse or better fit than the less 
restricted model (covariance model). A significant p-value indicates that the nested model 
significantly worsens model fit. The results in Table 7.3 confirm that the theoretical model 
better represents the data.  
The model hypotheses also predicted that there would be no direct relationship between 
informal networks and voluntary networks. An additional model was tested with the specified 
pathway between the two network dimensions (see Table 7.4). The model fit, and difference 
test results confirm that the specified pathway is less suited to the data than the theoretical 
model, indicating no causal relationship between informal and formal networks.  
 
Table 7.3: Social capital path model fit statistics 
Model (χ2) df p-value RMSEA CFI 
Theoretical 1981.720 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 
Covariance 2094.93 124 0.000 0.021 0.972 











Value 4.973 12.049 
df 1 1 
P-value 0.0257 0.0005 
 
Without certainty over direction, the issue of model equivalence arises. Even though a valid 
model has been identified, without any ability to provide a temporal control, the ability to 
confirm the influence in one direction cannot be causally substantiated. It is quite feasible that 
alternative models exist, which generate identical covariance matrices and, as a result, fit the 
observed data equally well (MacCallum et al. 1993). While we are unable to overcome the 
limitations of cross-sectional data, we can critically evaluate the model observations by 
confirming their appropriateness to the data and theory in the form of equivalence. 
7.14 Models of Equivalence  
[As an indication of the potential variation and number of identified models. If we consider a 
model without prior knowledge, resulting in non-specified relationships between five 
variables, the number of possible permutations would return 42 equivalent models]. Without 
the ability to structure the model with a definite causal pathway (that would restrict the causal 
pathways), the proposed theoretical model has nine other Markov equivalent models, 
presented below. The coloured arrow indicates a deviation from the theoretical model while 
remaining within the same equivalence class.  
The equivalent models are easily classified relating to each social capital dimension. Models 
H0, 1 and 4 are the dedicated institutional models, 2 and 3 are the informal directed models, 
5, 6 and 7 are the interpersonal led models, and 8 and 9 are the voluntary centred models. All 
latent variable variances have been fixed at one (and observed variables freed under each 
factor) to aid comparability of the coefficients between models. 
Within the equivalent models, three relationships remain consistent throughout the predicted 
model iterations. [According to the equivalence theorem (Verma and Pearl 1990), these 
specified pathways represent a shielded collider, meaning that any conditioning cannot alter 
this relationship if it is to follow the rules of d-separation and remain within the equivalence 
class.] Observing the predicted models, interpersonal trust, informal networks and voluntary 
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participation all influence the political participation latent variable. These specified 
relationships are in line with the proposed theoretical model substantiated earlier. As such, I 
will direct attention to those arrows that provide potentially conflicting outcomes to the 
hypothesised model and assess any variation in model fit (Table 7.5).        
 
 







































Table 7.5: Equivalent models, fit statistics 
            
Model (χ2) df p-value RMSEA CFI 
0 1993.517 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 
1 1993.500 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 
2 1993.489 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 
3 1993.494 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 
4 1993.491 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 
5 1874.867 125 0.000 0.020 0.977 
6 1874.860 125 0.000 0.020 0.977 
7 1874.863 125 0.000 0.020 0.977 
8 1993.494 125 0.000 0.020 0.974 







The first relationship for assessment is the direction between informal networks and 
interpersonal trust (model 1). Considering the evidence within the literature on the importance 
of informal networks for social trust (Putnam 2000; Delhey and Newton 2003; Li, Pickles, and 
Savage 2005; Paxton 2007), the fact that altering the direction conforms to the same 
equivalence class, with the same model fit, makes sense. This fact draws our attention to the 
apparent difficulties faced with directionality in modelling with cross-sectional data. The only 
deciphering variation is the fractionally different chi-square value from the hypothesised 
model, and the slightly larger effect of interpersonal trust on informal networks (β=.096, 
p=<.001), compared to the reversed (model 1) informal on interpersonal (β=.084, p=<.001), 
which is not significantly different.  
Although we find support for our theoretical position of access with the initial (H0) model, both 
directions remain plausible without being able to specify causally. Regarding our 
understanding of the relational nature between these two dimensions, it is likely that 
interpersonal trust and informal networks are mutually reinforcing. Experiences with family 
and friends are liable to shape our predisposition to place trust in others. At the same time, an 
individual who trusts others is likely to have trust reciprocated through the norm of trusting 
behaviour. An individual whom themselves is deemed trustworthy is more likely to gain greater 
access to informal social capital. 
Disentangling the informal networks and institutional trust relationship is another difficult task. 
The each-way direction provided a negative coefficient of institutional on informal (H0, β=-
.096, p=<.001) and informal on institutional (H0, β=-.096, p=<.001) and informal on 
institutional (model 5, β= -.060, p=<.001; model 3, β= -.086, p=<.001; model 2, β= -.082, 
p=<.001). Whether individuals trust institutions to deliver services and guarantee effective 
provision reduces the need to secure a strong informal network base. Or distrust in institutions 
encourages them to ensure access to informal networks through self-interest, or anxiety of 
non-market survival is perhaps open to question. 
As the second analytical chapter showed, countries with high levels of institutional trust also 
have a generous entitlement that includes the provision of informal support. Here, the 
modernisation thesis implies the negative direction of influence would run from institutional 
trust to informal, with trust in institutions to provide support previously afforded to familial 
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informal network structures of provision. Theoretically, it makes sense for the negative causal 
arrow to run from institutional trust to informal networks. However, it remains plausible that 
greater reliance on informal social capital leads to a deeper distrust in institutions.  
7.14.2 Voluntary 
Institutions are considered essential in creating the conditions and climate [of trust] necessary 
for social capital development (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Larsen 2007). The expectation, 
therefore, within the theoretical model was for institutional trust to influence voluntary 
participation. Comparing the H0 model (β=.147, p=<.001) with the (voluntary led) equivalence 
model 8 (β=.212, p=<.001), 6 and 9 (β=.136, p=<.001), the results indicate a positive effect of 
voluntary associations on institutional trust.  
Participation within civic associations may create a 'public-spiritedness', as Putnam (2000) 
suggests. The (positive) experience of formal participation engenders trust that is then 
reciprocated towards cooperative public institutions. Formal associations are those most 
closely related to the formal organisations and institutional framework, often overlapping the 
third sector. As such, individuals who participate in the formal sphere are likely to trust the 
organisational process it represents. It is equally plausible that that institutional trust acts as a 
guarantor for uncertain exchange within civil society. Here the cooperative norms of state 
institutions provide the formal institutional framework for participation (van der Meer et al. 
2009). Although either model is credible, it is difficult to see how participation within the third 
sector is established without trust in the institutions themselves.   
Reversing the pathway direction from interpersonal → voluntary in the H0 model (β=.183, 
p=<.001), to voluntary → interpersonal in model 4 (β=.167, p=<.001), falls within the same 
equivalence class. The regression coefficients are not significantly different from one another 
and have the same model fit. Without additional information, the data suggests the models 
are equally plausible. As such, it is feasible that the positive experiences of participating in 
voluntary associations create 'spill-over effects', generating wider social trust (van Ingen and 
Bekkers 2012). This does not alter the fact that social trust may be required to participate 
(Uslaner 1996; Stolle and Hooghe 2004; Bekkers and Bowman 2009; Bekkers 2012) as the 





When we compare the H0 model (β=.356, p=<.001) with the equivalent model 7 (β=.357, 
p=<.001), we observe the same effect between interpersonal and institutional trust in both 
directions; as such, trusting individuals may have a greater tendency to report trust in 
institutions. We also notice a slight improvement in the model fit with the interpersonal led 
models, reporting a reduction in the chi-square and an increase in the CFI (.977). However, this 
may relate to the variable itself (i.e. a single indicator compared to the more complex latent 
variable). What the equivalent model does bring to our attention is a potential disagreement 
with the empirical evidence (Nannestad et al., 2014; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2016), of a causal 
influence from institutional to interpersonal trust, running counter to the institutional position 
of state institutions forming the basis for trusting others (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). 
We cannot overcome the difficulty in disentangling the casual relationship between 
institutional and interpersonal trust with the present data limitations. What the equivalence 
model shows is that contrary to expectations, the model with interpersonal trust influencing 
institutional trust fits the data equally well.  
7.15 Discussion  
This chapter aimed to explore the interrelationships of the social capital dimensions. 
Specifically, it looked to address the importance of trust and provide insight into society-
centred and institutionalist approaches to social capital production. The results of the 
proposed theoretical social capital model did support the centrality of trust found within the 
literature; (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993) as a necessary condition for the creation of networks 
(Newton 1999), enabling social relationships to emerge (Fukuyama 2000) and facilitating 
collective action (Putnam 2000). The equivalent models (5, 6 and 7) with interpersonal trust as 
the exogenous variable (influencing all other social capital dimensions) also showed that they 
fit the data equally well.  
If interpersonal trust is the leading causal dimension, then this raises questions of both the 
institutionalist and society-centred approaches and further raises the question of what 
influences interpersonal trust. To be clear, both the institutional led models (H0, 1 and 4) and 
the voluntary-led models (8 and 9) are in the same equivalence class. Given the issue of 
causality, combined with the fact that the majority of comparative work relies on cross-
sectional data, it is perhaps not surprising that conflicting theories are substantiated.  
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There is some support for the society-centred position. The equivalent models show voluntary 
associations positively influence political participation, along with interpersonal trust and 
institutional trust. The limitation of explaining directionality between institutional and 
voluntary networks within the data makes addressing the approaches difficult. The position 
taken within the thesis has primarily been in support of the institutional position that 
emphasises the importance of institutions for civil society (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; van der 
Meer et al. 2009). There is no evidence to suggest that this is not the case, but rather what the 
equivalent models have indicated is that the dimensions are likely to be mutually reinforcing. 
Thus, trust is simultaneously a result of cooperation (Gambetta 1988) and a precondition for 
cooperation (Misztal 1996). In terms of our theory and model outcomes, there is reasonable 
support for trust as a precondition for participating. 
The fact that we observe positive relationships between interpersonal trust and social capital 
dimensions in both directions is perhaps indicative of the relational nature of trust itself. Trust 
adheres to the nature of social relations (Coleman 1998), created in the interaction between 
individuals within the structure of relations (Frederiksen 2014). There is some support for this 
mutually reinforcing nature in Robbins (2012). His non-recursive SEM analysis (WVS 2000) 
shows a statistically significant positive feedback effect between generalised trust20 and 
institutional quality21, where the path from generalised trust to institutional quality is stronger.  
In terms of trying to understand the potential for welfare states to influence social capital 
outcomes, this implies a more important consideration for improving the environment of trust. 
If interpersonal trust directly affects social capital dimensions, models that previously explored 
the outcomes of interpersonal trust across countries are of further importance when 
interpreting the potential welfare state effect. Specifically, as universalism and generosity 
relate positively to interpersonal trust, this indirectly implies a greater potential for social 
capital production, alongside the specific direct effects on each dimension. Reducing the 
cultural distance may have more extensive benefits to social capital production beyond the 
hypothesised interpersonal trust relationship. If we consider the potential role the welfare 
state has in crowding out informal networks, but at the same time observe generosity increases 
 
20 Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with others?  
21 Three indicators measuring fairness and effectiveness; legal property rights protection, the rule of law, and 
corruption   
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interpersonal trust, which also increases informal networks, then the negative effect of 
generosity on informal networks may be indirectly offset through interpersonal trust. 
It is also worth drawing attention to the fact that not all relationships within the model were 
positive. Informal networks were associated with a (𝛽-.026, <.05) reduction in political 
participation. Institutional trust with a reduction in informal social capital (β=-.096, p=<.001) 
and informal negatively related to institutional (model 5 β=-.060, p=<.001, model 2 β= -.086, 
p=<.001). This potential for a negative association or ‘dark-side' of social capital does have 
support within the literature (Portes & Landolt, 1996; Portes 1998; Putnam, 2000; van Deth, 
and Zmerli 2010). 
As previously indicated, informal networks are considered distinct from other forms, often 
referred to as 'bonding' social capital (Putnam, 2000). The homogeneity of the network lends 
itself to network closure, where associations are isolated and inward-looking, restrictive to 
outsiders and the wider community (Portes 1998; Li, Savage, & Pickles 2003; García Albacete 
2010). This is confirmed in García Albacete (2010:710), whose regional analysis in Spain finds 
members of bonding social networks have fewer positive attitudes toward the political system 
than those active in bridging groups. 
Relating this to the welfare state discussion, Albano and Barbera (2010) (using ESS, 2002) focus 
on the relationship of informal help with trust and satisfaction in institutions. They find that 
the welfare state is an important factor in mediating the informal institutional political 
relationship. Those helping others in a weak welfare state tend to have a critical attitude 
toward the political system. Where the welfare state is stronger, the negative relationship is 
significantly less. Here we understand the importance of the social solidarity engendered by 
the welfare state and its outcomes for the social capital environment. 
Within the context of the thesis, we have confirmed the positive effect of the welfare state on 
the dimensions of social capital, except for informal networks. When we observe the crowding-
out of informal networks through increased welfare state support, it is important to remember 
that a negative relationship does not necessarily mean that individuals are without support. 
Instead the primary access point may have transitioned from the family to the state, where the 
systems of universal provision and collectivised caring replaces the dependency on informal 
networks. It is quite feasible that there could be a reduction in the negative associations 
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between informal networks and the other dimensions in such instances where support is 
guaranteed. 
7.16 Conclusion  
This chapter endeavoured to further our understanding of the specific relationships between 
the dimensions of social capital. After reviewing the theory and empirical evidence, a proposed 
model of social capital was established. The aim was to test whether we could identify the 
specific role of trust in and on social capital formation. What the analysis confirmed, though 
with limitations, is that trust is an essential element in understanding and strengthening social 
capital. This finding is of further importance when we consider the role of the welfare state in 
creating a socially conducive environment for trust. Although theoretically driven, the 
proposed model requires further work to establish causality for the complex relationship 
between the dimensions of social capital to be fully realised.   
As highlighted by the multiple plausible models, if we did not address the issue of equivalence, 
then one could easily find support for their corresponding theoretical position. Such is the 
nature of cross-sectional data and the complexity of social capital that we cannot easily 
disentangle the interrelationships. Part of the criticism attached to the exploration of existing 
social capital research is the lack of precision in the application, particularly when aspects are 
used interchangeably as an account of social capital. What the examination of the 
interrelationships has highlighted is that the mutually reinforcing nature of the social capital 
dimensions confirms the need to approach social capital as a multidimensional construct. The 
implication being that we cannot fully understand individual outcomes focussing on a single 
dimension alone. 
What this means in terms of the welfare state is that improving social capital outcomes should 
not focus entirely on one element. Communitarian positions that promote civil society as the 
answer to social improvement may need first to consider the environment of trust necessary 
for participation to occur. Likewise, institutionalist arguments may also need to recognise the 
importance of creating the environment for trust and participation at the individual-level. 



































Institutional             
→ Voluntary 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.212 0.147  0.147   
 Informal -0.094 -0.060   -0.094  -0.098 -0.098 -0.094 -0.094 
 Interpersonal 0.356 0.361  0.361 0.321    0.321  
Interpersonal            
→ Voluntary 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183  0.179 0.232 0.179   
 Political 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.071 0.071 
 Institutional    0.361   0.363 0.326 0.357  0.324 
 Informal  0.095   0.095 0.066 0.101 0.101 0.095 0.095 
Informal             
→ Political -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
 Interpersonal 0.084  0.062 0.084       
 Institutional    -0.082 -0.060  -0.086     
Voluntary            
→ Political 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.513 0.513 0.513 0.520 0.520 
 Interpersonal     0.167    0.167 0.235 




This chapter provides an overview of the thesis and contributions, highlighting the importance 
of measurement. It provides a summary of findings before situating them within the broader 
context of communitarian and institutionalist approaches to social capital and its policy 
implications. I also discuss a potential alternative for social policy that builds on the findings of 
this study. The final section raises some limitations and areas for likely future research before 
concluding. 
8.1 Overview  
In chapter 2, the thesis began with an exploration of the central theoretical positions within 
social capital. From these principal exponents, we established an understanding of social 
capital as an individual and collective property. Importantly, this also provided insight into how 
and under what conditions we could understand social capital variation, which is critical to 
understanding the welfare state relationship. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of 
social capital. Scholars choose to focus on either the sources or effects of social capital and 
whether social capital is an individual or collective property. However, its value as a concept 
and avenue for research lies in its conception; as a resource (one embedded within social 
relationships) which we consider both individual and collective in nature. 
8.1.1 Multidimensionality of social capital  
The key message here is that if we understand social capital as both an individual and collective 
property, we must distinguish between the structural dimension of networks and the relational 
dimension of trust (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Dasgupta 2000; Kaasa and Parts 2008). 
Although the dimensions are related due to the nature of social relations within a structure, 
they are substantively different, neither reducible nor interchangeable. Thus, within the 
literature and my own analyses, we find support for identifying social capital as a 
multidimensional construct (Oorschot et al., 2006; Kaasa and Parts 2008; Oorschot and 
Finsveen 2009; Guillen et al., 2011; Ferragina 2017). It is only by separating the structural and 
relational elements that we can provide the necessary distinctions to answer the crowding-out 
debate and clarify the nature of the welfare state's impact on social capital outcomes.  
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Figure 8.1: The dimensionality of social capital  
 
 
The analytical model of the dimensions of social capital provides us with a position from which 
to address the social capital welfare state relationship. While this analytical distinction is 
essential, it is only meaningful if the measures we use are sufficient and reliable. With this in 
mind, the purpose of chapter 4 was to address the critical issue of measurement.  
8.1.2 Dependent variable  
There is surprisingly little attention given to the actual measurement and construction of 
indicators used, considering the wealth of social capital research that exists. Proxies are widely 
employed without always having the critical reflection required to ensure the indicators 
measure what they purport to measure. Arguably, the main strength of this thesis is that social 
capital is theoretically driven and empirically substantiated. Having identified social capital as 
a multidimensional construct, the application of CFA ensured the construct validity of each 
dimension. In doing so, we confirmed both the dimensionality of social capital and its 
coherence as a latent variable construct. The importance here is not only to ensure that our 
dependent variable is valid for inquiry but also to address the relationship between social 
capital and the welfare state. 
Driven by theoretical underpinning, I established measuring social capital through five distinct 
dimensions. By accounting for the critical distinction of access to potential resources, informal 
networks measure those resources available to an individual they can rely on to provide 
support, measured here through the five resources of; help, advice, support, jobs and money.  
Formal networks also represent the potential access to resources, this time through the wider 










potential access through the network being present rather than the frequency at which 
participation occurs. Formal networks are measured through two separate indicators of 
voluntary22 and political networks23.   
Trust is a dimensional construct in its own right. Here we distinguish between the interpersonal 
trust between individuals that allows networks to be created and maintained, alongside 
institutional trust that frames the social environment in which participation takes place. 
Institutional trust is measured through four indicators of trust in governmental institutions24. 
These indicators are those most closely associated with the welfare state and where crowding-
out is most likely to be realised. There is only one question relating to interpersonal trust [an 
inherent limitation] within the data set and is included as an observed variable25.   
In empirically confirming the separate dimensions of social capital, we have provided a reliable 
basis for understanding social capital outcomes. What the theoretical model of social capital 
also illustrates is that the dimensions themselves, although distinct, are interrelated. In chapter 
7, we acknowledge the central role of trust in social capital formation. In doing so, we provide 
a broader context for the influence of the welfare state and how this may affect social capital 
as a whole. Importantly, through equivalence models, we also established how the social 
capital dimensions were mutually reinforcing, giving credence to the position of social capital 
as a multidimensional construct.   
8.1.3 Measuring the welfare state 
In addition to the multidimensionality of social capital, we need to be critical about the 
operationalisation of the welfare state. Previous research has focussed on social expenditure 
or welfare regimes to account for welfare state influence. However, these approaches are 
limited because spending alone does not adequately account for the substance of welfare 
states, its coverage and distribution [Spending at the macro-level may not necessarily reflect 
the real generosity of welfare states at the micro-level]. In contrast, welfare regimes can 
obscure the variation in countries’ social insurance programmes. By focusing on replacements 
 
22 i) community and social services ii) education, cultural, sports or professional associations iii) social movements 
or charities, and iv) other voluntary organisations 
23 attended a meeting of a trade union, a political party or political action group ii) attended a protest or 
demonstration iii) signed a petition, including an e-mail or online petition and iv) contacted a politician or public 
official 
24 Parliament ii) the legal system iii) the government and iv) local (municipal) authorities 




rates, we explicitly capture welfare states' commitment to ensuring individual's participation 
irrespective of market provision. In doing so, we can assess whether increased support is 
positively or adversely related to social capital outcomes.  
Alongside generosity, another critical aspect to understanding welfare state provision is the 
mode of delivery. Here we distinguish between the provision of social benefits as a matter of 
right and those through means-testing. Identifying universalism through the absence of 
means-testing, we aim to capture the perceived fairness and solidarity of the welfare state 
(Kumlin and Rothstein 2005) and its potential to reduce the cultural distance (Larsen 2007). 
Crucially, a dimensional approach allows for an assessment of where crowding-in and 
crowding-out occur, according to the form and level of provision. A specific limitation of the 
crowding-out debate has been to present a dualism of welfare state influence without 
acknowledging how this might change according to the dimensions of social capital and the 
welfare state in question. By maintaining the dimensionality of social capital through various 
models in chapter 5, we can assess the potential influences on social capital accumulation and 
avoid the pitfalls of selectivity. In doing so, we move away from the reductionist dichotomy to 
one that acknowledges the potential calibrating effects of the welfare state.  
8.1.4 The difference across different socioeconomic groups 
A second inherent limitation to the crowding-out thesis is the assumption that if the welfare 
state does not intervene then, individuals would be free to accumulate social capital, which I 
have identified within the literature as being unequally distributed according to socioeconomic 
factors. Here of importance is the ownership of existing economic and cultural capital an 
individual possesses, which can then be used to generate social capital; in a mutually 
reinforcing manner (Bourdieu 1986). From the literature, I have identified the welfare state as 
a potential equalising mechanism that reduces social capital inequalities. There has been a 
tendency with mainstream approaches to social capital to overlook the differences between 
SEGs in their access to social capital. Here a focus on promoting the positive potential of social 
capital has ignored issues of structure and inequality. With this in mind chapter six, expressly 
acknowledges how the structural patterns of inequality might influence access to social capital 
and how the welfare state might moderate this relationship. 
In summary, this thesis asks how the welfare state influences social capital outcomes, whether 
this influence affects SEGs differently and what this means for social capital as a whole. 
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8.2 Summary of findings  
The following section summarises the findings and conclusions of the empirical chapters.  
8.2.1 The social determinants of social capital: Do welfare states matter?   
The 2nd analytical, chapter 5 of the thesis, critically addresses the crowding-out argument, 
asking whether welfare state generosity and universalism matter for an individual's social 
capital. Despite the significant attention given to the welfare state social capital relationship, 
some specific limitations have perpetuated the crowding-in or crowding-out argument. Part of 
this relates to the lack of clear mechanisms explaining the welfare state's influence on social 
capital. A focus on the size of the welfare state has tended to reproduce polarised [ideological] 
debates in terms of positive and negative dualism. By establishing mechanisms, I proposed the 
idea of calibration, suggesting that the welfare state can, in fact, crowd-in and crowd-out – 
depending on the type of social capital in question and which aspect of the welfare state is in 
focus. In order to assess this proposition and provide some clarity on this debate, the research 
questions specifically address how generosity and universalism relate to each dimension of 
social capital; explored through the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1-1: More generous welfare states with higher replacement levels will 
crowd out informal networks by decreasing individuals social capital.  
Hypothesis 1-2: Welfare states with greater social protection through generous 
replacement rates support individual's formal network structures and provide access to new 
ones - increasing the level of formal participation.  
Hypothesis 1-3: A more generous and universal welfare state that promotes solidarity 
with less means-testing will increase the levels of reported interpersonal and institutional trust.   
The results of the models confirm country-level variation across each of the social capital 
dimensions. Broadly speaking, the selected welfare state indicators are essential factors in 
explaining social capital outcomes. In terms of our hypotheses, there is a negative association 
of welfare state generosity with informal networks. Although the significance drops to the 90%-
level with the addition of the GDP control, it is statistically significant when robust standard 
errors are applied. With some caution, we accept the first hypothesis that generosity crowds 
out informal social capital.   
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The results for formal social capital are mixed. We find that welfare state generosity has a 
positive and significant effect on voluntary networks, but not for political participation, which 
does not remain significant after the introduction of the wealth of the country as a control. So 
our hypothesis holds for voluntary but not for political, social capital. So while greater welfare 
state generosity is associated with increased participation in voluntary networks, the same 
cannot be said for political participation. Importantly, the direction is positive, so although the 
significance drops for political participation, welfare state generosity is likely to positively 
influence building a stronger civil society, rather than crowding-out, as some may suggest. 
Furthermore, let's consider the large positive association of voluntary networks on political 
participation, explored in chapter 7. The positive effect of welfare state generosity may also 
indirectly improve political participation via voluntary networks.  
Welfare state indicators generally had a positive relationship with trust, though not entirely as 
the hypothesis predicted. Non-means-testing has a positive effect on interpersonal trust and 
is significant across all estimation applications, allowing us to accept the third hypothesis; 
countries with a greater proportion of non-means testing are likely to increase the levels of 
interpersonal trust. The positive effect of non-means-testing on institutional trust did not hold 
after the model included welfare state generosity. With generosity remaining significant after 
the inclusion of GDP, it seems that generosity is a better predictor of institutional trust than 
our second welfare state measure non-means-testing. In this case, we partially accept the 
hypothesis for institutional trust, noting the significant effect of welfare state generosity and 
the overall positive effect that the generous and universal welfare state has on trust. 
Alongside the hypothesis that specifically addresses the relationship between the welfare state 
and each dimension of social capital, we are also interested in the broader question of what 
this means for the crowding-out debate. Remember, part of this disjuncture results from the 
conflicting narratives on society and the individual. We have sought to move the discussion on 
by focussing on the dimensionality of social capital, acknowledging the individual and collective 
properties, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the welfare state influence. 
The analysis results confirm that the welfare state mainly has a crowding-in effect on social 
capital. Previous research has suggested a detrimental impact of increased welfare state 
support on civil society. I find the opposite is true. The universal generous welfare state is a 
crucial determinant of trust, which is essential not just for the perceived cultural distance 
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between individuals but also the wider social fabric. [Without trust, there can be no functioning 
civil society (Simmel 1990). 
Where there is an adverse effect and what looks like crowding-out is on informal networks, 
specifically the reliance on resources from informal networks; this implies that there is likely to 
be a calibrating effect, with the welfare state crowding both in and out. Importantly perhaps 
in response to the communitarian approaches, is that the welfare state crowds in civil society. 
It is also possible that the crowding-out observed will not be detrimental to individuals, 
particularly if the welfare state steps in to provide access to resources previously out of reach. 
In some respect, this relates to the importance of the welfare state as an institution providing 
access to resources that would have previously been the domain of families.  
Although the hypotheses focus on country-level effects on social capital, the individual-level 
controls are also of interest and particularly relevant to the discussion of social capital 
inequalities. The results confirmed that income is the most important predictor of social capital 
across all dimensions. Tertiary education is also a significant predictor across all dimensions. A 
clear indication of resources derived from economic and cultural capital can enhance social 
capital; what Bourdieu (1986) understands as the process of capital accumulation and 
reproduction. Individuals who are unemployed report significantly less social capital across all 
social capital dimensions compared to the employed. Receiving social benefits has a negative 
relationship to social capital, which is significant for interpersonal trust and informal social 
capital. These four distinct socioeconomic groups highlight the potential variation in access to 
resources and are the subject of the third empirical, analytical chapter. 
8.2.2 The Role of the Welfare State in Moderating Social Capital Inequalities 
between Socioeconomic Groups 
If we consider the importance often placed upon the concept of social capital and its 
widespread application, there is still surprisingly a lack of attention directed towards 
inequalities and the structural causes of social capital from a cross-national perspective (Pichler 
and Wallace 2009). One could argue that part of the success of social capital as a political 
project and its universal appeal is its emphasis on community and the individual. The product 
of Putnam's social capital vision, Ferragina (2010:8) argues, has been to 'shift the attention 
from structural and collective problems of western democracies, such as economic 
inequalities, to individual issues of responsibility'. From this position, the deficit in social capital 
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between SEGs is a result of individual agency. It is only by increasing individual freedom that 
individuals can benefit from accessing social capital.   
I take issue with this assumption in the third analytical chapter, acknowledging the structural 
issues surrounding the unequal distribution of social capital (Bourdieu 1979). I consider the 
welfare state a critical factor in mediating structural inequalities rather than hindering 
individual freedom. In doing so, I ask whether welfare states moderate the social capital 
inequalities between SEGs. Previous research is limited in fully accounting for social capital 
variation between SEGs across welfare states. [Pichler and Wallace (2009) focus on networks 
between SEGs with the macro-level measure of inequality (Gini coefficient). Gesthuizen et al. 
(2008) explored the effect of social security on volunteering between education groups. Van 
der Meer et al. (2009) focuses on informal networks between income groups and social 
expenditure. Oorschort and Finsveen’s (2010) study relies on correlational data to assess social 
capital inequalities between welfare regimes]. This chapter adds to this existing literature with 
a fully dimensional approach to social capital and improved welfare state representation.  
This question is explored through the following hypothesis: 
H2.1: Differences in informal social capital across SEGs will be lower in countries with 
more generous welfare states 
H2.2: Differences in individual's formal networks across SEGs will be lower in countries 
with more comprehensive welfare states 
H2.3: The difference in the levels of an individual's institutional and interpersonal trust 
between socioeconomic groups will be more equal in more generous and universal welfare 
states. 
Contrary to our expectations, the welfare state was limited in explaining the cross-national 
variance in the social capital gap found between socioeconomic groups. We found consistent 
moderating effects with the welfare state appearing to widen inequalities between education 
groups. Here welfare state generosity provides an additional benefit to tertiary-educated for 
the informal, political, institutional and interpersonal dimensions of social capital. Universalism 
also shows an increase for tertiary-educated in political participation. We did, however, 
observe a potential calibrating effect, with universalism reducing the importance of income for 
voluntary and political networks. At the same time, welfare state generosity increased the 
importance of income for informal networks.  
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Our first hypothesis predicted that welfare state generosity would reduce informal network 
inequalities between SEGs. However, the only moderating effect observed widened the gap 
between income groups, so the hypothesis is rejected. It seems that high-income groups are 
able to use the generosity of the welfare state and invest in informal networks, while low-
income groups are relying on the welfare state for informal social capital.  
The second hypothesis provided mixed evidence. Universalism reduces the importance of 
income for voluntary and political networks, suggesting that it may alleviate potential barriers 
to participation. While both welfare state generosity and universalism increase the gap 
between education groups in political networks, suggesting that the welfare state supports 
capital accumulation for the higher educated. Here we accept the hypothesis in terms of 
income groups but reject it in terms of reducing education inequalities. 
There again was very little evidence of the welfare state moderating trust inequalities between 
groups. The only significant effect observed was generosity widening the gap between 
education groups in interpersonal trust and institutional trust, which is a rejection of the 
hypothesis. Here those with existing capital supported by generous entitlement have greater 
trust in the systems of provision and others.   
Although the findings were not entirely as anticipated, there was further evidence of the 
calibrating nature of the welfare state - reducing inequalities in some areas and perpetuating 
them in others. This finding further demonstrates the importance of exploring the welfare 
state social capital relationship in a dimensional manner. 
8.2.3 The interrelations of social capital: Exploring the ‘causal’ pathways 
In the final analytical chapter, the focus is on the interrelations of social capital. Despite 
accounts within the literature that explores outcomes for social capital, the specific dynamics 
of how the dimensions relate is often underexplored and requires further clarification. 
Focussing on the determinants of social trust, I provided an assessment of the society-centred 
and institutional approaches to social capital. Previously, research has addressed specific 
aspects of the social capital relationship [Ingen and Bekkers (2013) account for volunteering 
and generalised trust; Glanville, Andersson and Paxton (2013) focus on informal networks and 
generalised trust; Sønderskov and Dinesen (2016) assess institutional and interpersonal trust]. 
I build on this previous research with a complete relational account of social capital. Deriving 
a causal model of social capital requires the application of structural equation modelling - 
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combining the measurement model (our established social capital latent variables) with a 
structural model (the relationship between the latent variables) specified through regressions.   
In generating a theoretical model of social capital for empirical assessment, I test the following 
hypotheses: 
H3.1: Interpersonal trust determines network outcomes 
H3.2: Institutional trust is central to social capital formation 
The model results proved that the institutional-trust-led theoretical model was empirically 
substantiated, providing a better fit than the covariance model (with no path directions 
specified). Institutional trust has a positive effect on interpersonal trust and voluntary social 
capital and indirectly on political, social capital through interpersonal and voluntary social 
capital. There was, however, a negative effect of institutional trust on informal networks. 
Suggesting that individuals with high trust in institutions may have low informal social capital 
because they trust the welfare state to provide access to informal resources where required. 
Interpersonal trust also reported a positive increase in formal and political social capital. The 
proposed model mainly supports the hypotheses on the centrality of trust for social capital 
formation, with trustworthy institutions encouraging participation and trust between 
individuals and interpersonal trust increasing participation. 
Although the proposed model was theoretically driven and confirmed within the data, we are 
limited in the causal claims we can make due to cross-sectional data limitations. Therefore, to 
remain both critical and transparent, I tested for model equivalence. This process produced 
nine other Markov equivalent models that could be equally plausible within the data without 
a distinct causal pathway. The results of the secondary analysis highlighted the difficulties faced 
with claiming certainty on the specified pathways. With all models being valid, the only 
deciphering factor between them was a slight difference in model fit for interpersonal trust. 
Whilst this does challenge the centrality of the institutionalist hypothesis, interpersonal trust 
remains vital to social capital formation. Furthermore, if interpersonal is central to social capital 
formation, then the positive effect of the welfare state on interpersonal trust may have more 
comprehensive benefits to social capital.  
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8.3 Research and Policy Implications 
This study has confirmed the importance of addressing the multidimensionality of social 
capital. In doing so, we move beyond the previous dualistic tendencies of the crowding-in and 
crowding-out debate and instead ask how and under what conditions the welfare state affects 
social capital. We find evidence of calibration, where the welfare state simultaneously crowds 
out informal networks whilst crowding-in, formal networks and institutional and interpersonal 
trust. What this reveals for the communitarian and confirms for the institutionalist approaches 
to social capital is the importance of comprehensive welfare provision.  
8.3.1 Implications for social capital as communitarianism: Crowding-in 
There is a considerable emphasis within the social capital literature, specifically from the 
Putnam vision, on the importance of voluntary associations to create a more cohesive, 
productive and democratic society. This decision to shift attention from the structural and 
potential role of the welfare state to individual responsibility is arguably a political one 
(Ferragina 2017). This pattern has been remarkably prescient in the UK with multiple social 
capital incarnations; New Labour's Third way, Cameron's big society and the current 
Conservative civil society strategy, have all shifted responsibility from state support to private 
provision. Here the enabling state (Gilbert, 2005) increases social capital by enhancing the role 
of local communities and removing the barriers of service provision for charities and private 
businesses (Cameron 2010; Cabinet Office 2018). What the analysis has shown is that 
comprehensive welfare is conducive to the formal networks on which this development of civil 
society is based. There appears to be an inherent contradiction between the 
communitarianism proposed and the actual participatory outcomes. Volunteering in the UK 
declined by 14.5% between 2005 and 2015 (ONS 2017), which coincided with efforts to reduce 
public expenditure and a decline in generosity.  Other countries debating the merits of service 
substitution (DG EAC 2010), particularly as a means of curbing public expenditure, should 
consider the positive effect generosity has on civil society (volunteering). 
The desire to reduce costs and improve efficiency while advocating social engagement, has 
been on the agenda for most major European parties and EU policy over the last decade. In 
response to the economic (financial) crisis, structural reforms have resulted in widespread cuts 
to public expenditure. Within this context, the Europe 2020 strategy considers this an 
opportunity to enhance the efficiency of social protection, and at the same time, promote 
social cohesion and inclusion (COM 2010). The response of governments to achieve efficiency 
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and achieve targets for reducing poverty and social exclusion has primarily focussed on 
restrictive targeting on those at the very bottom of the income distribution (Nelson; EC 2011). 
However, as the analysis indicates, increasing means-testing to enhance inclusion and 
cohesion may prove counterproductive. 
Policy design that focuses on excluded groups through means-testing may increase the existing 
stigma associated with receiving benefits, preventing take-up and reinforcing social divides 
(Larsen 2007). Universal entitlement, on the other hand, creates an environment conducive to 
the development of interpersonal trust and bridges the cultural distance between social 
groups (Larsen 2007). Furthermore, as interpersonal trust is central to social capital formation 
(the social capital model in chapter seven), an increase in means-testing may have pervasive 
consequences for inclusion and social capital in general.   
The number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion has increased in 17 EU Member 
States since 2008 (European Union 2016). As such, countries may need to re-evaluate the 
success of efficiency strategies to improve individual outcomes. Particularly in light of findings 
that show the positive influence of generous and universal entitlement on social capital. Rather 
than increasing conditionality and continuing with austerity measures that see spending cuts 
disproportionately affect the poorest (OECD 2014). Countries (wishing to improve social capital 
outcomes) may need to consider a more progressive taxation system, rather than offsetting 
the burden of the recession on those in most need of support (and least able to mobilise 
politically against cuts to their entitlements).  
8.3.2 Implications for Institutions: Crowding-out and social capital 
inequalities 
Where we do notice a negative effect of the welfare state on social capital is in the form of 
informal networks. To be clear, crowding-out does not necessarily mean individuals are 
without access to resources within informal networks; rather, welfare state structures may 
have replaced traditional forms of support. Arguably, this could be considered a natural 
response brought about through modernisation and the demands of insufficient market 
provision. Suggesting the removal of welfare state support to enhance social capital would be 
to misunderstand existing social structures - ignoring the obvious need for support individuals 
have.   
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To clarify this point, let us consider the outcomes of the informal random slope models in 
chapter six. There was a positive interaction effect of generosity on both income and the 
tertiary-educated slope. So, while we observe a negative impact of generosity on informal 
networks, the reduction in access is less for higher-income groups and less for tertiary-
educated than for primary educated groups. The welfare state and crowding-out implications 
are that those with limited resources have to rely upon support systems for non-market 
survival; whereas, those with existing resources are less likely to feel the negative effects of 
welfare state reduction. 
There is a distinction between those who rely on social capital as a matter of need and those 
with more socioeconomic resources, who maintain sociability in networks through choice. As 
the welfare state has transitioned to one of caregiver, those with existing resources are 
simultaneously able to rely on the welfare state for support and use their privileged position 
to generate social capital. Thus, the income gap widens for informal networks because welfare 
state provision allows those with economic capital to maintain their independence whilst being 
supported by generous entitlement if the need occurs. In this sense, the generous welfare 
state supports a form of collective individualism. Under the auspices of austerity, those reliant 
on access through the welfare state systems of support are likely to see the adverse effect of 
welfare removal and reduction to their social capital. 
In this context, perhaps we do not see a moderating effect of the welfare state reducing social 
capital inequalities between SEGs because welfare state restructuring disproportionately 
affects lower SEGs. Whether the reduction in welfare state generosity (over time) also 
coincides with reducing social capital and increasing inequalities requires clarification and is an 
important area for future research.   
Another reason why the comprehensive welfare state may not reduce social capital 
inequalities, as expected, is that the welfare state has evolved to meet the growing aspirations 
and sustained advantage of the middle class (Esping-Andersen 1990). Those with existing 
cultural capital and a greater understanding of the 'rules of the game' can use their privileged 
position to ensure successful practices within the welfare field. Except for volunteering, the 
welfare state improves outcomes for tertiary-educated across all social capital dimensions. The 
shared structure habitus of higher status groups aligns more closely with the political class and 
the reproduction of privilege within the education system. As such, political participation, trust 
in the institutions of provision and trust between each other increase through generous and 
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universal entitlement. Higher educated groups can then utilise the welfare state's generosity 
to ensure they get the access required in informal social capital.   
Beyond the welfare state measures of generosity and universalism, we do notice some 
equalising tendencies through LMPs. Greater LM spending on training improves informal social 
capital outcomes for benefit recipients and the unemployed. One would imagine this 
predominantly relates to gaining access and information for jobs, which is present within the 
informal social capital latent variable. Whether activation leads to sustained employment and 
expanded participatory outcomes is unclear. What it does indicate is that some specificity to 
education and skills may be a relevant area for improving social capital outcomes. 
Having the requisite resources to access social capital is somewhat lacking in the 
communitarian accounts of society and social capital. The central idea that individuals, through 
shared common goals, can maintain the services required relies on individuals having the 
necessary skills and social capital to fulfil such tasks and demands. The logic that restructuring 
welfare and removing the barriers of service provision will enable social capital to flourish 
assumes that everyone has equal access to resources to begin with, which we know to be 
unevenly distributed. Therefore, rather than reducing social spending to improve the social 
capital of lower SEGs, greater spending and training beyond existing welfare state support may 
be required. Support that is specific to the needs of individuals, enabling them to develop the 
necessary skills and networks would allow them to participate and be active in their 
participation.   
8.4 Wider implications for social policy:  A potential alternative 
The research presented here has shown how generosity and universalism increase average 
levels of social capital. It has also shown that a reduction in welfare state effort will likely affect 
those of lower socioeconomic groups disproportionately. At the same time, in its current form, 
the welfare state is unlikely to improve the social capital inequalities between SEGs. With this 
in mind, I consider a potential alternative to current welfare provision that may provide a way 
to enhance social capital outcomes. 
8.4.1 Universal Basic Income (UBI) 
UBI has many characteristics relevant to our welfare state conception, which I consider 
conducive to social capital development. A guaranteed basic income to all individuals aims to 
eliminate material poverty and enable the social and cultural participation of every individual 
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(BIEN 2018). It is an income paid to all individuals without the requirement of a means-test, 
paid on a regular basis and without work conditionality (BIEN 2018).   
The universal nature of the payment can have equalising tendencies both within and between 
households - bridging social divides. As universalism increases interpersonal trust, UBI could 
promote a system of increased trust between individuals and reduce the cultural distance. 
Furthermore, as interpersonal trust positively influences all other dimensions of social capital, 
UBI will provide an environment conducive to social capital development. Such an approach 
may also prove more beneficial to achieving the EU 2020 strategy aim of reducing social 
exclusion.  
The main barrier to volunteering across Europe is time (DG EAC 2010). The pressure of 
economic concerns demands the resource of time spent to accumulate economic capital. 
Without the conditionality of work, UBI provides individuals with the necessary coverage and 
affords them the resource of time to enable social capital production- in this case, time to 
volunteer. So, rather than promoting social capital, merely as voluntary networks stepping in 
to fill the void in times of austerity, through UBI, individuals would be given the necessary 
support to participate within society. Providing individuals with the security of income will 
allow them the freedom to develop skills, invest in their future and communities.  
The actual empirical evidence for UBI is somewhat limited, although there are a few studies 
we can draw upon to provide some insight into the potential outcomes of support. These 
studies highlight the improvements for health and social outcomes at the community level 
(Forget 2011), along with the weakening of social stigmatisation between the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ poor (Calnitsky 2016), which is considered essential for trust and social capital 
development.  
Significant positive health and social outcomes were found in the UBI pilot program in Otjivero, 
Namibia in 200826. The study's findings highlighted the positive effects of an unconditional cash 
transfer that is both individually and socially transformative. It enabled some individuals to use 
basic income (economic capital) as a means of investing in education (generate cultural capital) 
while providing security for others, allowing them to contribute to their communities (increase 
social capital). At the same time as fighting poverty, UBI fostered social and local economic 
development (BIG coalition 2014). In this case, enabling individuals the opportunity and 
 




support to participate is a crucial function of UBI and provides opportunities for successful 
practices of social capital production. 
Current UBI experiments are underway in Finland, Spain, Canada and the Netherlands. 
Although no evidence for the programs is available yet, it is worth briefly reflecting on the types 
of programs introduced and how their intended design may relate to social capital outcomes.  
Addressing the unemployment trap that can arise through means-tested guaranteed minimum 
schemes (the lack of positive income differential between no work and low-paid work) and 
increased financial insecurity from part-time, precarious and temporary contracts is an 
essential element of UBI (BIEN 2018). Finland's basic income experiment is primarily concerned 
with labour supply effects and focuses on those who previously received unemployment 
benefits. Such an approach is likely to have psychosocial benefits for an individual's wellbeing. 
Unfortunately, the scheme under consideration is only a partial income and insufficient to 
meet basic living expenses. As such, the support may not be enough for an individual to 
dedicate time to invest in social capital. Limiting the target population to those in receipt of 
unemployment benefits also limits the universal element of UBI, which may hinder broader 
perceptions of legitimacy and trust. 
The Tilburg experiment has three control groups: i) the removal of reintegration requirements 
ii) more intensive form of reintegration service for welfare recipients in line with the 
Participation Act (that requires verification that individuals made adequate effort to find 
employment) iii) a group permitted to keep additional income earned on top of welfare 
benefits. The Nijmegen experiment follows a similar logic, with one group having minor 
reintegration requirements and the second having more strict reintegration requirements. 
Interestingly, the second group will maintain some autonomy concerning participation with 
help finding work, volunteering, or assistance for entrepreneurship (McFarland 2017). This 
program distinction provides opportunities to assess participation in social and cultural life 
alongside education and employment prospects. The freedom to contribute to civil society also 
provides a clear opportunity to evaluate the potential of social capital development.  
Barcelona’s B-MINCOME experiment aims to address poverty and social exclusion. Participants 
are again drawn from current recipients of social assistance, though participation is voluntary. 
Half of the households within the control group are assigned to participate in one of four social 
programs; i) occupation and education, ii) social and cooperative economy program, iii) 
guaranteed housing program, and iv) community participation program. The remaining 
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household receives income without any conditionality of work or willingness to participate 
(McFarland 2017).  
Ontario's basic income pilot focuses on lower-income households, with eligibility for 
participation set below a certain income level (half the median annual income) and not 
restricted to current welfare recipients. The guaranteed minimum income program is 
concerned with reducing poverty, food insecurity and wellbeing outcomes, alongside 
education, training and labour market participation (Segal 2016). This approach could provide 
opportunities for developing social capital and alleviate the stigma associated with welfare 
claimants. Unfortunately, the program will end in March 2019, mainly because the government 
deciding it is too costly.  
The current programs underway in the EU primarily target existing welfare claimants at the 
bottom end of the income distribution. Part of this logic for assessing UBI in terms of 
employment trap, or sustained support for precarious work patterns, will undoubtedly impact 
individuals' wellbeing. However, given that the focus is solely on welfare claimants, it might not 
remove the stigma associated with benefit receipt. A strong case for universal coverage is that 
it brings everyone together under one group of belonging (Larsen 2006).     
A problem of focussing on welfare groups is that it may not change wider perceptions of 
deservingness, which is essential not just for the social capital outcomes of society as a whole 
but also for maintaining political support for such policy endeavours. Recent attitude research 
from democratic forums (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth 2018) shows strong support for social 
investment. The justification for policy intervention tends to vary according to the welfare 
system in place. Highlighting the individual and social benefit intervention has, in the more 
socio-democratic universal systems (Denmark) and economic motivation in corporatist 
(Germany) and liberal (UK) welfare systems. As such, one might expect that the type of UBI 
followed, its viability and its presentation may relate to the existing welfare system in place. In 
countries with typically higher levels of generosity and universalism, the institutional structure 
reinforces the community's shared sense of solidarity and individual obligations. Here the 
social value of UBI may prove more easily translatable. More liberal countries with greater 
means-testing, where deservingness of benefits relate more to contribution and participation, 
may require alternative forms of basic income.  
Atkinson makes the argument that in order to maintain political support, it may be necessary 
to compromise on the principle of unconditionality, with basic income being paid conditional 
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on participation (Atkinson 1996:68). Those in (and seeking) employment, caring roles, 
education, training or voluntary work would all contribute to the idea of being an 'active citizen' 
and thus deserving of a non-means-tested income. Such an approach may be more credible in 
the UK, where attitudes towards welfare provision are geared more towards individual 
responsibility and societal contribution (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018).         
Whether such as system would reduce the burden on administrative costs (and stigma 
attached to means-testing) to satisfy a genuine participation requirement has been the cause 
of some debate (see De Wispelaere and Stirton 2018). Other authors suggest some conditional 
elements may be required initially before introducing a more generous unconditional basic 
income. As a part of broader public discourse on the values of community contribution, some 
form of compulsory community participation may help strengthen awareness and social 
cohesion (Parijs and Vanderborght 2017:213).  
There are participation requirement elements in both the Spanish and the Netherlands basic 
income schemes. Such approaches could prove fruitful, particularly within the context of 
providing individuals with the opportunity to develop the requisite skills to generate social 
capital. Provision is something often overlooked by advocates promoting social capital 
production through reduced welfare spending. Regardless of whether income is conditional, 
the key to enhancing social capital is through investment. Education and training provide a 
straightforward way to improve an individuals' potential to generate social capital, which is 
essential for those without the requisite skills and existing cultural capital. As noted earlier, 
there was some support for total LM spending and training spending to reduce social capital 
inequalities. Entry into the labour market is one way to improve an individual's opportunities 
to access social capital. An alternative approach, one that UBI could provide, is participation in 
civil society. 
Social policy is geared towards labour market participation, yet the prospect of full 
employment remains elusive across all EU countries. As rapid technological change continues 
to challenge labour, new approaches are required to substitute the possibility of work with a 
valued contribution. Here social policy has an opportunity to strengthen the value of social 
contribution beyond economic participation towards civil society and investment in social 
capital. Empowering individuals and local communities is a way of redefining contribution 
towards more socially productive means. Participation income is a way to begin this process. 
The focus of such a policy should not be limited to those of lower-income groups but needs to 
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ensure the universal nature of UBI is maintained. The centrality of universalism to policy is 
essential for trust-building, providing the structural foundations for social capital, social 
cohesion and participation.       
The danger of current EU policy, particularly its response under austerity, has the potential to 
undermine social capital development. The focus on welfare as efficiency and measurable 
expected returns of spending, alongside attempts to address social inclusion, has led to a 
reduction in generosity and an increasing turn towards means-testing. Such a direction 
increases the conflict over resources, undermines perceptions of deservingness and is likely to 
exacerbate the cultural distinctiveness of lower SEGs. As my research indicates, this runs 
counter to the positive effects of universalism and generosity on trust and participation 
outcomes for individuals within Europe.    
8.5 Limitations and Future Research  
8.5.1 Individual-level 
The analysis in chapter five focussed on four socioeconomic groups, specific to the resources 
perspective. However, there is also the potential for variation in outcomes for other social 
groups, such as gender, age and ethnicity. 
Gender makes a difference in how much time one can dedicate to volunteering and the type 
of volunteering (Wilson 2000). Typically, men have more active social networks (Van Oorschot 
and Finsveen 2010), participating more in business and political associations (Pichler and 
Wallace 2009). Women tend to be involved in more associations relating to health and social 
services (Kroll 2010). The gendered difference of network diversity finds men more likely to 
gain access to information and jobs in voluntary networks (Lin 2000); while women have access 
to less diverse networks, and some see a reduction in the size and volume of contact as a result 
of a 'child-rearing effect' (Lin 2000:788). Here the difference in access afforded to men and 
women can be understood concerning the wider structural separation of the familial roles on 
childbearing, alongside exclusion to formal networks, and in particular power and prestige. 
The reconciliation between paid and unpaid work is considered vital for women’s social capital 
profiles (Lowndes 2000), which means the stratification functions of the welfare state have the 
potential to affect the development of an individual's social capital. A family policy that 
promotes independence with flexible working patterns, generous maternity leave and child-
care provision will enable a great deal more autonomy than a welfare state that supports 
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traditional family values (Davaki 2010). Alternative forms of support and generous provision 
may reduce the need to rely on informal networks but at the same time increase flexibility for 
investing in formal networks. One would also expect that a system that promotes greater 
autonomy and resources through entitlement is likely to improve trust outcomes in the 
institutions of provision. Alongside family expenditure, the generosity measure of income 
replacement could also better reflect the gendered nature of the provision. Specifically, a 
measure that accounts for the net replacement of single mothers would be a valuable 
contribution to understanding the effect of generosity on social capital outcomes for women. 
It was not possible to account for individuals ethnicity with the data set used in this study. 
However, much like the examined SEGs, there are likely to be issues of access and inequalities 
between ethnic groups that remain unaccounted. Economic inequality increases social barriers 
between ethnic groups that, in turn, reduce informal and formal social capital (Gesthuizen et 
al., 2009:136). Conflict over resources, particularly between denizens and immigrants, are also 
likely to challenge the trust outcomes of those who find themselves restricted as labour market 
outsiders. The increasing trend of welfare chauvinism within Europe, with calls for restrictions 
on access to welfare provision (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017), will likely be detrimental to the 
social capital development of immigrants. How the welfare state responds in terms of 
generosity and universal entitlement may have far-reaching consequences for the cultural 
distinctiveness and interpersonal trust between groups. Therefore, policies that challenge 
interpersonal trust (which is central to social capital formation) are another area for 
meaningful research.   
8.5.2 Dependent variable 
A limitation with the current measurement of accessing social capital within network 
structures is the ability to account for online networks. The available data is somewhat limited 
and, beyond being on the internet, provides little in the way of adequate operationalisation. 
Social capital within the context of online communities has generated a significant amount of 
recent research, which is undoubtedly an important area for modern forms of access. Whether 
we find the transfer of traditional forms of solidarity and participation engendered through 
welfare states online is an interesting question. Access to the internet may seem ubiquitous, 
yet there are still likely to be structural issues that decide access. If social inequalities are 
reinforced through Internet usage, as Neves et al. (2018) find, then welfare states and social 
policies are likely to be vital for future research.    
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8.5.2.1 Culture  
To some extent, the macro-level indicators of generosity, universalism and GDP are accounting 
for cultural differences. The types of welfare state structures shape social relations, while GDP 
represents a general modernisation process that shapes individuals' relationships. Something 
observable in the negative effect that both the welfare state and GDP had on informal 
networks. Owing to the relational nature of social capital, we would still expect an element of 
cultural influence unaccounted for at the individual level.  
Culture can help explain the negative outcomes of network membership, in the case of 
privileged access or group conformity that may have detrimental consequences to the 
individual or society. For example, in our case, culture may influence the responsibilities to 
care, the acceptability of lending money, charity or protesting. Although the theoretical 
distinction made in this thesis is one of access to resources and arguably less susceptible to 
cultural influence than the frequency of contact and participation, there is still likely to be some 
cultural differences. Whether culture mediates, the welfare state social capital relationship 
would provide a relevant area for future research. There is some evidence to suggest that 
institutions are central to explaining trust outcomes even after accounting for cultural 
variations (Nannestad et al., 2014).  
    
8.5.3 Methodology 
Accounting for variation in social capital outcomes for individuals in different welfare states 
has been a principal area for investigation. Our methodological approach reflected the 
available data of individuals within countries and applied multilevel analysis. As social policies 
are organised at the national level, this assessment of the macro-micro relationship makes 
sense for comparative analysis. However, other contextual influences on individuals' social 
capital are likely to be relevant at lower geographic levels, such as regions and local authorities. 
[Indeed, Putnam's (1993) original social capital thesis developed from identifying civic 
associations as the main reason for differences between the regional administrations of North 
and South Italy’s performance 
.]  
While it was not possible to address regional variation with the dataset used, it is important to 
acknowledge that the existing resources within local areas and the implementation of a 
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national policy locally might influence social capital production. This limitation is not specific to 
this study but is a larger issue for (cross-sectional) survey data in general. Comparative datasets 
are restricted by funding limitations, which often means adequate sample sizes for regional 
data preclude analysis of variation.  
The limitations of cross-sectional data also constrain us. While we have shown that positive 
and negative relationships between the welfare state and social capital exist, we cannot 
confirm they are a direct cause. This limitation was highlighted explicitly in chapter 7, where 
without a direct causal pathway between the dimensions of social capital, multiple competing 
models coexist. Examining evidence from numerous longitudinal studies may provide a way to 
inform and specify models with greater certainty.  
8.5.4 Wellbeing  
The analysis in chapter five confirmed that the welfare state positively influences all social 
capital dimensions, except for informal social capital. As previously suggested, whether this is 
an actual crowding-out of individuals informal networks; or whether the welfare state actively 
steps in to provide the support when required is difficult to determine. What the moderating 
inequalities models in chapter six indicated was that in countries with greater generosity, those 
with existing capital would most likely see an increase in access to informal networks compared 
to lower SEGs. This observation raises the interesting question of what the influence of 
generosity on informal networks means for individuals themselves and their immediate 
wellbeing. After all, the crowding-out of informal networks is significant only in terms of 
whether access is restricted and whether; this is detrimental to wellbeing. 
The importance of social relationships for individuals’ wellbeing is well-documented (Argyle 
1987; Shields and Wooden 2003; Searle 2008) and substantiated throughout the empirical 
literature. We find a positive effect of informal networks (Helliwell and Putnam 2005; Kroll 
2010; Bartolini et al., 2012), formal networks (Keyes 1998; Frey and Stutzer 2000; Meier and 
Stutzer 2008; Bacchetti 2009), interpersonal (Helliwell 2006; Hudson, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007; 
Kroll 2010) and institutional trust (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Hudson, 2006; Dolan et al., 
2008) are all associated with greater wellbeing.  
There is also evidence of the positive effect of the generous and universal welfare state on 
wellbeing and life satisfaction (Radcliff 2001; Graham & Pettinato, 2001; Di Tella et al., 2003; 
Haller and Hadler; Pacek and Radcliff 2008; Kotakorpi and Laamen, 2010; Flavin 2011; Ochsen 
and Welsch 2012; Wulfgramm 2014). Here, the decommodifying and universal functions of the 
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welfare state combat against market insecurities, providing safe refuge from market forces, 
enhance a shared sense of solidarity, increase the life chances and experience of the world, 
and improve wellbeing. 
So far, we have established the relationship between the welfare state and social capital. An 
unexplored relationship is how the welfare state affects the importance of social capital for 
wellbeing. As the welfare state provides access to resources, one would expect the importance 
of social capital for individual wellbeing to be less where the generosity of the welfare state is 
greater — as such, crowding-out should not affect wellbeing where support is sufficient. In 
addition, we might expect the welfare states impact on wellbeing to be mediated through the 
impact they have on social capital formation [for different groups of individuals]. 
Although the government's interest in social capital is primarily preoccupied with its productive 
potential, as a resource, social capital is of value in itself and a significant contributor to our 
wellbeing. This makes the exploration of the social capital, welfare state, wellbeing relationship 
a vital and fruitful area for future investigation. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This thesis has highlighted the importance of a dimensional approach in addressing the 
influence of the welfare state on social capital outcomes. Significant for communitarian 
approaches that emphasise the role of the individual and civic associations in social capital 
development; we find strong evidence of the generous welfare state supporting social capital 
and not crowding-out, as some suggest. Where there is a potential crowding-out observed is 
with informal networks. Here the welfare state can be seen to replace traditional forms of 
informal support. Whether this actively crowds out or the welfare state steps in to fulfil a need 
is challenging to determine and requires future clarification. Perhaps the critical question is 
what this implied crowding-out means for an individual's wellbeing - an area that should be 
considered for future research.   
Where there is a question raised for institutionalist accounts of the welfare state influence on 
social capital is the impact of generosity on social capital between SEGs. As generosity did not 
moderate social capital inequalities as expected. In some instances, we find that those with 
existing (economic and cultural) capital benefit more from generous entitlement. Here social 
policy needs to do more to address the existing class cleavages and improve opportunities and 
access for lower-status groups. This inevitably requires more significant investment - [Austerity 
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and reduced entitlement will only exacerbate existing inequalities]. There was an indication 
that spending on the labour market and training could improve social capital inequalities (for 
benefit recipients and the unemployed). As such, consideration should be given to social 
investment strategies to strengthen social capital outcomes.  
Although limited, our findings are broadly supportive of the centrality of trust to social capital 
formation. Through universalism and generosity, the welfare state has a vital role in 
maintaining trust and supporting social capital. In a climate of reduced support and a trend 
towards means-testing, the concern of current policy is the detrimental impact this could have 
on trust, participation, and broader social cohesion. With this in mind, I proposed UBI as an 
alternative approach for social policy consideration, one that maintains the central importance 
of universal inclusion while providing economic security to enable social capital production. 
Directly investing in social capital offers the opportunity to respond to the increasingly 
uncertain and technologically driven times by empowering individuals and local communities 
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Appendix A Definitions of social capital 
 




Authors Definitions of Social Capital 
External 
Baker 
‘a resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then 
use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes in the 
relationship among actors’; (Baker 1990, p. 619). 
Belliveau, 
O’Reilly, Wade 
‘an individual’s personal network and elite institutional affiliations’ 
(Belliveau et al. 1996, p. 1572). 
Bourdieu 
‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (Bourdieu 1986, 
p. 248).’made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is 
convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be 




‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of 
more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119). 
Boxman, De 
Graai. Flap 
‘the number of people who can be expected to provide support and 
the resources those people have at their disposal’ (Boxman et al. 
1991, p. 52). 
Burt 
‘friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you 
receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital’ (Burt 





‘the process by which social actors create and mobilise their network 
connections within and between organisations to gain access to other 
social actors' resources' (Knoke 1999, p. 18). 
Portes 
‘the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in 
social networks or other social structures’ (Portes 1998, p. 6). 
Internal 
Brehm, Rahn 
‘the web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitate 
resolution of collective action problems’ (Brehm and Rahn 1997, p. 
999). 
Coleman 
‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a 
variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: 
They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate 
certain actions of individuals who are within the structure’ (Coleman 
1990, p. 302). 
Fukuyama 
‘the ability of people to work together for common purposes in 
groups and organisations' (Fukuyama 1995, p. 10).'Social capital can 
be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of informal values 
or norms shared among members of a group that permits 
cooperation among them' (Fukuyama 1997). 
Inglehart 
‘a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of 
voluntary associations emerge’ (Inglehart 1997, p. 188). 
Portes 
Sensenbrenner 
‘those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the 
economic goals and goal’ seeking behaviour of its members, even if 
these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere’ 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, p. 1323). 
Putnam 
‘features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social 
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' 




‘those voluntary means and processes developed within civil society 




‘naturally occurring social relationships among persons which 
promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the 
marketplace. . . an asset which may be as significant as financial 
bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our 
society’ (Loury 1992, p. 100). 
Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 
‘the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises 
both the network and the assets that may be mobilised through that 
network' (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, p. 243). 
Pennar 
‘the web of social relationships that influences individual behaviour 
and thereby affects economic growth’ (Pennar 1997, p. 154). 
Schiff 
‘the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations 
among people and are inputs or arguments of the production and/or 
utility function’ (Schiff 1992, p. 160). 
Woolcock 
‘the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s 






Appendix B Response rates 
Table B.1 EQLS country response rates 
Country Sample size Response (%) 
Austria 1,032 51.4 
Belgium 1,013 49.9 
Bulgaria 1,000 61.4 
Czech Republic 1,012 45.2 
Germany 3,055 41.4 
Denmark 1,024 35.3 
Estonia 1,002 54.9 
Greece 1,004 45.1 
Spain 1,512 37.1 
Finland 1,020 39.6 
France 2,270 31.7 
Hungary 1,024 42.4 
Ireland 1,051 49.9 
Italy 2,250 40.2 
Lithuania 1,134 45.2 
Latvia 1,009 51.5 
Netherlands 1,008 32.4 
Poland 2,262 61.6 
Portugal 1,013 38.2 
Romania 1,542 59.7 
Sweden 1,007 100 
Slovenia 1,008 48.8 
Slovakia 1,000 61.7 





Appendix C Dependent variable  







s Trade Union Other     
Community 1       
Association 0.2382 1      
Charities 0.2865 0.2324 1     
Trade Union 0.1375 0.1623 0.1916 1    
Other 0.2190 0.1745 0.2274 0.1602 1   
                
 Help Advice Job 
Depresse
d Money     
Help 1       
Advice 0.2947 1      
Job 0.1684 0.214 1     
Depressed 0.2516 0.3504 0.2034 1    
Money 0.2353 0.2559 0.2739 0.2529 1   
                
 Religious Online Sports Social       
Religious 1       
Online -0.0972 1      
Sports -0.0316 0.4778 1     
Social 0.0458 0.3047 0.418 1    
                
 Meeting Protest Petition Official       
Meeting 1       
Protest 0.2703 1      
Petition 0.2344 0.2964 1     
Official 0.2763 0.1737 0.2596 1    
                
 Parliament 
Legal 





Parliament 1       
Legal system 0.6809 1      
Press 0.4275 0.4530 1     
Police 0.4814 0.6024 0.4236 1    
Government 0.7746 0.6258 0.4076 0.5036 1   
Local 
Authority 0.5124 0.5131 0.4025 0.5016 0.5532 1  
Interpersona















Appendix D Household composition 
 
D1.1: Informal social capital, by household composition of averaged entitlement 
                   
 Model 1.0 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3  
 (Single) (1 earner 2 child) (Single 2 child) (1 earner 0 child)  
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE   
Total net replacement rate -0.072+ (0.036) -0.119** (0.038) -0.053 (0.045) -0.106* (0.045)  
Non-means testing %GDP -0.039 (0.036) -0.068* (0.032) -0.057 (0.036) -0.065+ (0.034)  
GDP_PPS -0.130* (0.063) -0.087 (0.058) -0.153* (0.060) -0.096 (0.063)  
          
Constant 0.847*** (0.021) 0.894*** (0.026) 0.857*** (0.027) 0.877*** (0.026)  
Variance country level 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)  
Variance Individual level 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000)  
          
Log-likelihood  2960***  2963***  2960***  2962***   
R2 level 1 0.088***  0.097***  0.087***  0.092***   
R2 level 2 0.426***   0.534***   0.405***   0.477***    
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls(all models) gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits, domicile and citizenship 




D1.2: Voluntary social capital, by household composition of averaged entitlement 
                   
 Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3  
 (Single) (1 earner 2 child) (Single 2 child) (1 earner 0 child)  
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE   
Total net replacement rate 0.113** (0.041) 0.108** (0.038) 0.043 (0.044) 0.132** (0.040)  
Non-means testing %GDP 0.013 (0.032) 0.049 (0.031) 0.039 (0.035) 0.051+ (0.030)  
GDP_PPS 0.109+ (0.057) 0.102+ (0.057) 0.165** (0.058) 0.082 (0.057)  
          
Constant -0.035+ (0.020) -0.069** (0.026) -0.033 (0.027) -0.068** (0.024)  
Variance country level 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)  
Variance Individual level 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000) 0.070*** (0.000)  
          
Log-likelihood  -2553***  -2553***  -2556***  -2552***   
R2 level 1 0.082***  0.083***  0.077***  0.084***   
R2 level 2 0.607***   0.614***   0.520***   0.638***    
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls(all models) gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits, domicile and citizenship 






D1.3: Political social capital, by household composition of averaged entitlement 
                   
 Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3  
 (Single) (1 earner 2 child) (Single 2 child) (1 earner 0 child)  
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE   
Total net replacement rate 0.035 (0.036) 0.038 (0.033) 0.009 (0.035) 0.035 (0.037)  
Non-means testing %GDP 0.035 (0.028) 0.047+ (0.027) 0.042 (0.028) 0.046+ (0.028)  
GDP_PPS 0.134** (0.050) 0.128** (0.050) 0.153** (0.047) 0.130* (0.052)  
          
Constant -0.060*** (0.017) -0.073** (0.023) -0.058** (0.022) -0.068** (0.022)  
Variance country level 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)  
Variance Individual level 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000) 0.045*** (0.000)  
          
Log-likelihood  3609***  3610***  3609***  3609***   
R2 level 1 0.097***  0.097***  0.096***  0.097***   
R2 level 2 0.609***   0.614***   0.597***   0.608***    
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls(all models) gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits, domicile and citizenship 




D1.4: Interpersonal social capital, by household composition of averaged entitlement 
                   
 Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3  
 (Single) (1 earner 2 child) (Single 2 child) (1 earner 0 child)  
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE   
Total net replacement rate 0.130+ (0.077) 0.127+ (0.071) 0.127+ (0.074) 0.126 (0.079)  
Non-means testing %GDP 0.112+ (0.060) 0.154** (0.059) 0.148* (0.059) 0.153* (0.059)  
GDP_PPS 0.104 (0.106) 0.094 (0.106) 0.131 (0.099) 0.092 (0.111)  
          
Constant 0.259*** (0.034) 0.217*** (0.047) 0.229*** (0.043) 0.231*** (0.044)  
Variance country level 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001)  
Variance Individual level 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000)  
          
Log-likelihood  -1449***  -1449***  -1449***  -1450***   
R2 level 1 0.099***  0.100***  0.099***  0.098***   
R2 level 2 0.470***   0.476***   0.471***   0.465***    
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls(all models) gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits, domicile and citizenship 






D1.5: Institutional social capital, by household composition of averaged entitlement 
                   
 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3  
 (Single) (1 earner 2 child) (Single 2 child) (1 earner 0 child)  
level 2 controls B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE   
Total net replacement rate 0.142* (0.068) 0.199*** (0.057) 0.118+ (0.067) 0.162* (0.069)  
Non-means testing %GDP 0.072 (0.054) 0.125** (0.047) 0.109* (0.053) 0.119* (0.051)  
GDP_PPS 0.284** (0.094) 0.228** (0.085) 0.324*** (0.089) 0.253** (0.096)  
          
Constant 0.279*** (0.030) 0.203*** (0.038) 0.254*** (0.039) 0.238*** (0.038)  
Variance country level 0.006*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)  
Variance Individual level 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000) 0.047*** (0.000)  
          
Log-likelihood  2956***  2959***  2955***  2957***   
R2 level 1 0.174***  0.191***  0.171***  0.178***   
R2 level 2 0.639***   0.709***   0.626***   0.652***    
N level 1=28,032, Level 1* controls(all models) gender, age, income, education, unemployed, cohabitation, benefits, domicile and citizenship 
N level 2=29 countries,  + p<0.10 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001       
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Appendix E Income data 
 
E1.1: Individual level controls, comparison breakdown of listwise deletion sample 
Missing data Full sample Diff% 
Male Female Male Female  
57.01 42.99 57.43 42.57 0.042 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed  
92.68 7.32 92.83 7.17 0.015 
Benefits None Benefits None  
14.84 85.16 15.52 84.48 0.068 
Degree No Degree No  
24.33 75.67 23.82 76.18 0.051 
Cohabiting No Cohabiting No  
60.34 39.66 60.16 39.84 0.18 
Rural Urban Rural Urban  
47.34 52.66 48.02 51.98 0.068 
 
E1.2 Age groups, comparison of listwise deletion sample 
Age 18-24 25-39 40-54 55-64 65+ 
Missing data 8.28 22.02 26.1 17.82 25.77 
Full sample 7.05 22.39 26.07 18.14 26.34 
% Diff 1.23 -0.37 0.03 -0.32 -0.57 
 
